Johnson v. Wolfenbarger
| Decision Date | 17 August 2010 |
| Docket Number | No. 09-1895,No. 10a0520n.06,10a0520n.06,09-1895 |
| Parties | CHRISTOPHER JOHNSON, Petitioner-Appellee. v. HUGH WOLFENBARGER, Respondent-Appellant. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit |
Defendant Christopher Johnson was convicted offour counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct following a bench trial in Wayne County Circuit Court. Johnson had waived his right to a jury trial after he was bound over on four counts of third-degree criminal sexual conduct. Subsequently, Johnson's information was amended and the original charges of first-degree criminal sexual conduct were reinstated. Several weeks passed after the firstdegree charges were reinstated, but Johnson did not seek to withdraw his waiver of jury trial. Nor did he object to the ensuing bench trial until after he was found guilty and sentenced to four concurrent prison terms of eighteen to fifty years. The conviction was affirmed on appeal.
In habeas, the district court concluded that Johnson did not effectively waive his right to a jury trial on the first-degree charges and is entitled to a new trial. Warden Hugh Wolfenbarger argues on appeal that Johnson's claim is procedurally defaulted, and that Johnson has failed to show cause and prejudice excusing his default. Further, the Warden contends, even if the court reaches the merits of petitioner's claim, habeas relief is inappropriate because the Michigan Court of Appeals' affirmance of the conviction has not been shown to be an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. The Warden is right in both respects. The district court's ruling will therefore be reversed.
The facts established by the trial proofs, which are not in dispute for present purposes, are summarized in the Michigan Court of Appeals' opinion. People v. Johnson, 2005 WL 602543 at *1 (Mich. Ct. App. 2005). The details need not be reiterated. In short, defendant Johnson was shown to have used force and threats of force during a two-day episode in October 2003 as he repeatedly brutalized the woman with whom he was then cohabiting. Johnson was initially charged with six counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct in state court. Following a preliminary examination, the state district court dismissed two of the counts and reduced the remaining charges to third-degree criminal sexual conduct. Johnson was bound over on these charges and an amended information was filed on November 5, 2003, to reflect the third-degree charges.
At a November 14, 2003 docketing conference, Johnson waived his right to a jury trial and asked that all pre-trial motions be decided by an alternate judge. The court granted Johnson's request for referral of all pre-trial motions to an alternate judge. The court also questioned Johnson underoath and ascertained that he understood his right to a jury trial and that he was not promised any special result or verdict in exchange for giving up his right to a jury trial. R. 9, ex. 3, docketing conf. tr. pp. 4-5. Johnson signed a written waiver. Id. Subsequently, the alternate judge heard and granted the prosecution's motion to amend the information so as to reinstate the original charges of firstdegree criminal sexual conduct. A second amended information was prepared to reflect the reinstated charges.
Three weeks passed before the ensuing trial. At no time did Johnson seek to withdraw his jury trial waiver. The state court failed to elicit from Johnson an express acknowledgment that his jury trial waiver extended to the first-degree charges. Yet, Johnson did not assert his right to a jury trial and stated no objection to proceeding with the bench trial. Johnson was convicted of four counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct under M.C.L. § 750.520b(1)(f) and sentenced to four consecutive terms of eighteen to fifty years' imprisonment.
Johnson appealed, challenging for the first time the validity of his jury trial waiver. Johnson, 2005 WL 602543 at *4. Specifically, Johnson contended that his conviction must be reversed because his jury trial waiver did not extend to the first-degree charges. The Michigan Court of Appeals reviewed this claim for plain error, because no objection had been asserted in the trial court. The court found that Johnson was aware of the allegations against him at all times and held that his waiver was valid. The court held that because Johnson neither moved to withdraw his waiver nor objected to the bench trial, no plain error occurred. Further, the court observed that Johnson had not carried his burden of showing prejudice resulting from any error and had not shown that the fairness, integrity or public reputation of the proceedings had been adversely affected. Id. at *4-5. The Michigan Supreme Court denied leave to appeal.
Johnson filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Eastern District of Michigan. The district court concluded that Johnson's claim was procedurally defaulted, but nonetheless granted the petition. The district court held that the Michigan Court of Appeals' holding that Johnson had effectively waived his right to a jury trial on the first-degree charges contained in the second amended information represented an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. The Warden challenges these conclusions, contending that the district court improperly merged the procedural default cause-and-prejudice analysis with the merits of the case; that Johnson did not demonstrate cause for his failure to object to the bench trial; and that Johnson's jury trial waiver effectively applied, in view of his non-objection, to the reinstated first-degree charges.
We review the district court's legal conclusions de novo and its factual findings for clear error. Fleming v. Metrish, 556 F.3d 520, 524 (6th Cir. 2009). Johnson's habeas petition is evaluated under the limited standard of review prescribed in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA"), 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). See Fleming 556 F.3d at 524. Under AEDPA, a federal court may not grant habeas relief from a state conviction unless the state-court adjudication "resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).
A state court adjudication is contrary to clearly established federal law if it arrives at a conclusion opposite to that of the Supreme Court on a question of law or decides a case differentlyon a set of materially indistinguishable facts. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 413 (2000). Alternatively, an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent occurs if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the case. Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 520 (2003). A state-court adjudication must be objectively unreasonable to warrant relief; it is not sufficient that the reviewing court finds the state court's decision erroneous or incorrect. Id. at 520-21.
Federal habeas relief may be precluded on claims that a petitioner has not presented to the state courts in accordance with the state's procedural rules. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 85-87 (1977). Such a "procedural default" occurs when a petitioner fails to comply with a state procedural rule, the rule is actually relied upon by the state courts, and the procedural rule is "adequate and independent." White v. Mitchell, 431 F.3d 517, 524 (6th Cir. 2005). Procedural default may be excused where the petitioner demonstrates cause and prejudice for his failure to comply with the state procedural rule, or when a petitioner establishes that failing to review the claim would result in a fundamental miscarriage ofjustice. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991); Combs v. Coyle, 205 F.3d 269, 274 (6th Cir. 2000). To demonstrate that a "fundamental miscarriage of justice" would occur absent review of a petitioner's claim, the petitioner must assert a credible claim of actual innocence that is supported by reliable evidence that was not presented at trial. Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 315-16 (1995).
The district court correctly determined that Johnson's claim was procedurally defaulted by virtue of his having failed to object to the bench trial in the trial court, which failure resulted inappellate review only under the more restrictive "plain error" standard of review. See Johnson, 2005 WL 602543 at *3. It is now well-established that the Michigan Court of Appeals' application of plain-error review constitutes the invocation of an independent and adequate procedural rule that bars federal review of the merits of his claim absent a showing of "cause and prejudice." See Fleming, 556 F.3d at 530.
Yet, the district court side-stepped the cause-and-prejudice requirement, observing simply and without authority that the analysis "merged" with the analysis of the merits of the case. This decision to ignore the cause-and-prejudice requirement is directly contrary to controlling precedent. It is well-established that either cause and prejudice or actual innocence must be established in order to excuse procedural default. See Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986); Murphy v. Ohio, 551 F.3d 485, 501-02 (6th Cir. 2009); Haylim v. Mitchell, 492 F.3d 680, 690-91 (6th Cir. 2007). The district court's disregard of the cause-and-prejudice requirement was in error, for it is abundantly clear that Johnson has shown neither cause nor prejudice to excuse his procedural default.
In order to establish "cause," a petitioner must show that "some objective factor external to the defense impeded counsel's efforts to comply with the State's procedural rule." Haylim, 492 F.3d at 690-91 (quoting Murray, 477 U.S. at 488). "Prejudice," meanwhi...
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