Johnson v. Woodard, 30635

Decision Date21 February 1961
Docket NumberNo. 30635,30635
Citation343 S.W.2d 646
PartiesStella JOHNSON, (Plaintiff) Appellant, v. Mary WOODARD and Regina Goff, (Defendants) Respondents.
CourtMissouri Court of Appeals

Jerome F. Duggan, Sidney W. Horwitz, St. Louis, for appellant, Dubinsky & Duggan, St. Louis, of counsel.

Sidney R. Redmond, St. Louis, for respondents.

WOLFE, Judge.

This is an action to partition certain real estate. A motion to dismiss the petition was filed by the defendants. This motion was sustained and the petition dismissed. The plaintiff appeals from the judgment dismissing the action.

The petition, starting at paragraph 2 thereof, states:

'2. Plaintiff states that Sara C. Young died testate on the 22nd day of August, 1957, and on the date of her death was the owner of personal property and real estate which is hereinafter described; that the personal property is greatly in excess of the amount necessary to pay all claims and demands, legacies, taxes, all costs of administration, and all other debts or charges against her estate.

'3. Plaintiff states that she and the defendants, Mary Woodward and Regina Goff, are the specific and residuary devisees named under the last Will and Testament of Sara C. Young, deceased, to receive the real property owned by testatrix at her demise; and that to the best of plaintiff's knowledge and belief, the parties herein named are the only persons having or claiming any interest in and to the real estate hereinafter described.'

Paragraphs 4 and 5 describe the real estate, which is located in the City of St. Louis, and the sixth paragraph sets out Article II of the last Will and Testament of Sara C. Young, which is as follows:

'I give, bequeath and devise my home located at 4562 Labadie Avenue in the City of St. Louis, Missouri, and any and all other real estate wheresoever situated to my beloved sisters, Mary V. Woodward and Stella Johnson, and my beloved niece, Regina Goff, Ph. D., to share equally, and to the survivor of them.'

This is followed by formal allegations petitioning for a sale of the property and a division of the proceeds.

The motion to dismiss the petition was predicated upon the theory that to partition the real estate would be in violation of Civil Rule 96.13, V.A.M.R.

The question presented by this appeal is whether or not the petition is sufficient to grant partition of the real estate involved. It set forth the clause of the Will by which the plaintiff seeks to establish a title subject to partition. The defendants maintain that by that clause it was the obvious intent of the testatrix to limit the estate in the plaintiff and defendants to a life estate with the remainder in fee to the one of them that survived the others. It is contended that by reason of this a partition of the real estate would defeat the Will of the testatrix by destroying the right of survivorship. It is stated that this is contrary to Civil Rule 96.13, V.A.M.R., which provides:

'No partition or sale of lands, tenements or hereditaments, devised by any last will shall be made under the provisions of this Rule relating to partition, contrary to the intention of the testator, expressed in any such will.'

Conversely, the plaintiff appellant states that to so construe the Will would be violative of Section 442.450 RSMo 1949, V.A.M.S., which is as follows:

'Every interest in real estate granted or devised to two or more persons, other than executors and trustees and husband and wife, shall be a tenancy in common, unless expressly declared, in such grant or...

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4 cases
  • Domyan v. Dornin
    • United States
    • Missouri Court of Appeals
    • 8 Agosto 1961
    ...of whether it has been challenged. Hammonds v. Hammonds, Mo.App., 289 S.W.2d 903, 904(1), and cases there cited; Johnson v. Woodard, Mo.App., 343 S.W.2d 646, 648(1). Innumerable opinions have considered what is required for a case to involve title to real estate within the meaning of our co......
  • Morrow v. Caloric Appliance Corp.
    • United States
    • Missouri Court of Appeals
    • 5 Diciembre 1962
    ...not challenged by the parties [Hammonds v. Hammonds, Mo.App., 289 S.W.2d 903, 904(1), and cases cited in footnote 1; Johnson v. Woodard, Mo.App., 343 S.W.2d 646, 648(1); Domyan v. Dornin, Mo.App., 348 S.W.2d 360, 361], we cannot ignore the obvious fact that, as we shall explain and elaborat......
  • Johnson v. Woodard
    • United States
    • Missouri Court of Appeals
    • 17 Abril 1962
    ...on the ground that the case involves title to real estate within the meaning of the Constitution, Art. V, Sec. 3, V.A.M.S. Johnson v. Woodard, Mo.App., 343 S.W.2d 646. However, the Supreme Court, deciding that title to real estate in the constitutional sense was not presented, retransferred......
  • Johnson v. Woodard
    • United States
    • Missouri Supreme Court
    • 11 Diciembre 1961
    ...Court on the ground that the case involves title to real estate within the meaning of Constitution, Art. V, Sec. 3, V.A.M.S. Johnson v. Woodard, Mo.App., 343 S.W.2d 646. Stella Johnson's amended petition for partition alleged that Sara C. Young, fee simple owner of the land, devised it by h......

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