Caez v. Commissioner of Correction

• Decision Date: 13 May 2008
• Docket Number: No. 28277.,28277.
• Citation: 946 A.2d 279,107 Conn.App. 617
• Court: Connecticut Court of Appeals
• Parties: Israel CAEZ v. COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION.

946 A.2d 279

107 Conn.App. 617

Israel CAEZ v. COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION.

No. 28277.

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued March 14, 2008.

Decided May 13, 2008.

Paul R. Kraus, special public defender, for the appellant (petitioner).

Timothy F. Costello, deputy assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Gail P. Hardy, state's attorney, and Erik T. Lohr, former deputy assistant state's attorney, for the appellee (respondent).

BISHOP, LAVINE and ROBINSON, Js.

PER CURIAM.

The petitioner, Israel Caez, appeals from the judgment of the habeas court denying his second amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The petitioner claims that his due process rights were violated by the court because he was not given jail credit pursuant to the terms of a plea agreement. We affirm the judgment of the habeas court.

On February 2, 2000, the petitioner pleaded guilty to possession of narcotics (narcotics case) in violation of General Statutes § 21a-279 (a) and was sentenced to nine months incarceration. He subsequently was arrested and charged with robbery in the first degree (robbery case) in violation of General Statutes § 53a-134 (a)(2) and several other offenses all related to the robbery. On October 2, 2000, the petitioner pleaded guilty pursuant to the Alford doctrine¹ to robbery in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-134 (a)(2), conspiracy to commit robbery in the first degree in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-48 and 53a-134 (a)(2), and assault in the second degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-60 (a)(2). On October 20, 2000, the petitioner was sentenced in the robbery case to twenty years incarceration, suspended after nine years, and five years probation.

On August 26, 2005, the petitioner filed a second amended petition for writ of habeas corpus, alleging, inter alia, a violation of his constitutional right to due process because, contrary to the terms of his plea agreement, the sentencing court in the robbery case had not included a credit for 259 days of time served on his February 2, 2000 narcotics conviction as part of his sentence on the conviction in the robbery case. Following a trial, the habeas court denied his petition for a writ of habeas corpus.² Thereafter, the court granted the petition for certification to appeal, and this appeal followed.

The petitioner claims that his guilty plea in the robbery case was not knowing and voluntary because he did not receive credit for time served in accordance with his plea agreement, specifically, the 259 days between February 3 and October 18, 2000, representing his period of incarceration flowing from his narcotics conviction on February 2, 2000. "Due process requires that every valid guilty plea must be demonstrably voluntary, knowing and intelligent. . . . [T]he trial court judge bears an affirmative, nondelegable duty to clarify the terms of a plea agreement. [U]nless a plea of guilty is made knowingly and voluntarily, it has been obtained in violation of due process and is therefore voidable. . . . When a defendant pleads guilty, he waives important fundamental constitutional rights, including the privilege against self-incrimination, the right to a jury trial, and the right to confront his accusers. . . . These considerations demand the utmost solicitude of which courts are capable in canvassing the matter with the accused to make sure he has a full understanding of what the plea connotes and its consequences. . . .

"We, therefore, require the trial court affirmatively to clarify on the record that the defendant's guilty plea was made intelligently and voluntarily. . . . In order to make a knowing and voluntary choice, the defendant must possess an understanding of the law in relation to the facts, including all relevant information concerning the sentence. . . . The defendant must also be aware of the actual value of any commitments made to him by the court . . . because a realistic assessment of such promises is essential in making an intelligent decision to plead guilty. . . . A determination as to whether a plea has been knowingly and voluntarily entered entails an examination of all of the relevant circumstances. . . . [W]e conduct a plenary review of the circumstances surrounding [a] plea to determine if it was knowing and voluntary." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Perez, 85 Conn.App. 27, 31-32, 856 A.2d 452, cert. denied, 271 Conn. 933, 859 A.2d 931 (2004).

"[B]ecause a defendant pleading guilty pursuant to a plea agreement waives a number of fundamental constitutional rights . . . the circumstances surrounding the plea agreement must comport with due process to ensure [the] defendant's understanding of its consequences. . . . The notion of fundamental fairness embodied in due process implies that whatever promises the government makes in the course of a plea agreement to induce a guilty plea must be fulfilled." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Rosado, 92 Conn.App. 823, 826-27, 887 A.2d 917 (2006).

"Our Supreme Court has held that a plea agreement is akin to a contract and that the well established principles of contract law can provide guidance in the interpretation of a plea agreement. . . . Whether a contractual provision is ambiguous presents a question of law and...