Mathews v. Crosby

• Decision Date: 16 March 2007
• Docket Number: No. 05-12515.,05-12515.
• Citation: 480 F.3d 1265
• Parties: Willie MATHEWS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. James V. CROSBY, Jr., Tim Giebeig, Sgt. Hall, Sgt. Crockett, C.O. Young, in their individual capacities, et al., Defendants-Appellees, C.O. Dobson, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit

480 F.3d 1265

Willie MATHEWS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. James V. CROSBY, Jr., Tim Giebeig, Sgt. Hall, Sgt. Crockett, C.O. Young, in their individual capacities, et al., Defendants-Appellees C.O. Dobson, et al., Defendants.

No. 05-12515.

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.

March 16, 2007.

Guy Bennett Rubin, Rubin & Rubin, Stuart, FL, Stuart M. Address, Port St. Lucie, FL, for Mathews.

Ronald S. Wasilenko, Michael D. Kendall, Gobelman, Love, Gavin, Wasilenko & Broughan, Jeffrey A. Cramer, Law Offices of Jeffrey A. Cramer, J. Ray Poole, Jr., John F. Dickinson, Margaret Philips Zabijaka, Constangy, Brooks & Smith, LLC,

Jacksonville, FL, Theodore R. Doran, Doran, Wolfe, Rost & Ansay, Daytona Beach, FL, Martin A. Fitzpatrick, Broad & Cassel, Tallahassee, FL, for Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida.

Before TJOFLAT, BARKETT, and GOODWIN,^* Circuit Judges.

BARKETT, Circuit Judge:

Willie Mathews appeals the grant of summary judgment in favor of James V. Crosby, former warden at Florida State Prison ("FSP"),¹ and Tim Giebeig, former inspector at FSP, on the grounds that they were immune from suit on the basis of qualified immunity. Mathews also appeals the district court's order granting costs and the amount of those costs to Crosby, Giebeig, and other FSP employees who were voluntarily dismissed before trial.²

While Crosby was the warden of FSP, Mathews was transferred to FSP and housed on X-wing, where inmates with the most serious disciplinary problems were assigned. Mathews sued Crosby, Giebeig, and several other FSP employees, alleging, inter alia, that they violated his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by subjecting him to a series of attacks in which excessive and unjustified force was used, resulting in serious injury, including a broken jaw. Mathews alleged that prison guards repeatedly beat him, and that Crosby knew about the general propensity for violence against inmates at FSP — especially by certain corrections officers who were involved in the beatings of Mathews — but that Crosby was deliberately indifferent to the risk of abuse and deliberately indifferent to Mathews' serious medical needs. Crosby and Giebeig moved for summary judgment, and the district court granted it, finding they could not be held liable for their acts as supervisory officials. For the following reasons, we reverse the district court's order granting summary judgment to Crosby, affirm the district court's order granting summary judgement to Giebeig,³ affirm the district court's order granting costs to all defendants, except Crosby and Giebeig, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review de novo a district court's ruling on summary judgment, applying the same legal standards as the district court. Skrtich v. Thornton, 280 F.3d 1295, 1299 (11th Cir.2002). Summary judgment is appropriate only when the evidence before the court demonstrates that "there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(c). The evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Skrtich, 280 F.3d at 1299 (citing Augusta Iron and Steel Works, Inc. v. Employers Ins. of Wausau, 835 F.2d 855, 856 (11th Cir.1988)). That is, courts must construe the facts and draw all inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and "when conflicts arise between the facts evidenced by the parties, we credit the nonmoving party's version." Evans v. Stephens, 407 F.3d 1272, 1278 (11th Cir.2005) (emphasis omitted). Even though the "`facts,' as accepted at the summary judgment stage of the proceedings, may not be the `actual' facts of the case," Priester v. City of Riviera Beach, 208 F.3d 919, 925 n. 3 (11th Cir. 2000), our analysis for purposes of summary judgment must begin with a description of the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, Skrtich, 280 F.3d at 1299.

DISCUSSION

As we have often stated, "[q]ualified immunity offers complete protection for government officials sued in their individual capacities as long as their conduct violates no clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Lee v. Ferraro, 284 F.3d 1188, 1193-94 (11th Cir.2002) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). In order to receive the protection of qualified immunity, the government official must first prove that he was acting within the scope of his discretionary authority when the allegedly wrongful acts occurred. Kesinger v. Herrington, 381 F.3d 1243, 1248 (11th Cir.2004) (citing Vinyard v. Wilson, 311 F.3d 1340, 1346 (11th Cir.2002)).⁴

Once eligibility for qualified immunity is established, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that qualified immunity is not appropriate. Lee, 284 F.3d at 1194. This step consists of a two-part inquiry, set forth in Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001). First, we ask, "do the facts alleged show the government official's conduct violated a constitutional right?" Id. at 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151. If a constitutional violation is established, based on the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, we then must determine whether such conduct would have violated federal law that was clearly established at the time of the incident. Garrett v. Athens-Clarke County, 378 F.3d 1274, 1278-79 (11th Cir.2004) (citing Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201-02, 121 S.Ct. 2151).

I. Constitutional Claims

We first address the question of whether Crosby violated Mathews' Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. "The Constitution does not mandate comfortable prisons, but neither does it permit inhumane ones, and it is now settled that the treatment a prisoner receives in prison and the conditions under which he is confined are subject to scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment." Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994) (citations and quotation marks omitted). "In its prohibition of `cruel and unusual punishments,' the Eighth Amendment places restraints on prison officials, who may not, for example, use excessive physical force against prisoners." Id. "Being violently assaulted in prison is simply not part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses against society." Id. at 833, 114 S.Ct. 1970 (citations and quotation marks omitted).

We have held that supervisors can be held liable for subordinates' constitutional violations on the basis of supervisory liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Cottone v. Jenne, 326 F.3d 1352, 1360 (11th Cir.2003). Supervisory liability under § 1983 occurs "when the supervisor personally participates in the alleged constitutional violation or when there is a causal connection between the actions of the supervising official and the alleged constitutional deprivation." Id. The question before us on appeal is whether there was a causal connection between Crosby's actions or inaction and the beatings suffered by Mathews.

A causal connection may be established when: 1) a "history of widespread abuse" puts the responsible supervisor on notice of the need to correct the alleged deprivation, and he or she fails to do so; 2) a supervisor's custom or policy results in deliberate indifference to constitutional rights; or 3) facts support an inference that the supervisor directed subordinates to act unlawfully or knew that subordinates would act unlawfully and failed to stop them from doing so. Cottone, 326 F.3d at 1360.

Therefore, we next examine whether the district court erred in concluding that insufficient facts were presented to support liability against Crosby through a causal connection between his actions and the alleged constitutional deprivation committed by Crosby's subordinates.

A.

The facts, construed in the light most favorable to Mathews, the nonmoving party, are as follows. Willie Mathews arrived at FSP on July 4, 1999, along with four other inmates from Hamilton Correctional Institution following an incident in which they were accused of assaulting two correctional officers. At FSP, Mathews was placed in isolation on X-wing. On or about July 4, 5, and 10, Mathews claims he was beaten by corrections officers because of the incident at Hamilton. He claims that on or about July 12, 1999, his mother called warden Crosby to inform him that she had received a letter from an officer working at the prison, stating that her son was in danger and was being abused by prison guards. The same day, Mathews was visited by Giebeig, the on-site inspector at FSP. Mathews told Giebeig that he had been repeatedly beaten. Mathews was seen by a doctor, but no other action was taken to protect Mathews from further beatings or to determine the validity of the allegations.

Giebeig testified that he "had conversations with [Crosby] every day on everything going on at FSP" and that therefore the inspector was "almost positive" that by July 13, 1999, Crosby was aware of Mathews' allegations that he was being repeatedly attacked. The inspector later testified that he was "sure somewhere between the 13th and the . . . 16th" of July 1999, he "spoke with [Crosby] . . . concerning the Mathews allegations."

On July 15, 1999, Mathews filed an emergency grievance stating that he was in fear for his life and was suffering from an untreated broken jaw following repeated assaults by prison guards on X-wing. Mathews urged authorities to send someone to remove him from X-wing "before [he is] killed." By July 16, 1999, Giebeig was advised by dental staff that Mathews had a fractured jaw. Giebeig claims he reported this information to the acting warden, A.D. Thornton. FSP had procedures which required officers to document any use of force against inmates on an official use of force form. Copies of the use of force forms were forwarded to the warden. No...