Johnson v. Tamsberg
| Decision Date | 31 July 1970 |
| Docket Number | No. 13941.,13941. |
| Citation | 430 F.2d 1125 |
| Parties | Mary JOHNSON, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, Appellant, v. A. J. TAMSBERG, Executive Director, Housing Authority of the City of Charleston, Appellee. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit |
William L. Runyon, Jr., Charleston, S. C., for appellant.
Morris D. Rosen, Charleston, S. C. (Legare, Hare & Smith, Charleston, S. C., on brief) for appellee.
Before SOBELOFF, CRAVEN and BUTZNER, Circuit Judges.
The plaintiff, a public housing tenant in Charleston, South Carolina, brought this class action to challenge the administrative procedures by which the Housing Authority decided to remove her from her rented quarters. She seeks declaratory and injunctive relief.
The facts of the case are as follows. On June 4, 1969 the Housing Authority Director, defendant Tamsberg, witnessed plaintiff's son breaking window panes in a Housing Authority unit. Further investigation convinced him that this was not an isolated incident and that Mrs. Johnson's children had been involved in a long series of destructive acts. Based on this information Tamsberg informed her that day that termination of the lease would probably follow and explained why. Then, on June 6, 1969 Mrs. Johnson received a "Notice of Termination of Lease and Impending Eviction." This notice ascribed "vandalism and destruction of Housing Authority property" as the reason. Tamsberg had two subsequent conversations with plaintiff, one in person and one by phone, in which he explained the basis for the Housing Authority's proposed action.
Having been warned of what was to come, plaintiff on July 8 commenced this federal suit. The gist of the complaint was that as a constitutional matter the Housing Authority was required to hold an administrative evidentiary hearing with adequate notice before finalizing its decision to proceed for a judicial order of eviction.
The next day, thirty-four days after the initial written notice, the Housing Authority initiated formal eviction proceedings in the state court by causing service of a Notice to Quit. The case proceeded to hearing, and on July 29 a County Court jury trial was held in which seven witnesses testified to the acts of vandalism by the Johnson children and were subjected to extensive cross-examination. Then, after the mother, responding to a direct question, failed to deny the Housing Authority allegations and after her counsel conceded the factual issue, the judge directed a verdict for the landlord.
The District Judge rendered his decision on August 7, noting that the South Carolina statute affords tenants full opportunity to contest the factual basis for eviction. He made the further significant observation that in the state court proceeding Mrs. Johnson was accorded that opportunity and admitted the facts asserted by the Housing Authority. Accordingly, the District Judge held the plaintiff's claim insubstantial and denied relief.1 This appeal followed.
Plaintiff argues that while Thorpe v. Housing Authority of City of Durham, 393 U.S. 268, 89 S.Ct. 518, 21 L.Ed.2d 474 (1969), had reserved the question as to whether constitutionally a tenant may be evicted without being accorded full notice and hearing, the recent case of Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 90 S.Ct. 1011, 25 L.Ed.2d 287 (1970), dealing with the analogous question of termination of welfare benefits, dictates that these due process safeguards are to be observed in the housing context as well.
Plaintiff puts reliance upon Escalera v. New York City Housing Authority, 425 F.2d 853 (2d Cir. 1970), in which the Second Circuit ordered the New York City Housing Authority to upgrade its administrative procedures to meet Goldberg due process standards. Plaintiff asks that we order similar relief in this case. We decline to do so because we think Escalera inapposite.
The sharp distinction between the two cases is that under the New York eviction procedure, administrative decisions to evict, reached in Escalera without observing due process safeguards, were enforceable without any judicial review of the factual basis of the administrative action. In the South Carolina scheme, on the other hand, in order to obtain an eviction order the Housing Authority must prove its allegations. There is a full trial in which the tenant may demand a jury.2 Thus in Charleston, unlike New York in Escalera, public housing tenants are not actually ejected until basic due process requisites are satisfied.3 That is precisely what happened in this case.
We have then no Escalera situation, where, because of the New York...
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Joy v. Daniels
...what procedural due process requires by way of protection of plaintiff's right to tenancy except for cause. In Johnson v. Tamsberg, 430 F.2d 1125 (4th Cir. 1970), we noted that the South Carolina eviction scheme requires the landlord to prove in court his allegations, allows trial by jury, ......
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Owens v. Housing Authority of City of Stamford
...proceedings are required. Caulder v. Durham Housing Authority, supra; see Joy v. Daniels, 479 F.2d 1236 (4 Cir. 1973); Johnson v. Tamsberg, 430 F.2d 1125 (4 Cir. 1970). Even assuming, however, that a plenary judicial hearing were available in state summary process, pre-eviction administrati......
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Anderson v. Denny
...State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding." In Johnson v. Tamsberg, 430 F.2d 1125 (4th Cir. 1970) and Joy v. Daniels, supra, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals found that the substantive right of a tenant in quasi-publi......
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Aguiar v. Hawaii Housing Authority
...Authority, 433 F.2d 998 (4th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1003, 91 S.Ct. 1228, 28 L.Ed.2d 539 (1971), with Johnson v. Tamsberg, 430 F.2d 1125 (4th Cir. 1970). But they rejoin that a pre-eviction hearing at which a tenant may present evidence that he is not overincome does not remedy t......