Johnson v. Warden

• Decision Date: 18 June 2019
• Docket Number: CV154006992
• Court: Connecticut Superior Court
• Parties: Anthony JOHNSON #334872 v. WARDEN

Anthony JOHNSON #334872 v. WARDEN

No. CV154006992

Superior Court of Connecticut, Judicial District of Tolland, Rockville

June 18, 2019

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

Hon John M. Newson

I. Procedural History

The petitioner was the defendant in a matter pending in the New Haven Judicial District under docket NNH-CR08-0084790-T where he was charged with Felony Murder, in violation of General Statutes § 53a-54(c), ^[1] Robbery First Degree, in violation of General Statutes § 53a-134a(2), ^[2] Conspiracy to Commit Robbery First Degree, in violation of General Statutes § § 53a-48 and 53a-134a(2), and Manslaughter Second Degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-56.^[3] He was represented by Attorney Walter Bansley, III, before the trial court. The allegations were that the petitioner and co-defendants, Akeem Gayle and Rashon Felton, set up a drug deal to purchase marijuana from the victim, but with the intent of robbing the victim of his drugs when he appeared. The victim was shot by Akeem Gayle during the robbery attempt, and later died from his injuries. On January 20, 2010, the petitioner entered pleas to the Conspiracy to Commit Robbery First Degree and Manslaughter Second Degree charges in exchange for a maximum sentence of between 18 and 25 years in prison, with the parties reserving their right to present argument to the Court at sentencing, and also with an agreement that the petitioner would testify if his co-defendant’s case went to trial. On August 20, 2010, the petitioner was sentenced to 20 years, suspended after 18 years, with 5 years of probation on the robbery charge, and 10 years, execution fully suspended, with 5 years of probation on the manslaughter conviction. The convictions were ordered to run consecutive to each other, for a total effective sentence of 30 years, suspended after 18 years, followed by 5 years of probation.^[4]

The petitioner filed the present habeas action on February 2, 2015. The operative Amended Petition makes claims that Attorney Bansley provided ineffective representation, and that his plea was not "knowingly and voluntarily" entered as a result. The respondent filed a Return generally denying the allegations in the petition, and also raising the special defense of procedural default to the petitioner’s claim that his plea was not knowing and voluntary. The matter was tried before the Court on February 21, 2019. Further factual and procedural background will be provided as needed throughout the remainder of this decision.

II. Law and Discussion

The two claims made by the petitioner here are really the same claim just stated differently. Claim One alleges that Attorney Bansley was ineffective for incorrectly advising the petitioner as to the terms and conditions of the plea agreement, thus rendering his plea defective, because it was not "knowingly and intelligently" entered. Claim Two is a free-standing due process claim, asserting that his pleas were not "knowingly and voluntarily" entered because trial counsel failed to adequately advise him of the specific terms and conditions. The specific allegations underlying both claims are that counsel incorrectly advised the petitioner that he would be pleading to Robbery 2nd Degree, instead of the Robbery 1st Degree, and that counsel also led him to believe that the plea agreement limited him to receiving a "flat" sentence of 18 to 25 years, one without any additional suspended time or probation attached. Despite the different wording and titles, both claims require this Court to make a determination of whether the petitioner’s guilty pleas were "knowingly and intelligently" entered.

Due process requires that every valid guilty plea must be demonstrably voluntary, knowing and intelligent ... [T]he trial court judge bears an affirmative, nondelegable duty to clarify the terms of a plea agreement. [U]nless a plea of guilty is made knowingly and voluntarily, it has been obtained in violation of due process and is therefore voidable ... When a defendant pleads guilty, he waives important fundamental constitutional rights, including the privilege against self-incrimination, the right to a jury trial, and the right to confront his accusers ... These considerations demand the utmost solicitude of which courts are capable in canvassing the matter with the accused to make sure he has a full understanding of what the plea connotes and its consequences ...

We, therefore, require the trial court affirmatively to clarify on the record that the defendant’s guilty plea was made intelligently and voluntarily ... In order to make a knowing and voluntary choice, the defendant must possess an understanding of the law in relation to the facts, including all relevant information concerning the sentence ... The defendant must also be aware of the actual value of any commitments made to him by the court ... because a realistic assessment of such promises is essential in making an intelligent decision to plead guilty ... A determination as to whether a plea has been knowingly and voluntarily entered entails an examination of all of the relevant circumstances ...

(Citation omitted; emphasis added.) Caez v. Commissioner of Correction, 107 Conn.App. 617, 619-20, 946 A.2d 279, cert. denied, 289 Conn. 903, 957 A.2d 868 (2008).

[B]ecause a defendant pleading guilty pursuant to a plea agreement waives a number of fundamental constitutional rights ... the circumstances surrounding the plea agreement must comport with due process to ensure [the] defendant’s understanding of its consequences ... The notion of fundamental fairness embodied in due process implies that whatever promises the government makes in the course of a plea agreement to induce a guilty plea must be fulfilled ...

Our Supreme Court has held that a plea agreement is akin to a contract and that the well established principles of contract law can provide guidance in the interpretation of a plea agreement.

[T]he primary goal of contract interpretation is to effectuate the intent of the parties ... Where the language of the contract is clear and unambiguous, the contract is to be given effect according to its terms ... [T]he government ordinarily has certain awesome advantages in bargaining power ... [Therefore] [b]ecause of ... the substantial constitutional interests implicated by plea agreements, the state must bear the burden for any lack of clarity in the agreement and ambiguities should be resolved in favor of the defendant.

(Alterations in original; citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 620-21.

Therefore, if the Court finds that the petitioner’s pleas were "knowingly and intelligently" entered, both the due process and the ineffective assistance of counsel claims fail. E.g., Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 56, 106 S.Ct. 366, 88 L.Ed.2d 203 (1985) ("The longstanding test for determining the validity of a guilty plea is ‘whether the plea represents a voluntary and intelligent choice among the alternative courses of action open to the defendant’ ").

The petitioner’s first claim is that he was put to plea on Conspiracy to Commit Robbery in the First Degree, but that counsel had advised him that he would be pleading to Conspiracy to Commit Robbery in the Second Degree.^[5] The petitioner has failed to support this claim with credible evidence.

During the plea canvass, the petitioner fails to make any comment, or to ask any questions, nor is there any indication that there is any stoppage, when he is put to plea on Conspiracy to Commit Robbery in the First Degree by the clerk.^[6] Similarly, when the trial Court later mentions Robbery in the First Degree by name and goes over the elements with the petitioner, he, again, asks no questions and seeks no clarification about supposedly being put to plea on a charge different than what he had agreed to.^[7] He also responds affirmatively, and without question, when the Court asks if he is familiar with the elements of Robbery in the First Degree and whether he had gone over those elements with his attorney. See, Bowers v. Warden, 19 Conn.App. 440, 443, 562 A.2d 588, cert. denied, 212 Conn. 817, 565 A.2d 534 (1989) ("A habeas court, as well as a trial court, may properly rely on ... the responses of the [defendant] at the time he responded to the trial court’s plea canvass, in determining that he was adequately informed of the elements of the offense charged").

In support of this claim, the petitioner insinuates that he wasn’t fully paying attention at his change of plea hearing, and only listened for the word "robbery," but not the specific degree. Because part of the petitioner’s plea deal contemplated the possibility of testifying against one of his co-defendants, however, he was not sentenced until eight months later. This gave the petitioner plenty of time to realize the alleged error in charges. Despite that significant passage of time, and despite the fact that Robbery in the First Degree is stated several times, he still failed to raise any issue about this supposed error when back before the Court eight months later at his sentencing.^[8] Finally, despite the fact that the petitioner claims Attorney Bansley had already misled him about the charges he was pleading to, and about the overall sentence he was to receive, the petitioner then asks the Court to accept, as the reason it took him five years to raise any documented complaint about this issue, that he called Attorney Bansley shortly after sentencing to complain about the error, but accepted Attorney Bansley’s advice that the best course of action was to wait until he was close to 50% of his 18-year prison sentence and apply for a sentence modification. It is enough to say that this Court did not find this testimony, or the excuse, at all credible.

Adding to the issue of the...