Johnson v. Tyler

• Decision Date: 10 April 1916
• Docket Number: 30695
• Citation: 157 N.W. 184,175 Iowa 723
• Parties: ROSA STEWART JOHNSON, Appellee, v. E. G. TYLER et al., Appellants
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

157 N.W. 184

175 Iowa 723

ROSA STEWART JOHNSON, Appellee, v. E. G. TYLER et al., Appellants

No. 30695

Supreme Court of Iowa, Des Moines

April 10, 1916

Appeal from Harrison District Court.--THOMAS ARTHUR, Judge.

ACTION in equity to set aside a conveyance on the ground of fraud. The opinion states the case. Decree for the plaintiff in the court below. Defendants appeal.--Reversed.

Reversed and Remanded.

Roadifer & Roadifer, for appellants.

J. A Murray, for appellee.

GAYNOR J. EVANS, C. J., LADD and SALINGER, JJ., concur.

OPINION

GAYNOR, J.

This is an action in equity to set aside a quitclaim deed given by the plaintiff to E. G. Tyler. The relief prayed for is grounded upon alleged fraud, mistake and undue influence practiced upon the plaintiff by the said E. G. Tyler, to induce the execution of the deed. Hattie P. Tyler is the wife of E. G. Tyler, and it is alleged that, after the making of the deed by the plaintiff to the defendant E. G. Tyler, he conveyed the premises to his wife, for the purpose of hindering, delaying and defrauding his creditors, and especially to hinder, delay and defraud this plaintiff, and it is asked that such conveyance be set aside. In the hearing below, the relief prayed for, as against the defendant E. G. Tyler, was granted, and such deed canceled, set aside, and held for naught. From this, the defendant E. G. Tyler appeals. No decree was entered touching the deed executed by E. G. Tyler to his wife, the other defendant, but judgment was entered against both defendants for costs, and both appeal. As to the devolution of the title of the property in controversy, it appears that Frederick Geith, during his lifetime, was the owner of this property; that, when he died, he left a will, which was duly probated. By its terms, he gave to his wife, Mary Geith, who survived him, a life interest in the property, and to his children the remainder, share and share alike. That the plaintiff is the only daughter of Lizzie Geith Stewart, one of the children of the said Frederick Geith, and as such, under the will, took the interest of the said Lizzie, and became invested with a one-eleventh interest in the entire estate, subject only to the life estate vested in the wife of the said Frederick Geith. The property consisted of the E 1/2 of the NE 1/4 of Sec. 3, Twp. 79, Range 43, Harrison County, Iowa.

Frederick Geith, the original owner of said land, died about 16 years prior to the commencement of this suit. Mary Geith, his wife, who was the life tenant, died on or about August 29, 1912. Upon her death, the plaintiff became entitled to an undivided one-eleventh interest in the above described premises, and was, at the time of the making of the deed, the owner of an undivided one-eleventh interest in said real estate. The deed to set aside which this action was brought was executed on the 16th day of November, 1912. The plaintiff received $ 100 from the defendant as a consideration for the execution of the deed. Prior to the time of the execution of the deed, she had mortgaged her interest in the property to Lloyd Fallon for $ 120, and this was a subsisting lien upon her interest in favor of Fallon at the time of the making of the quitclaim deed.

The grounds upon which the plaintiff seeks to have the deed set aside are: That the defendant E. G. Tyler represented to her that her grandmother, Mary Geith, the life tenant, was still living at that time, and that plaintiff's interest was contingent and remote, and that her enjoyment of her interest was likely to come so far in the future that it was of little value; that, in truth and in fact, the life tenant had died nearly two months before the quitclaim deed was procured, and plaintiff had become and was the absolute owner in full of the interest hereinbefore set out; that her interest was of the value of $ 700, and that the consideration paid was grossly inadequate; that she did not know, at the time, that the life tenant was dead, and did not learn of that fact until long afterwards; that, at the time of the execution of the deed, she was acting under a misapprehension both of fact and of law, and that, if she had known that the life tenant was dead, and that she had become invested with the legal title to her interest as devisee, she would not have made the deed; that the defendant did know this fact; that he represented himself to be a lawyer; and that he concealed both the death of the life tenant and the legal effect of the death upon plaintiff's rights, knowing that she was laboring under a misapprehension touching the same. Plaintiff further says that she relied entirely upon the knowledge and integrity of the defendant in signing the quitclaim deed; that she was unable to read intelligently enough to inform herself as to the character of the instrument that she was signing, and did not understand the nature and extent of the property which the instrument purported to convey; that the defendant knew the extent of her interest at the time of the making of the deed, and the value of such interest, and knew that plaintiff was reposing confidence in him, in his statements, and in his knowledge touching the matter.

The defendant Tyler admits all the facts touching the devolution of the title of the property, and that plaintiff made him a quitclaim deed of her interest therein; denies that she was unable to read intelligently and understand the nature and character of the instrument that she signed; denies that he made any statements to her such as are alleged by her; denies that the consideration was grossly inadequate; denies that plaintiff did not know of the death of the life tenant before the making of the deed; denies that any fraud or undue influence was practiced upon the plaintiff to induce her to execute the deed; denies that she was laboring under a misapprehension of any fact touching her right in the property in controversy, at the time that the deed was made.

Plaintiff testifies that she is 33 years old; that she resided in the vicinity of this property until she was 12 or 13 years old; that she first met the defendant Tyler at Omaha, at some place where she was working; that she learned that he was from Logan, and she there discovered who he was, and he there discovered that she was also from Logan; that he asked her if she knew anyone in Logan; that she said that she knew Lloyd Fallon to a certain extent; that she told him that she had done some business with Fallon and that he had been unfair to her, and he remarked that he would look into it; that he came back in about a week after that and told her that he was an attorney, and that he had some trouble with Fallon; that he would give her $ 100 for a quitclaim interest in the property; that that was the only way that she could get even with Fallon; that she asked him if her grandmother, the life tenant, was still living, and he said, "Yes," she was living with Ed on a farm; that he told her that, if she would sign the deed, he would give her $ 100, and he would make $ 150 out of it himself. Plaintiff further testifies:

"I didn't know at the time I signed the deed that my grandmother was dead. I knew I was entitled to a one-eleventh interest. I knew when my grandmother died I would get some money. I knew that when she died I would get my mother's share--a one-eleventh interest."

She further testifies that she had lived with her grandparents, the Geiths, until she was about 11 or 12 years of age, and knew something about the land; that she went to school until she was 14, when she went to Missouri Valley; that she went to Omaha when she was about 17; that she married a man in Sioux City by the name of Johnson; that he got a divorce from her, but she does not know when. She further testified that she was subsequently married to a man by the name of Pierson; that she always went by the name of Laura Holmes. She said that she went by that name when she was living with her first husband, and has gone by that name since her last marriage; that she was last married about two years before she testified. She says that she does not remember the date on which she married her last husband; thinks it is about two years ago; that she was not married to this last man at the time of the making of the deed. She testified:

"I acknowledged the deed before a notary public. I can read. I glanced at the deed, but did not read it thoroughly. I first learned of my grandmother's death when I called my uncle over the phone after there was an advertisement in the Omaha paper for me. My folks did not know where to find me. This was about a week or three or four days after the deed was made. My uncle made all the arrangements about commencing this suit. I guess I have told all the statements that Mr. Tyler made to me that induced me to sign the deed. I don't know whether the mortgage to Fallon is paid yet or not."

This is all the testimony given by the plaintiff bearing upon this question, and all the testimony offered by her touching the execution of the deed.

The testimony for the defendant was substantially as follows: The notary before whom the deed was acknowledged testified that he asked the plaintiff if she knew the contents of the deed when she signed it, and she answered, "Certainly;" that, before he took the acknowledgment of the deed, he went to get his notarial seal; that, when he came back, she had the deed in her hand, and had it open, and she laid it back on the table when he came in.

Mrs. A J. Carey, called for the defendant, testified that she lived in Omaha; was acquainted with the plaintiff; that the plaintiff goes by the name of Holmes; that she had known her about four years; that she knew Tyler; had some business with Tyler; that is, he attended to some business for her;...