Johnson v. Western Union Tel. Co.

• Decision Date: 03 January 1919
• Docket Number: 594.
• Citation: 97 S.E. 757,177 N.C. 31
• Parties: JOHNSON v. WESTERN UNION TELEGRAPH CO.
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

97 S.E. 757

177 N.C. 31

JOHNSON v. WESTERN UNION TELEGRAPH CO.

No. 594.

Supreme Court of North Carolina

January 3, 1919

Appeal from Superior Court, Macon County; Ferguson, Judge.

Action by F. N. Johnson against the Western Union Telegraph Company. From judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals. Error.

Negligence of telegraph company in delaying death message was not proximate cause of injuries to plaintiff in traveling toward home on freight train after he had missed first passenger train or injuries from attempting to walk from station to his home because he did not wish to pay automobile fare and had not been met by conveyance ordered.

This is an action to recover damages caused by the negligent delay in the transmission and delivery of an interstate message from Franklin, N. C., to Kingsport, Tenn., informing the plaintiff of the death of his wife. From the verdict and judgment, the defendant appealed.

Merrimon Adams & Johnston, of Asheville, and Tillett & Guthrie, of Charlotte, for appellant.

J Frank Ray, of Sylva, T. J. Johnston, of Franklin, and P. B D'Orr, of Atlanta, Ga., for appellee.

CLARK C.J.

The complaint sets out three causes of action:

1. For mental anguish suffered by reason of the negligence of the defendant.

On the former appeal, 175 N.C. 588, 96 S.E. 36, the court held that this being an interstate message, recovery could not be had on that ground. The court did not pass upon the other two grounds of action.

2. There was delay in the proper transmission of the telegram, which prevented the plaintiff from leaving on the first passenger train which passed after the time at which the message should have been delivered. He secured permission to travel in the caboose of the freight train and had a rough ride, and there is evidence that he was injured by being jolted and thrown against the steel ladder in the caboose, bruising his knee and wrenching his side.

3. The third cause of action was that when the plaintiff reached Dillsboro, N. C., whence he had to travel by private conveyance to Franklin, N. C., the automobile charge was more than he was willing to pay. The conveyance which he had wired to Franklin to be sent not having arrived, the plaintiff set out to walk, and he put in evidence that he was seriously injured by the overfatigue before the car which had been sent by his order met him.

Without going into the details of the injuries and sufferings endured by the plaintiff on the freight train and in attempting to walk from Dillsboro to Franklin, it is sufficient to say that in no sense can the delay in the delivery of the telegram be deemed a proximate cause of such injuries.

It is true that the ride on the freight train and the fatiguing walk occurred after the delay in the delivery of the telegram. If it had been delivered in proper time, he might have been saved the trip by freight, though it does not appear that he would have avoided the walk, for there is no evidence that the automobile charges from Dillsboro would have been less if he had arrived by passenger train. But the syllogism "post hoc, ergo propter hoc," is not conclusive as to proximate cause.

The delay in the delivery of the telegram might have caused, and doubtless did cause, mental anguish to the plaintiff by preventing him from reaching home by the earliest conveyance. But that is out of this case, for the reasons given in our former opinion. But it did not cause the sufferings endured by the plaintiff in his trip on the freight train. It...