Johnson v. Woodward Lumber Co
Decision Date | 22 November 1947 |
Docket Number | No. 31667.,31667. |
Citation | 45 S.E.2d 294 |
Parties | JOHNSON. v. WOODWARD LUMBER CO. |
Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
Syllabus by the Court.
1. "Where a witness testifies to a fact, the presumption is, in the absence of anything to the contrary, that he is testifying from his own knowledge."
2. "Where a witness testifies to a conclusion of fact which could be within his knowledge and such testimony is admitted without objection, it cannot be attacked on review as being incompetent or insufficient."
3. Where the location of one boundary line is in dispute, it is not error to admit testimony of a coterminous landowner relative to the location of another boundary line of the same tract of land where it serves to elucidate or throw light upon the issue being tried.
Error from Superior Court, Richmond County; G. C. Anderson, Judge.
Action in trespass by the Woodward Lumber Company against W. C. Johnson to recover damages for the cutting and removing of standing timber from realty owned by plaintiff. To review a judgment for plaintiff, defendant brought error to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court, 42 S.E.2d 639, transferred the appeal to the Court of Appeals.
Judgment affirmed.
The Woodward Lumber Company brought an action in trespass against Wm. Clifford Johnson to recover damages occasioned by the cutting and removing of standing timber from a tract of land owned by the plaintiff.
In his answer the defendant denied the trespass and alleged that he owned adjoining land and had cut timber from his land only.
The jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff. The defendant filed a motion for new trial based on the general and one special ground. This motion was overruled, and the defendant excepted.
Pierce Bros., of Augusta, for plaintiff in error.
Wm. P. Congdon and J. Walter Harper, both of Augusta, for defendant in error.
1. The defendant contends that none of the witnesses for the plaintiff testified from their own knowledge that the defendant cut timber located on the land of the plaintiff.
I. H. Zimmerman, witness of the plaintiff, testified: * * *"
The testimony of Zimmerman does not affirmatively disclose that he was testifying from hearsay, and this Court cannot say, as a matter of law, that he was not testifying from personal knowledge. "Where a witness testifies to a fact, the presumption is, in the absence of anything to the contrary, that he is testifying from his own knowledge." Shaw v. Jones, Newton & Co., 133 Ga. 446, 66 S.E. 240; Reaves v. Columbus Electric & Power Co., 32 Ga.App. 140, 150, 122 S.E. 824, "Where a witness testifies to a conclusion of fact which could be within his knowledge and such testimony is admitted without objection, it cannot be attacked on review as being...
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