Johnson v. United States

• Decision Date: 28 June 1948
• Docket Number: No. 48520.,48520.
• Citation: 111 Ct. Cl. 750,79 F. Supp. 208
• Parties: JOHNSON v. UNITED STATES.
• Court: U.S. Claims Court

79 F. Supp. 208

111 Ct. Cl. 750

JOHNSON v. UNITED STATES.

No. 48520.

Court of Claims.

June 28, 1948.

Charles J. Margiotti, of Pittsburgh, Pa. for plaintiff.

Edgar T. Fell, of Washington, D. C., and H. G. Morison, Asst. Atty. Gen. (John R. Franklin, of Washington, D. C., on the brief), for defendant.

Before JONES, Chief Justice, and WHITAKER, MADDIN, LITTLETON and HOWELL, Judges.

WHITAKER, Judge.

This case is before us on demurrer.

Plaintiff, Albert Williams Johnson, alleges that he was appointed United States District Judge for the Middle District of Pennsylvania on May 21, 1925. He resigned on June 29, 1945. He has been paid nothing since his resignation for the reason later to be stated. He sues for the salary to which he says he is entitled under section 260 of the Judicial Code, section 375 of Title 28 U.S.C.A. This section provides: That "when any judge of any court of the United States, appointed to hold his office during good behavior, resigns his office after having held a commission or commissions as judge of any such court or courts at least ten years, continuously or otherwise and having attained the age of seventy years, he shall, during the residue of his natural life, receive the salary which is payable at the time of his resignation for the office that he held at the time of his resignation. * * *"

Defendant says that the amount to which plaintiff is entitled under this Act is either a pension or a gratuity. If a pension, defendant says we have no jurisdiction of a suit to recover it, since such suits are expressly excluded from among those over which we are given jurisdiction by section 145 of the Judicial Code, section 250 of Title 28 U.S.C.A. This Act gives this court jurisdiction of "First. All claims (except for pensions) founded upon, * * * any law of Congress * * *." If the payments are gratuities, defendant says it is within the power of Congress to withhold a gratuity at any time and that by the Act of June 24, 1946, 60 Stat. 304, Congress did withhold payment of this gratuity to plaintiff.

We are of opinion that the amount due under this section is neither a pension nor a gratuity.

The Constitution of the United States in Article III provides that "judges, both of the Supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices during good Behavior, and shall, at stated times, receive for their Services, a Compensation which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office." When a person is appointed to the office of United States District Judge he becomes entitled to draw the salary of this office so long as he continues to hold it. He continues to hold it until he voluntarily relinquishes it or is ousted by impeachment or death.

Many judges of seventy years and older have maintained unimpaired their mental vigor and in their years beyond seventy have contributed much to the jurisprudence of the country, but it is common knowledge that some of them have continued to hold their offices for some time after the ravages of time had so far wasted the tissues of their minds and bodies that they were no longer capable of properly administering the duties of their offices. They held on partly due to an unwillingness to admit the toll time had taken, and partly due to a desire to hold on to their constitutional right to draw the salary of the office as long as they lived.

The situation was not good, and yet there was no way to force a judge to relinquish his office except through impeachment, and impeachment only lay when the judge had been guilty of bad behavior. Faced with this unhappy situation, Congress came to the conclusion that many superannuated judges might be induced to relinquish their offices if they could be assured for the balance of their lives of the salary attached to it. It is common knowledge that this was at least one of the reasons for the passage of the Act upon which section 260 of the Judicial Code is based. See, e. g., the discussion of the Act of April 10, 1869, upon which the pertinent part of section 260 of the Judicial Code is based, in the Congressional Globe, 41st Congress, 1st session, page 647, and appendix thereto, page 2.

Since the Act was passed partly as an inducement to bring about resignations, we have no doubt that a judge thereby induced to resign is entitled to demand the inducement offered. He has a right to demand it not as a pension or a gratuity, but as the consideration offered to induce him to give up his right to hold the office as long as he lives.

Certainly if a private corporation bound itself to an employee by a long-term contract, from which there was no practical way to escape, and this employee became disabled to efficiently discharge the duties of his position, and if the corporation offered to permit him to resign on full salary in order to put a more efficient man in his place, and the employee did resign, there can be no doubt that the corporation would be liable to him for his salary for the remainder of his term of employment, whether or not the employee after resignation did anything to earn it. The employee had waived a right in consideration of a promise and he undoubtedly would have the right to sue on that promise.

A United States District Judge who resigns waives his right to hold his office for the remainder of his life and good behavior, in consideration of the promise of his employer to continue to pay him for the remainder of his life the salary he was drawing when he resigned.

This rule would be applicable to any Federal employee or to any other employee to whom an employer was similarly bound. It is not alone applicable to a judge; it is applicable to any employee under a comparable contract.

This does not mean, of course, that it is not within the power of Congress to repeal section 260 of the Judicial Code, but so long as it stands unrepealed, a judge can demand the benefit of it as of right. He has the right to demand it not as a bounty or gratuity, but as a sum promised in consideration of a right surrendered.

Indeed, it is doubtful if Congress could take that right away from a judge, who had previously resigned under the above recited circumstances, by a repeal of the statute giving the right. Certainly a State cannot by the repeal of a statute relieve itself of a contractual obligation embodied in the statute repealed. Carondelet Canal & Navigation Co., v. Louisiana, 233 U.S. 362, 377, 34 S.Ct. 627, 58 L.Ed. 1001. While section 10 of Article I of the Constitution, forbidding the passage of a law impairing the obligation of a contract, is directed at the States and not at the National Government, it nevertheless states the general public policy on the matter of the impairment of the obligation of contracts by legislative action — as well of the national legislature as that of the States. Such action by any legislature is abhorrent to our idea of justice and contrary to the right sought to be safeguarded by section 10 of Article I of the Constitution.

By the 10th Amendment to the Constitution all rights are retained by the States or the people except those delegated to the Federal Government. Could it be said that it was intended to prohibit the States from impairing the obligation of a contract and at the same time to delegate to the National Government the power to do so, except in those fields where the power to do so is incidental to the exercise of a power specifically granted, as the power to establish a uniform bankruptcy system? See Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555, 589, 55 S.Ct. 854, 79 L.Ed. 1593, 97 A.L.R. 1106; Mitchell v. Clark, 110 U.S. 633, 643, 4 S.Ct. 312, 28 L.Ed. 279.

While section 10 of Article I of the Constitution is directed to the States alone, we think it nevertheless states the policy of the founders of the Government on the question of impairing the obligation of contracts and that any Act of the national legislature that does impair the obligation of contracts is contrary to that policy and not within the powers delegated to the National Government, except in specific cases, such as bankruptcy.

The Supreme Court recently in Hurd et al. v. Hodge et al., 1948, 68 S.Ct. 847, held that the public policy declared by the 14th Amendment against the denial of the equal protection of the laws was applicable to action by the Federal courts of the District of Columbia in enforcing contracts found to be against the public policy declared in the 14th Amendment, as well as to State courts, although the 14th Amendment was directed at State action alone. No reason is perceived why the principle announced in this decision is not equally applicable here.

Moreover, in those fields where from the grant of power there is to be implied the power to impair the obligation of contracts, this power must nevertheless be exercised subject to the limitations of the 5th Amendment to the Constitution. Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, supra. This Amendment prohibits the taking of private property for public use without just compensation. A contractual right comes within its protection. Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312, 13 S.Ct. 622, 37 L.Ed. 463. The right there taken by the National Government was a franchise granted by a State to a company for the erection of locks and dams. It was held it could not be taken without just compensation.

The right acquired by a judge who resigned after the passage of the Act sued on is no less a property right than the franchise granted to such company. Both, it would seem, come within the protection of the 5th Amendment. See also Omnia Commercial Co. v. United States, 261 U.S. 502, 43 S.Ct. 437, 67 L.Ed. 773.

It follows from this that the payments to which plaintiff is entitled under section 260 of the Judicial Code are not in the nature of a pension nor of a gratuity. They are payments he has a right to demand under the promise contained in the section, a promise given in consideration of his...