Johnson v. Walker

Docket Number9:22-cv-80881-DIMITROULEAS
Decision Date12 October 2023
PartiesLEE MITCHELL JOHNSON, Plaintiff, v. DEPUTY WALKER, in his individual capacity, Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — Southern District of Florida

Lee Mitchell Johnson W40563 Florida State Prison-West Unit PRO SE

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS

LAUREN F. LOUIS UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

THIS CAUSE is before the Court upon the Bill of Costs and Memorandum in Support thereof (the Motion to Tax Costs) (ECF Nos. 86, 87), and the Motion for Attorneys' Fees (ECF No. 89), filed by Defendant Deputy Walker. Plaintiff Lee Mitchell Johnson, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed a “Motion to Oppose Defendants Motion for Attorneys Fees and Costs,” which the Court construes as a combined Response in opposition to both Motions. (ECF No. 91). Defendant filed a Reply. (ECF No. 92). Plaintiff also filed an unauthorized Sur-reply. (ECF No. 93); cf. S.D Fla. L.R. 7.1(c)(1). The Motions were referred to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge by the Honorable William P. Dimitrouleas, United States District Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 and the Magistrate Judge Rules of the Local Rules of the Southern District of Florida for appropriate disposition or for report and recommendations. (ECF Nos. 88, 90). Having reviewed both Motions, the Response, the Reply, the Sur-reply, the materials submitted in support of the briefing, the record as a whole, and being otherwise fully advised, the undersigned respectfully RECOMMENDS that the Motion for Bill of Costs (ECF No. 86) be GRANTED, in part, and DENIED, in part, and that the Motion for Attorney's Fees (ECF No. 89) be GRANTED, in part.

I. BACKGROUND

This is a Section 1983[1] civil rights action brought by pro se Plaintiff Lee Mitchell Johnson against two deputy sheriffs from the Palm Beach County Sheriff's Office, in their individual capacities, arising under the Court's federal question jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Plaintiff commenced this action in this Court on June 14, 2022 asserting a claim against Deputy Walker for use of excessive force, and a claim against Deputy Henley for failure to intervene in Deputy Walker's use of force, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. (ECF No. 1).

Because Plaintiff is an inmate in state custody who was granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis, (ECF No. 5), his Complaint was subject to screening in accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). Upon screening, the District Court determined that Plaintiff sufficiently pled that Deputy Walker had used excessive force against Plaintiff. Thus, the District Court permitted that claim to proceed against Deputy Walker in his individual capacity. However, Plaintiff's claim against Deputy Henley for failure to intervene in Deputy Walker's use of force was dismissed, under § 1915(e) for failure to state a claim, because Plaintiff had failed to make any allegation that Deputy Henley was able to intervene in the use of force. (ECF No. 7).

Deputy Walker appeared and answered the Complaint on August 3, 2022. (ECF Nos. 17, 18). The Parties engaged in discovery, which included Plaintiff's deposition. (ECF Nos. 39, 40). On February 21, 2023, Defendant moved for sanctions, invoking the Court's inherent authority and referencing Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11. (ECF No. 48). Defendant averred that video footage of the incident in question refuted Plaintiff's claim, as well as that Plaintiff had testified under oath at his deposition that Defendant had not used excessive force against him. Accordingly, Defendant requested that the Court dismiss this action with prejudice, award Defendant attorney's fees and costs, and enjoin Plaintiff from making future frivolous filings in this Court. (ECF No. 48). Defendant also moved for summary judgment. (ECF No. 59).

On May 19, 2023, following the calendar call, the District Court sua sponte dismissed this action with prejudice as frivolous and malicious, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i). (ECF No. 80). As relevant here, upon viewing the video footage of the incident, reviewing Plaintiff's sworn deposition testimony, and hearing argument, the District Court found that this case is frivolous and malicious. The District Court noted that the video recordings of the incident clearly showed that Plaintiff tripped and fell and that Deputy Walker did not lift Plaintiff off the ground by his restraints, as alleged in the Complaint. The District Court further noted that the video recordings corroborated Plaintiff's sworn deposition testimony that Defendant never harmed Plaintiff.[2] (ECF No. 80 at 7).

Now, Defendant Deputy Walker moves to tax costs against Plaintiff under 28 U.S.C. § 1920, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d), and Southern District of Florida Local Rule 7.3(c). Deputy Walker also moves for an award of attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988.[3]

II. DISCUSSION

In his Motion to Tax Costs (ECF Nos. 86, 87), Defendant Deputy Walker seeks the entry of an award of $587.24 in taxable costs under 28 U.S.C. § 1920, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d), and Southern District of Florida Local Rule 7.3(c). In his Motion for Attorney's Fees (ECF No. 89), Defendant seeks the entry of an award of attorney's fees in the amount of $26,114.50 as the prevailing party under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, because this action was dismissed with prejudice as frivolous.

Plaintiff opposes both motions based on indigency. He asserts that he has been homeless since 2007 when not incarcerated, depends on panhandling on the side of the highway, owns no assets, and expects to again be homeless and unemployed when released from prison. Plaintiff further asserts that an award of fees and costs to Defendant will result in a double recovery because Plaintiff claims the Palm Beach County Sheriff's Office is covering the cost of defending this action.

In his Reply, Defendant challenges Plaintiff's assertion of indigency. Defendant cites to Plaintiff's sworn interrogatory responses as supporting that Plaintiff was not homeless from 2007 to 2010. Defendant further notes that Plaintiff can expect to earn wages after being released from prison because Plaintiff averred in interrogatory responses that he anticipates work as a mechanic upon release. Defendant also raises in his Reply a request that the District Court invoke its inherent authority to enjoin Plaintiff from filing any future actions unless (i) Plaintiff first submits a contempt bond, (ii) Plaintiff's complaints are screened under 28 U.S.C. § 1915, (iii) Plaintiff's complaints are accompanied by a document disclosing his litigation history, and (iv) Plaintiff's complaints are subject to dismissal for failure to comply with the foregoing.

In his unauthorized Sur-reply, Plaintiff disputes Defendant's factual contentions and asserts that Defendant's request for the entry of an injunction as a sanction is contrary to the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e et seq.

The Court first turns to Defendant's Motion to Tax Costs.

A. Motion to Tax Costs
1. Legal Standard

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(1) allows the prevailing party to receive litigation costs other than attorney's fees. There is a “strong presumption” in favor of awarding taxable costs to the prevailing party, which the challenging party has the burden to overcome. Mathews v. Crosby, 480 F.3d 1265, 1276 (11th Cir. 2007). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1920, a district court may tax as costs: (1) Fees of the clerk and marshal; (2) Fees for printed or electronically recorded transcripts necessarily obtained for use in the case; (3) Fees and disbursements for printing and witnesses; (4) Fees for exemplification and the costs of making copies of any materials where the copies are necessarily obtained for use in the case; (5) Docket fees under section 1923 of this title; (6) Compensation of court appointed experts, compensation of interpreters, and salaries, fees, expenses, and costs of special interpretation services under section 1828 of this title.”

[A]bsent explicit statutory or contractual authorization, federal courts are bound by the limitations set out in 28 U.S.C. § 1920.” Arcadian Fertilizer, L.P. v. MPW Indus. Servs., Inc., 249 F.3d 1293, 1296 (11th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted). “The party seeking costs bears the burden of submitting a request for expenses that enables the court to determine what expenses were incurred and whether those expenses meet the proof of necessity and reasonableness under 28 U.S.C. [§] 1920.” Shave v. Stanford Fin. Grp., Inc., No. 07-60749-CIV, 2008 WL 3200705, at *4 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 6, 2008).

2. Defendant Is the Prevailing Party

The Court first finds that Defendant Deputy Walker is the prevailing party in this action for purposes of an award of taxable costs under Rule 54(d)(1).

[T]here are two requirements for a party to reach prevailing party status. First, the party must be awarded some relief on the merits of its claim by the court. Second, the party must be able to point to a resolution of the dispute which materially altered the legal relationship between the parties.” Royal Palm Props., LLC v. Pink Palm Props., LLC, 38 F.4th 1372, 1376 (11th Cir. 2022) (internal citations omitted) (first citing Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W.Va. Dep't of Health & Hum. Res., 532 U.S. 598, 603 (2001); and then citing Tex. State Tchrs. Ass'n v. Garland Indep. Sch. Dist., 489 U.S. 782, 792-93 (1989)). With respect to prevailing defendants, a defendant prevails if the defendant rebuffed the plaintiff's efforts to effect a material alteration in the legal relationship between the parties. Beach Blitz Co. v. City of Miami Beach, 13 F.4th 1289, 1298 (11th Cir. 2021). Further, under Eleventh Circuit law, there can only be one prevailing party in a case...

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