Johnson v. Watson

• Decision Date: 23 December 1941
• Docket Number: 28374.
• Citation: 120 P.2d 515,11 Wn.2d 690
• Court: Washington Supreme Court
• Parties: JOHNSON et ux. v. WATSON et ux.

120 P.2d 515

11 Wn.2d 690

JOHNSON et ux. v. WATSON et ux.

No. 28374.

Supreme Court of Washington

December 23, 1941

Department 2.

Action by Ray Johnson and wife for injuries to Ray Johnson and damages to an automobile against Ray Watson and wife. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendants appeal.

Affirmed.

Appeal from Superior Court, Yakima County; Dolph Barnett, Judge.

Bruce Bartley and J. E. Hullin, both of Seattle, for appellants.

Cheney & Hutcheson, John Gavin, and Marvin E. Cook, all of Yakima for respondents.

SIMPSON, Justice.

Plaintiffs brought this action to recover compensation for injuries to plaintiff Ray Johnson and damages to plaintiffs' automobile sustained in a collision with a truck owned by defendants and driven by defendant Ray Watson.

Plaintiff alleged that the driver of defendants' truck was negligent in failing to drive in a careful and prudent manner and in failing to give timely warning of an intention to turn to the right or to stop. Defendants, by answer, denied the charges of negligence, and alleged that if plaintiffs sustained any injury it was caused by their own negligence proximately contributing thereto. The reply denied the charge of contributory negligence. Upon the issues thus presented the case was tried to a jury, resulting in a verdict favorable to plaintiffs. After appropriate motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or for a new trial were denied, judgment was entered upon the verdict. The defendants appealed.

The assignments of error are in denying appellants' motion to dismiss at the close of plaintiffs' case, in denying appellants' motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or for a new trial, in refusing to instruct the jury to return a verdict for the appellants, and in giving instruction No. 22.

We will refer to plaintiff Ray Johnson, driver of the automobile, as respondent, and to defendant Ray Watson, driver of the truck as appellant.

The evidence which the members of the jury were justified in believing is summarized as follows: The accident occurred on arterial highway No. 97, running between the city of Yakima and the town of Sawyer in this state. The highway, paved to a width of twenty feet with a yellow line in the center thereof in the vicinity of the scene of the accident, is straight and runs in an easterly and westerly direction through a rural district. The weather was clear and the pavement dry. There were no other cars upon the highway. Both vehicles were traveling in an easterly direction at a rate of speed of thirty-five miles per hour. Respondent left his home at Selah about six a. m., and drove easterly towards Granger. As he approached within three hundred eighty feet of a service station located approximately one thousand feet west of the point of the accident, he saw appellant drive onto the highway and proceed in an easterly direction. Respondent slowed his speed somewhat and followed appellant along the highway, driving behind appellant at a distance of about thirty-five feet. In a short time thereafter appellant pulled to his left so that the left dual wheels of his truck were across the yellow line, as though he was going around someone upon the highway, and then swung back to his right. Appellant checked his speed at once as he turned right. Respondent didn't have time to apply his brakes and ran into the rear of appellant's truck as its right front wheel left the pavement. Appellant was attempting to turn to his right onto a private road or lane. The lane was fifteen or eighteen feet wide and there were weeds and foliage about the point at which it intersected the pavement. Appellant did not give a signal of his intention to turn from the highway to his right. He was traveling about fifteen or twenty miles per hour when the collision occurred.

Asked to describe the manner in which appellant slowed and turned respondent stated: 'Well he stopped sudden and turned in front of me and pulled across the line, and it was all in one motion, and he stopped sudden and went down.' He further stated that the two turns happened 'right now.'

Respondent admitted that just Before the collision he glanced at a man and boy who were walking in a westerly direction along the side of the shoulder of the road. He stated however, that he did not turn his head when he saw them. He further testified that he could stop his car within seventeen or twenty feet while traveling at the rate of thirty-five miles per hour.

Appellant admits negligence on his part, but earnestly contends that respondent was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law and for that reason cannot recover damages for the injuries he sustained.

In approaching a consideration of this case we have in mind the oft repeated and well recognized rule in this state that the presence or absence of contributory negligence is, as a general rule, a question for the jury. It is only when reasonable minds can draw but one conclusion, that the plaintiff was negligent, from all the facts and circumstances and the inferences to be drawn therefrom, that the court can determine the question as a matter of law. When the minds of reasonable men differ, the question is one for the jury. If there is substantial evidence to sustain the verdict, the judgment must be affirmed.

The rule of law which governs the conduct of the driver of a following vehicle is contained in Rem.Rev.Stat. Vol. 7A, § 6360-81: 'It shall be unlawful for the operator of any motor vehicle to follow another vehicle more closely than is reasonable and prudent, having due regard for the speed of such vehicles and the traffic upon and the condition of any such public highway. * * *'

Under this statute it was necessary for respondent to exercise that degree of care required of a reasonably prudent person under like or similar circumstances.

Certain underlying principles of law must apply to all cases of this character. It is true, however, that each case must be judged to a very large extent upon the pattern of its own facts. In determining each individual case, the condition of the highway, the traffic, the acts of the parties and all of the surrounding circumstances must be taken into consideration. We have had occasion to pass upon questions of this nature on numerous occasions.

In Spencer v. Magrini, 115 Wash. 29, 195 P. 1041, we upheld the judgment of the trial court in holding the driver of the following car, which crashed into the car ahead when it turned to avoid a parked car, guilty of negligence in driving four or five feet behind the leading car.

In Knudson v. Bockwinkle, 120 Wash. 527, 208 P. 59, we sustained a judgment which held the driver of the following car negligent for traveling at a distance of forty to fifty feet behind a bus at the rate of twenty to twenty-five miles per hour. The facts showed that at the time the collision occurred it was dark, stormy, and the pavement slippery.

Again, in Ritter v. Johnson, 163 Wash. 153, 300 P. 518, 520, 79 A.L.R. 1270, the rear car was a distance of two car lengths behind the front car. Both were traveling at a speed of about thirty-five miles per hour upon a straight, dry road located in a rural district. In upholding the trial court's judgment against the driver of the following car, we stated: 'Appellant was, according to his own testimony, traveling at thirty miles an hour, two car lengths behind the car driven by Mr. Fake. There was considerable traffic on the road. Under these circumstances, appellant was required to maintain careful and continual observation of the car ahead of him in order to avoid a collision with that machine. While it is true that the driver of a car is not required to be a mind reader, and that a driver is supposed to give a signal Before stopping or materially checking his speed, it is matter of common knowledge that emergency stops often must be made, of which there is no time to give a signal.'

We affirmed a jury's verdict in Jacklin v. North Coast Transportation Co., 165 Wash. 236, 5 P.2d 325, returned against the owner of a bus when it ran into the rear of another bus, which stopped in obedience to a traffic signal. The following bus was traveling about thirty feet behind the one in front and upon a street in the city of Seattle.

In Rust v. Schlaitzer, ...