Johnson v. Watkins

• Decision Date: 10 December 1996
• Docket Number: No. 488,D,488
• Citation: 101 F.3d 792
• Parties: Kyle JOHNSON; Leticia Johnson, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Ivan WATKINS; Chris Calloway, Defendants-Appellees. ocket 96-7410.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit

Page 792

101 F.3d 792

Kyle JOHNSON; Leticia Johnson, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Ivan WATKINS; Chris Calloway, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 488, Docket 96-7410.

United States Court of Appeals Second Circuit.

Argued Oct. 11, 1996.

Decided Dec. 10, 1996.

David R. Hayes, Assistant Corporation Counsel, Buffalo, NY (Michael B. Risman, Senior Deputy Corporation Counsel, Edward D. Peace, Corporation Counsel, City of Buffalo, Buffalo, NY, of counsel), for Defendants-Appellees.

Lucian C. Parlato, Williamsville, NY, submitted a brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants.

Before: CARDAMONE, MAHONEY, ^* Circuit Judges, and RESTANI, ^** Judge.

CARDAMONE, Circuit Judge:

Kyle and Leticia Johnson appeal the March 8, 1996 judgment of the United States District Court for the Western District of New York (Elfvin, J.) that granted summary judgment in favor of two arresting officers in Kyle Johnson's suit for false arrest, and dismissed plaintiffs' complaint seeking damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violation of Johnson's civil rights and his wife's loss of consortium.

The issue raised is whether collateral estoppel bars plaintiff from proving his case where probable cause to arrest him was preliminarily determined at a suppression hearing, despite his later acquittal at trial. Key to the use of collateral estoppel in civil litigation is whether there was a full and fair opportunity to litigate an issue already decided adversely to one party. Central to a full opportunity to litigate is whether appellate review of an adverse holding was available. If not, full and fair litigation was absent and collateral estoppel does not apply. Since here plaintiff had no opportunity to appeal the finding of probable cause, the doctrine of collateral estoppel does not bar suit.

BACKGROUND

A. Kyle Johnson's Arrest and Subsequent Acquittal

On March 2, 1993 Kyle Johnson was with two friends on the corner of Bailey and Schreck Avenues in the City of Buffalo, when they were approached by defendants, officers of the Buffalo Police Department. The encounter resulted in the seizure of a loaded .38 caliber handgun, and Johnson's arrest on a charge of illegal possession of a weapon. Defendants also seized bags of what they thought was crack cocaine, but later turned out to be Ivory soap flakes.

Johnson was taken to the police station and charged with third-degree criminal possession of a weapon in violation of N.Y. Penal Law § 265.02(3) & (4) and seventh-degree criminal possession of a controlled substance in violation of N.Y. Penal Law § 220.03. The drug charge was dropped after laboratory tests revealed that the seized substance was soap. A grand jury indicted Johnson on the weapons charge.

Prior to trial, Johnson moved to suppress the gun as the product of an illegal arrest. A pretrial suppression hearing was held on December 8, 1993. At the hearing, Johnson's counsel cross-examined the prosecution's witnesses and drew the hearing officer's attention to inconsistencies in their testimony. Nonetheless, the hearing officer concluded there was probable cause for the arrest and recommended that the suppression motion be denied. An order denying the motion was entered by the New York State Supreme Court, Erie County, on January 14, 1994. The State criminal proceedings culminated in a two-day jury trial. At the conclusion of the trial, the jury returned a verdict of not guilty.

B. The Proceedings Below

Following the acquittal, on April 13, 1994, Johnson and his wife Leticia filed the instant Defendants' motion was granted by memorandum and order dated February 29, 1996. Accepting defendants' invitation to apply collateral estoppel, the district court held that Johnson could not relitigate the issue of probable cause. It held that (i) the issue of probable cause had been determined in the prior proceeding and was necessary to the judgment of acquittal and (ii) that Johnson had been given a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue. Explaining its holding that the finding of probable cause was necessary to the judgment of acquittal, the district court stated that "the case never would have proceeded to trial absent the determinations that the arrest was legal and that probable cause existed." Because lack of probable cause is an essential element of the claims for malicious prosecution and false arrest, it further reasoned that the defendants were entitled to summary judgment.

complaint against the arresting police officers in the District Court for the Western District of New York (Elfvin, J.) under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging false arrest and malicious prosecution. After filing their answer, defendants moved for summary judgment on the ground that the finding of probable cause to arrest plaintiff made at the pretrial suppression hearing in the earlier State criminal proceeding collaterally estopped Johnson from proving false arrest.

As additional support for its holding that Johnson had been given a full opportunity to litigate, the trial court noted that he had a strong interest in suppressing the weapon as evidence, was zealously represented by counsel, there was no evidence that the forum was hostile or inconvenient, he was now making many of the same arguments to the district court that he had made to the hearing officer in the State criminal proceeding, and that the possibility of further litigation following an acquittal must have occurred to him.

The trial court expressly rejected plaintiffs' argument that Johnson's inability to appeal adverse findings in the suppression hearing (given his acquittal) should preclude collateral estoppel. Although the district court was aware of contrary holdings in Jones v. Saunders, 422 F.Supp. 1054, 1055 (E.D.Pa.1976) (applying Pennsylvania law) and Glover v. Hunsicker, 604 F.Supp. 665, 666 (E.D.Pa.1985) (same), cited by the plaintiffs, it apparently determined that the rule that collateral estoppel should not apply in the absence of an ability to appeal adverse findings was a peculiarity of Pennsylvania law. Relying on the Tenth Circuit's decision in Hubbert v. City of Moore, Okl., 923 F.2d 769, 772-73 (10th Cir.1991) (applying Oklahoma law), questioned by Bell v. Dillard Dep't Stores, 85 F.3d 1451, 1456-58 (10th Cir.1996), the district court found nothing out of the ordinary in giving preclusive effect to pretrial findings followed by an acquittal. This appeal followed.

DISCUSSION

Appellants' sole contention on appeal is that granting summary judgment was error because the jury verdict of not guilty at Johnson's criminal trial precluded giving collateral estoppel effect to the finding of probable cause made by the State court at the suppression hearing.

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1738 a federal court must, in according full faith and credit, give to a State court judgment the same preclusive effect as would be given to the judgment under the law of the State in which the judgment was rendered. Giakoumelos v. Coughlin, 88 F.3d 56, 59 (2d Cir.1996). This rule applies with equal force to actions brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 103-04, 101 S.Ct. 411, 419-20, 66 L.Ed.2d 308 (1980). We therefore look to New York law to determine what preclusive effect would be given to findings made at a pretrial suppression hearing in a criminal action when the criminal action results in an acquittal.

Under New York law, the doctrine of collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, "bars a party from relitigating in a subsequent proceeding an issue clearly raised in a prior proceeding and decided against that party where the party to be precluded had a full and fair opportunity to contest the prior determination." Weiss v. Manfredi, 83 N.Y.2d 974, 976, 616 N.Y.S.2d 325, 639 N.E.2d 1122 (1994). There are two requirements for the invocation of the doctrine of collateral estoppel under New York law: (1) The doctrine promotes important goals: it allows a party only one opportunity to litigate an issue thereby conserving the time and resources of the parties and the court; promotes the finality of judgments; preserves the integrity of the judicial system by eliminating inconsistent results; and ensures that a party not be able to relitigate issues already decided against it in prior litigation. See generally People v. Aguilera, 82 N.Y.2d 23, 30, 603 N.Y.S.2d 392, 623 N.E.2d 519 (1993) (explaining rationale behind doctrine); Staatsburg Water Co. v. Staatsburg Fire Dist., 72 N.Y.2d 147, 152-53, 531 N.Y.S.2d 876, 527 N.E.2d 754 (1988) (same). In actions brought under § 1983 the doctrine also serves the important purpose of promoting comity between State and federal courts. Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. at 95-96, 101 S.Ct. at 415-16.

"[t]here must be an identity of issue which has necessarily been decided in the prior action and is decisive of the present action" and (2) "there must have been a full and fair opportunity to contest the decision now said to be controlling." Schwartz v. Public Adm'r, 24 N.Y.2d 65, 71, 298 N.Y.S.2d 955, 246 N.E.2d 725 (1969). In determining whether a party has had a full and fair opportunity to litigate, a court must be mindful of the realities of the litigation. People v. Roselle, 84 N.Y.2d 350, 357, 618 N.Y.S.2d 753, 643 N.E.2d 72 (1994).

The institutional benefits gained for the administration of the legal system through application of collateral estoppel do not come without a price. By foregoing the opportunity to reexamine an issue, a degree of certainty about the correctness of the prior result is sacrificed, that is to say, the bar of collateral estoppel carries with it the devastating danger that the first decision on an issue may have been wrong and will remain unremedied. 18 Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 4416, at 142 (1981) (Federal Practice and Procedure ). Use of the doctrine represents an informed choice that the occasional permanent encapsulation...