People v. Aguilera

• Decision Date: 14 October 1993
• Citation: 623 N.E.2d 519,82 N.Y.2d 23,603 N.Y.S.2d 392
• Parties: , 623 N.E.2d 519 The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Jesus AGUILERA, Appellant.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Page 392

603 N.Y.S.2d 392

82 N.Y.2d 23, 623 N.E.2d 519

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Jesus AGUILERA, Appellant.

Court of Appeals of New York.

Oct. 14, 1993.

Kenneth Finkelman and Philip Weinstein, New York City, for appellant.

Robert M. Morgenthau, Dist. Atty. of New York County, New York City (Colin Aldrin Fieman and Norman Barclay of counsel), for respondent.

OPINION OF THE COURT

KAYE, Chief Judge.

The primary issue on appeal is whether the collateral estoppel doctrine was properly applied to deprive defendant of a pretrial Huntley hearing. We agree with defendant that he should not have been collaterally estopped from litigating the admissibility of his statements, and thus remit for a Huntley hearing. We disagree, however, with defendant's further contention that his right to be present at trial was abridged when the trial court, with counsel present, spoke with a sworn juror immediately prior to deliberations. Accordingly, a new trial is unnecessary at this time.

I.

By his own admissions--allegedly involuntary--defendant in August 1981 killed a man in the Bronx, and in a separate incident a few days later killed a woman in Manhattan. The present appeal relates to defendant's conviction for the Manhattan homicide.

The evidence adduced at a Huntley hearing in the Bronx case, which proceeded first, revealed that on February 16, 1982, around noon, defendant was arrested and placed in a holding cell in a Bronx station house. A series of interrogations over the next 20 hours led to defendant's confessions to the murders. The first substantive interview did not commence until 10:00 P.M., when a bilingual officer, Detective Andrew Lugo, arrived at the station house.

After Lugo advised defendant of his Miranda rights in Spanish, this initial interrogation, which lasted about two hours, proceeded in two stages. Through Lugo, defendant was first questioned about the Bronx killing by Detective Thomas Mullane, who took notes. Lugo read Mullane's notes to defendant in Spanish, and after stating that he understood, defendant signed the notes. Again through Lugo, defendant was then questioned by Detective Joseph Montuori, a Manhattan detective, about the woman's death. A separate statement regarding the Manhattan incident was reduced to writing and signed by defendant. Defendant was returned to his cell around midnight and given a sandwich and soda.

A Manhattan Assistant District Attorney (ADA) reported to the Bronx precinct and, commencing at 4:22 A.M. on February 17, conducted a videotaped confession, through a different translator, to the Manhattan murder. Present as observers during the videotape were Montuori and a Bronx ADA. After about a half-hour defendant twice stated that he did not want to continue and the interrogation ceased. Defendant then napped in his cell for about two hours and, upon awakening, was given a roll and coffee.

The final interview, also videotaped, began a few minutes before 7:00 A.M. and concerned the Bronx homicide. This interrogation was conducted by the Bronx ADA in the presence of Mullane.

Defendant was separately indicted for second degree murder and other charges in New York and Bronx Counties. In the Bronx case, the People served a CPL 710.30 notice listing the written and videotaped statements concerning the Bronx murder, and defendant in turn moved to suppress those statements. Accordingly, a Huntley hearing was held in Supreme Court, Bronx County. Two witnesses, Lugo and Mullane, testified. They were not asked any questions relating to Montuori's interrogation, and neither the Manhattan statement nor the Manhattan videotape was offered into evidence, although the court viewed the videotape.

At the hearing's conclusion, defense counsel offered essentially two arguments for suppression. He argued that defendant invoked his right to remain silent at the end of the Manhattan videotape, and thus the People did not "scrupulously" honor that right when they subjected defendant to the subsequent Bronx videotape (compare, Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 96 S.Ct. 321, 46 L.Ed.2d 313). Counsel also argued that the statements were involuntary under all the circumstances, including the long delay between arrest and the first interrogation 10 hours later, incommunicado confinement in close quarters for an extensive period, and lack of sleep, food and bathroom privileges. In passing, counsel additionally suggested that the Miranda warnings on the Bronx videotape were deficient, using the Manhattan tape as a model of proper warnings.

The prosecutor disputed these contentions, arguing that defendant's election to remain silent at the end of the Manhattan tape did not apply to the Bronx tape because "[i]t was a different D.A., different case, different jurisdiction, totally separate." The prosecutor additionally noted that defendant was treated fairly and that his statements were made knowingly and voluntarily. Ruling from the bench, the court denied defendant's suppression motion, concluding that the police procedures were "legally and properly conducted"; defendant was advised of his rights on a number of occasions and knowingly and voluntarily waived them; and "[t]here has been no other evidence introduced which would indicate that there was any coercion or involuntariness on the part of this defendant."

Later in 1982 defendant was tried and convicted in Supreme Court, Bronx County, for the Bronx murder. That conviction was affirmed by the Appellate Division in 1991 (People v. Aguilera, 172 A.D.2d 234, 567 N.Y.S.2d 732) and a Judge of this Court denied leave to appeal (78 N.Y.2d 1073, 577 N.Y.S.2d 236, 583 N.E.2d 948).

The Manhattan case was brought to trial in New York County in 1984. Prior to trial, defendant requested a Huntley hearing "to determine the constitutionality of the procedures used in connection with the * * * statements allegedly made." The People opposed defendant's motion on the ground that he was collaterally estopped by the ruling on his Bronx suppression motion. Agreeing with the People, the motion court ruled that "defendant had the full opportunity to litigate the constitutionality of his statements which includes the statements that the People are going to offer at trial here. The suppression court in Bronx County denied the motion to suppress the defendant's statements and that ruling is binding upon the defendant."

When defendant sought reconsideration before the Trial Justice, the court directed him to reargue before the motion court, which adhered to its original ruling. Hence, defendant went to trial in Manhattan without a Huntley hearing. Defendant took the stand in his defense and sought to have the jury reject the confessions as coerced (see, CPL 710.70[3]; see generally, Sobel, The "Second-Bite" Role of the Jury in the Admissibility of Confessions in New York, 48 Brooklyn LRev 1 [1981]. The jury deadlocked, reporting in a note that three of its members "have rejected the written and video statements as evidence," and a mistrial was declared.

Defendant's retrial was held in 1985. Defendant again testified, alleging that he was periodically beaten by the police in the station house and forced, on three occasions, to take cold showers while fully clothed. Defendant additionally testified that Lugo provided him with a statement written in Spanish --ordering him to memorize it--and struck him on the head with a bat, poked him with a stick, and repeatedly slapped him in the face. According to defendant, the statement made on the Manhattan videotape was not true but was merely a repetition of the statement the detectives forced him to memorize. Defendant acknowledged that he signed the written statement, but claimed that he did not understand English.

Immediately prior to deliberations, a juror, in the presence of the Judge and both counsel, expressed anxiety about her health and having to deliberate late into the night. She declined, however, the Judge's offer to be excused, explaining that she felt "better just talking among ourselves." Neither counsel objected to the juror's continued service, nor did defendant or his counsel object to defendant's absence from the conference. After brief deliberations, the jury reached a guilty verdict.

On appeal from that conviction, defendant argued that collateral estoppel was erroneously applied to deny him a Huntley hearing in Manhattan, but the Appellate Division disagreed and affirmed (185 A.D.2d 772, 586 N.Y.S.2d 957). We now modify and remit for a hearing.

II.

Collateral estoppel, or "issue preclusion" (People ex rel. Dowdy v. Smith, 48 N.Y.2d 477, 423 N.Y.S.2d 862, 399 N.E.2d 894), is a common-law doctrine rooted in civil litigation that, when applied, prevents a party from relitigating an issue decided against it in a prior proceeding (People v. Goodman, 69 N.Y.2d 32, 37, 511 N.Y.S.2d 565, 503 N.E.2d 996; Matter of McGrath v. Gold, 36 N.Y.2d 406, 411, 369 N.Y.S.2d 62, 330 N.E.2d 35; Schwartz v. Public Adm'r of County of Bronx, 24 N.Y.2d 65, 69, 298 N.Y.S.2d 955, 246 N.E.2d 725). While the principle applies in criminal cases as well (see, e.g., People v. Sailor, 65 N.Y.2d 224, 228, 491 N.Y.S.2d 112, 480 N.E.2d 701, cert. denied, 474 U.S. 982, 106 S.Ct. 387, 88 L.Ed.2d 340; People v. Berkowitz, 50 N.Y.2d 333, 344, 428 N.Y.S.2d 927, 406 N.E.2d 783), in the criminal context "it cannot be applied in quite the same way as in civil cases" (People v. Plevy, 52 N.Y.2d 58, 65, 436 N.Y.S.2d 224, 417 N.E.2d 518; see, People v. Reisman, 29 N.Y.2d 278, 285, 327 N.Y.S.2d 342, 277 N.E.2d 396, cert. denied 405 U.S. 1041, 92 S.Ct. 1315, 31 L.Ed.2d 582). We have actually employed the doctrine only once in a criminal case--to preclude the People from relitigating the fact of defendant's alleged presence at a crime scene (People v. Acevedo, 69 N.Y.2d 478, 515 N.Y.S.2d 753, 508 N.E.2d 665).

As collateral estoppel has evolved in our criminal jurisprudence, the formal prerequisites are...