Johnson v. Williams .

Decision Date30 March 2010
Docket NumberCivil Action No. 05-2315 (RBW).
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Columbia
PartiesJames F. JOHNSON, Plaintiff, v. Anthony WILLIAMS, et al., Defendants.

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED.

James F. Johnson, Washington, DC, pro se.

Dana K. Delorenzo, Office of the Attorney General for D.C., Washington, DC for Anthony Williams.

Jeremy S. Simon, U.S. Attorney's Office, Washington, DC, for Paul Quander, Paul Quander, John Taberski, Anthony Hinton.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

REGGIE B. WALTON, District Judge.

This matter is before the Court on a motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, for summary judgment, filed on behalf of Paul Quander, Paul Brennan, Anthony Hinton, and John Taberski. 1 For the reasons discussed below, the defendants' motion will be granted, and this civil action will be dismissed in its entirety.

I. BACKGROUND

In November 1976, the plaintiff was sentenced in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia to an aggregate term of six to 30 years incarceration for burglary while armed, rape while armed, assault with a dangerous weapon, and carrying a pistol without a license. United States Parole Commission's Opposition to Petitioner's Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus, Johnson v. Harrison, No. 05cv2504 (D.D.C. filed April 3, 2006) (Ex. G (June 16, 2005 Alleged Violation(s) Report) at 1). 2 Apparently the plaintiff had been released on parole for the 1976 conviction, and while on parole committed new offenses that resulted in the imposition of a prison sentence in February 1997 of 40 months to 10 years for carrying a pistol without a license, and one year for possessing an unregistered firearm. Id.

The United States Parole Commission (“USPC”) released the plaintiff on parole from his 1997 sentence on October 10, 2003. Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Defendants' Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment (“Defs.' Mem.”), Declaration of Paul S. Brennan (“Brennan Decl.”), Ex. 4 (Certificate of Parole) at 1. 3 The Court Services and Offender Supervision Agency (“CSOSA”) was responsible for supervising the plaintiff's parole and for carrying out the conditions of release imposed by the USPC. See D.C.Code § 24-133(c)(4) (2001). John Taberski (“Taberski”) initially was assigned as the plaintiff's community supervision officer (“CSO”), and when their relationship soured, Anthony Hinton (“Hinton”) was assigned to supervise the plaintiff. Defs.' Mem. at 4; Complaint (“Compl.”) ¶ 8. Paul Brennan, a Supervisory CSO, supervised both CSO Taberski and CSO Hinton. Defs.' Mem. at 4; see id., Brennan Decl. ¶ 2.

Among the conditions of the plaintiff's parole were the following:

4. You shall make a complete and truthful written report (on a form provided for that purpose) to your [CSO] between the first and third day of each month, and on the final day of parole. You shall also report to your [CSO] at other times as your [CSO] directs, providing complete and truthful information.
5. You shall not violate any law. You shall not associate with persons engaged in criminal activity. You shall get in touch within 2 days with your [CSO if you are] arrested or questioned by a law enforcement officer.
6. You shall not associate with persons who have a criminal record without the permission of your [CSO].
14. You shall cooperate fully with those responsible for your supervision. You shall carry out the instructions of your [CSO] and report as directed, knowing that failure to do so may be sufficient to cause your return to the institution.
16. If you have been convicted of any sexual offense, ... you must report for registration with your state (including the District of Columbia) sex offender registration agency as directed by your [CSO].

United States Parole Commission's Opposition to Petitioner's Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus, Johnson v. Harrison, No. 05cv2504 (D.D.C. filed April 3, 2006) (Ex. D (Certificate of Parole) at 3-4).

A. The Plaintiff's Status as a Sex Offender

Since April 2003, the plaintiff has been registered in the District of Columbia as a sex offender. Defs.' Mem., Brennan Decl., Ex. 2 (Sex Offender Registry Information). In May 2003, CSO Taberski ordered the plaintiff to undergo a psychosexual assessment by Dr. Michael Lavin. See Compl. ¶¶ 1-2; Defs.' Mem., Brennan Decl., Ex. 3 (Psychosexual Evaluation of James Johnson). Dr. Lavin placed the plaintiff “in the medium-high risk category of sexual offenders, based on [an] assessment ... completed on February 24, 2004,” United States Parole Commission's Opposition to Petitioner's Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus, Johnson v. Harrison, No. 05cv2504 (D.D.C. filed April 3, 2006) (Ex. E (Request for Modification(s) of Release Conditions) at 1), and recommended that the plaintiff undergo sex offender treatment, see Defs.' Mem., Brennan Decl., Ex. 5 (James Johnson Treatment Recommendation). In making his assessment, Dr. Lavin considered the results of polygraph and plethysmograph tests, as well as information from CSO Taberski regarding the plaintiff's plans to have his teenage daughter spend weekends with him at his residence. Id., Ex. 5 at 1. Based on Dr. Lavin's recommendation and “other ... behavior on the [plaintiff's] part that suggest[ed] that he present [ed][a] grave threat to the community, namely minors,” United States Parole Commission's Opposition to Petitioner's Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus, Johnson v. Harrison, No. 05cv2504 (D.D.C. filed April 3, 2006) (Ex. E at 1), the USPC imposed the following additional conditions on the plaintiff's parole:

You shall not have any association or contact of any kind with minor children, whether in your residence, employment, social, or other activities, without the approval of your [CSO].
In addition, you shall be subject to the Special Sex Offender Aftercare Condition. You shall participate in an in-patient or out-patient mental health program as directed by your [CSO], with special emphasis on long-term sex offender testing and treatment. You are expected to acknowledge your need for treatment and to participate in good faith in achieving the program goals that will be established for you.
Special Search Condition to allow CSOSA to conduct searches of your person, property and abode, at a reasonable time and manner by your CSO, in order to determine if you continue to have contact with minor[s] or possess items used to groom minors.

Defs.' Mem., Brennan Decl., Ex. 6 (March 1, 2004 Notice of Action). Notwithstanding these conditions, the plaintiff continued to have contact with minors, including his teenage daughter. See id., Ex. 5 at 5-8; United States Parole Commission's Opposition to Petitioner's Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus, Johnson v. Harrison, No. 05cv2504 (D.D.C. filed April 3, 2006) (Ex. L (September 13, 2005 Supplement to Warrant Application) at 1).

B. The Plaintiff's Association with Persons Who Have Criminal Records

The plaintiff had become a certified drug addiction counselor and a Criminal Justice Act (“CJA”) investigator. Compl. ¶ 4. On April 15, 2005, CSO Brennan encountered the plaintiff at the Superior Court, and observed that the plaintiff was wearing a badge indicating his status as a CJA Investigator. Defs.' Mem., Brennan Decl., Ex. 1 (Alleged Violation(s) Report, June 16, 2005) at 9; see United States Parole Commission's Opposition to Petitioner's Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus, Johnson v. Harrison, No. 05cv2504 (D.D.C. filed April 3, 2006) (Ex. G at 9). After learning from the Deputy Chief of the District of Columbia Public Defender Service's Investigations Division that the plaintiff should not have been issued an investigator's badge due to his criminal background, CSO Hinton confiscated the badge. Defs.' Mem., Brennan Decl., Ex. 1 at 9. A search of the plaintiff's residence on April 29, 2005, uncovered Superior Court witness vouchers and evidence “suggesting that the [plaintiff was] associating with persons who have criminal records and performed work as an investigator[.] Id. In addition, CSO Hinton obtained documents from the District of Columbia Jail which confirmed that the plaintiff had visited inmates both in his capacity as a CJA Investigator and in his personal capacity, notwithstanding the Warden's February 5, 2004 memorandum instructing staff to bar the plaintiff's entry. Id. From this information, CSO Hinton determined that the plaintiff had violated the condition of parole that he not associate with persons who have criminal records. Id.

C. The Plaintiff's May 18, 2005, Arrest

The plaintiff was arrested on May 18, 2005, and charged with operating a motor vehicle after suspension of his driver's license. Id., Ex. 1 at 10. The plaintiff failed to report his arrest to his CSO, and only admitted the arrest when he was confronted about it on 6/8/05, despite having reported to [his CSO] on 5/18/05 and 5/24/05[.] Id.

D. Parole Revocation

A USPC hearing examiner conducted a parole revocation hearing on November 28, 2005, and he found that the plaintiff violated the conditions of his release (1) by associating with persons having a criminal record and (2) by violating the special condition of his release not to associate or have contact with any minor as a result of having contacted his minor daughter without his CSO's permission. United States Parole Commission's Opposition to Petitioner's Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus, Johnson v. Harrison, No. 05cv2504 (D.D.C. filed April 3, 2000) (Ex. M (November 28, 2005 Hearing Summary) at 3-4). Consequently, the USPC revoked the plaintiff's parole and continued the matter until December 16, 2006, his presumptive re-parole date after serving 16 months incarceration. 4 Defs.' Mem., Brennan Decl., Ex. 7 (January 5, 2006 Notice of Action) at 1.

E. Allegations of the Plaintiff's Complaint

Generally, the plaintiff alleges that the defendants abused their authority by ordering his assessment and treatment as a sex offender,...

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