Jordan v. Quander, Civil Action No. 11–1486(JDB).

• Decision Date: 09 August 2012
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 11–1486(JDB).
• Citation: 882 F.Supp.2d 88
• Parties: Consuelo JORDAN, Plaintiff, v. Paul QUANDER, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Columbia

882 F.Supp.2d 88

Consuelo JORDAN, Plaintiff,
v.
Paul QUANDER, et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 11–1486(JDB).

United States District Court,
District of Columbia.

Aug. 9, 2012.

[882 F.Supp.2d 90]

Consuelo Jordon, Washington, DC, pro se.

Melissa Gaspar Rasmussen, U.S. Attorney's Office for the District of Columbia, Washington, DC, for Defendants.

[882 F.Supp.2d 91]

MEMORANDUM OPINION
JOHN D. BATES, District Judge.

This matter is before the Court on the federal defendant's motion to dismiss. For the reasons discussed below, the motion will be granted.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff, a black female, Am. Compl. ¶ 8, files this “complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief ... for a violation of her civil rights ... under ... the 1964 Civil Rights Act and the Civil Rights Act of 1866,” and “under the provisions of 42 U.S.C. [§ ] 1983,” id. ¶ 1. She names four defendants: Paul Quander, former Director of the Court Services and Offender Supervision Agency (“CSOSA”),¹ Jasper Ormand, former Interim Director of CSOSA,² Susan Shaffer, former Director of the Pretrial Services Agency (“PSA”),³ and Phillip McHugh, a Metropolitan Police Department (“MPD”) officer.⁴Id. ¶¶ 4–7.

A. Plaintiff's Allegations

The factual allegations pertaining to plaintiff's race discrimination claim are few. Generally, plaintiff alleges that she began her employment at CSOSA in 2000 as a Pretrial Services Officer subject to a two-year period of probation, see Am. Compl. ¶ 13, that she “filed a complaint for Job discrimination and Sexual Harassment” in or about 2000 “due to Employment Discrimination [by] her former Supervisor, Michael Kainu,” id. ¶ 16, and that, notwithstanding a satisfactory performance evaluation in July 2001, she was “terminated due to her race,” id. ¶ 19. The complaint, even as amended, otherwise rambles incoherently. For example, plaintiff accuses defendant McHugh of “illegally hacking exams in New York City using derogatory language, sex talk, and dirty talk and raping,” and of “follow[ing] plaintiff daily to get rid of her and jobs, due to job discrimination.” Id. ¶ 26. In addition, she alleges that the United States Attorney General, who is not a named defendant to this action, “held hate fights against plaintiff” and “attack[ed] plaintiff because of black men receiving 15 million yearly, due to basketball in her area.” Id. ¶ 27. Defendants Quander and Ormand are allegedly responsible for unspecified acts of discrimination “against [her] brother's career in professional basketball and degrees in Education that he received in New York, 1984 and his teachings.” Id. ¶ 28. And the PSA allegedly is “stealing from [plaintiff's] banking accounts, TSP Plans, slipping employees in her slots, and rehiring them due to her sexual harassment claims,” id. ¶ 29, and has “brought girls into the office to assault and fight plaintiff,” id. ¶ 39. Another of plaintiff's allegations is that assorted defendants have copied her “complaint letters,” id. ¶ 33, have “plac[ed] signs in front of [plaintiff's] home,” id., and have “enter[ed her] home to perform sexual harassment and

[882 F.Supp.2d 92]

illegal discrimination,” id. ¶ 34. Plaintiff demands a declaratory judgment, injunctive relief, and monetary damages. See id. at 10–11 (Prayer for Relief).

B. Defendants' Representations

In August 2000, plaintiff “filed an administrative EEO Complaint against a CSOSA official,” Mem. of P. & A. in Supp. of Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss (“Defs.' Mem.”) at 2, presumably her former supervisor, Michael Kainu, see Am. Compl. ¶ 16; see also Defs.' Mem., Ex. A (Decision, Jordan v. Quander, EEOC No. 100–A2–8158X (hereinafter “EEOC Decision”)) at 5–7 (discussing plaintiff's unsupported assertions that she was subjected to Kainu's “bullying, victimization and harassment”).

According to defendants, plaintiff was terminated on November 2, 2001, during her probationary period, because of her unsatisfactory work performance. See Defs.' Mem. at 2–3. She promptly “initiated EEO counseling on November 14, 2001, and thereafter filed a formal complaint on January 8, 2002, alleging that she had been discriminated against in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. Section 2000e et seq.” Id., Ex. A (EEOC Decision) at 1. An administrative law judge (“ALJ”) with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) considered “whether [plaintiff] was discriminated against based on her race (Black) and/or retaliated against based on prior EEO activity when she was terminated during her probationary period in November 2001,” and granted the agency's motion for summary judgment without a hearing. Id., EEOC Decision at 1. Commenting that there was “overwhelming evidence of record indicat[ing] that [plaintiff] did, in fact, experience performance deficiencies,” the ALJ found that plaintiff “ha[d] not placed in genuine dispute the reason articulated for her firing,” that is, the “performance deficiencies” documented as to her employment as a Pretrial Services Officer. Id., EEOC Decision at 7. CSOSA issued its final agency determination (“FAD”) on June 20, 2003. Id., Ex. B (Final Order, Jordan v. Quander, EEOC Case No. 100–A2–8158X, dated June 20, 2003).

C. Plaintiff's Past and Present Employment Discrimination Litigation

In September 2003, counsel filed a lawsuit on plaintiff's behalf alleging race discrimination and due process violations. Id., Ex. C (Plaintiff's Complaint for Discriminatory and Injunctive Relief, Jordan v. Quander, No. 03–cv–1926 (D.D.C. filed Sept. 16, 2003)). According to plaintiff, CSOSA terminated her because of her race, even though “similarly situated white employees were not treated the same as those individuals in [her] protected class.” Id. (Complaint) ¶ 16. She also claimed to have been a permanent employee with a protected property interest in her government employment, an interest violated by CSOSA when it afforded her only the rights of a probationary employee. See id. (Complaint) ¶¶ 19–23. The Court dismissed the suit “[i]n light of [plaintiff's] stated interest not to proceed.” Id., Ex. D (Minute Entry Order, Jordan v. Quander, No. 03–cv–1926 (D.D.C. filed Mar. 24, 2006)). More than a year later, plaintiff, proceeding pro se, attempted to reinstate the case; the court denied her request because she presented no “legitimate reason ... to abjure her prior voluntary dismissal.” Id., Ex. E (Order, Jordan v. Quander, No. 03–cv–1926 (D.D.C. filed May 4, 2007)). The Court instructed plaintiff that, if she “wishe[d] to once again prosecute her claims ..., she [would] have to file a new lawsuit.” Id., Ex. E.

In 2005, plaintiff filed four separate lawsuits in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia against CSOSA and individual

[882 F.Supp.2d 93]

employees of either CSOSA or PSA; each lawsuit was removed to this court and dismissed for plaintiff's failure to take necessary action. See Minute Order, Jordan v. Tiggs, No. 05–cv–1706 (D.D.C. filed Sept. 19, 2006) (dismissing case for failure to prosecute); Minute Entry Order, Jordan v. Quander, No. 05–cv–0281(D.D.C. filed Sept. 14, 2005) (granting Quander's motion to dismiss as conceded); Minute Order, Jordan v. Quander, No. 05–cv–1883 (D.D.C. filed Mar. 3, 2006) (granting defendant's motion to dismiss as conceded); Minute Order, Jordan v. Court Services and Offender Supervision Agency, No. 05–cv–2144 (D.D.C. filed Mar. 3, 2006) (granting defendants' motion to dismiss as conceded). Undeterred, plaintiff has filed two additional lawsuits, both pending before this court. See Jordan v. Quander, Civ. No. 11–2297 (D.D.C. filed Sept. 23, 2011); Jordan v. U.S. Attorney's Office, No. 12–cv–0838 (D.D.C. filed May 23, 2012).

II. DISCUSSION A. Dismissal for Failure to State a Claim Upon Which Relief Can Be Granted
1. Dismissal Standard Under Rule 12(b)(6)

Defendants move to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on the ground that the complaint, as amended, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See generally Defs.' Mem. at 9–19. A motion under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the sufficiency of the complaint. See Browning v. Clinton, 292 F.3d 235, 242 (D.C.Cir.2002). “[T]he complaint is construed liberally in the plaintiff['s] favor, and [the Court] grant[s the] plaintiff[ ] the benefit of all inferences that can be derived from the facts alleged.” Kowal v. MCI Comm'cns Corp., 16 F.3d 1271, 1276 (D.C.Cir.1994). The Court is “not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286, 106 S.Ct. 2932, 92 L.Ed.2d 209 (1986).

The complaint survives a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) only if it “contain[s] sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). A claim is facially plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw [a] reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)). A pro se complaint “must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers,” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94, 127 S.Ct. 2197, 167 L.Ed.2d 1081 (2007) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), but it, too, “must plead ‘factual matter’ that permits the court to infer ‘more than the mere possibility of misconduct,’ ” Atherton v. Dist. of Columbia Office of the Mayor, 567 F.3d 672, 681–82 (D.C.Cir.2009) (quoting Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1950).

2. Plaintiff's Title VII Claims Against Quander, Ormand and Shaffer in their Individual Capacities Will Be Dismissed

Defendants argue that, under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–16(c), the proper defendant is the current Director of CSOSA. See Defs.' Mem. at 9. The Court concurs. Title VII provides for the filing of “a civil action ... in which civil action the head of the department, agency,...