JOHNSTON ON BEHALF OF JOHNSTON v. Ellenbecker

Decision Date10 August 1988
Docket NumberCiv. No. 87-3022.
Citation692 F. Supp. 1099
PartiesTrudie C. JOHNSTON, on Behalf of Rebecca JOHNSTON, Isaac Johnston, Elizabeth Johnston, William Johnston, and Daniel Johnston, minors, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. James ELLENBECKER, Secretary of the South Dakota Department of Social Services, and the Agents, Employees, and Successors of the same, and Richard Lyng, Secretary of the United States Department of Agriculture, and the Agents, Employees, and Successors of the same, Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of South Dakota

Mark Falk, Larry Plank, Black Hills Legal Services, Rapid City, S.D., for plaintiffs.

Mark Bratt, Asst. Atty. Gen., Office of Legal Services/D.S.S., Pierre, S.D., for State defendant.

David L. Zuercher, Asst. U.S. Atty., Pierre, S.D., for Federal defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

DONALD J. PORTER, Chief Judge.

Dear Counsel:

Cross motions for summary judgment have been filed in this action raising the question of whether state rules and federal regulations on the imposition of sanctions for individuals who intentionally violate provisions of the Food Stamp Program violate the Food Stamp Act. Specifically, the plaintiffs challenge the State of South Dakota's imposition of a sanction against a household receiving Food Stamp benefits when an intentional program violation is committed by an adult member of the household and as a result children within the household lose food stamp benefits. Because the state and federal regulations challenged in this action are consistent with the Food Stamp Act and are rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose, the defendants' cross motions for summary judgment are granted.

I. STATUTORY FRAMEWORK

The Food Stamp Program was enacted by Congress "to safeguard the health and well-being of the Nation's population by raising levels of nutrition among low-income households." 7 U.S.C. § 2011 (1982). Under the Program, states adopt plans to participate based upon uniform federal standards governing eligibility. See 7 U.S. C. § 2020(e)(5) (1982). States may not impose additional eligibility requirements.1 Id.

Section 2015(b)(1) of Title 7 sets forth the following disqualification penalty for fraud:

Any person who has been found by any State or Federal court or administrative agency to have intentionally (A) made a false or misleading statement, or misrepresented, concealed or withheld facts, or (B) committed any act that constitutes a violation of this Act 7 U.S.C. § 2011 et seq., the regulations issued thereunder, or any State statute, for the purpose of using, presenting, transferring, acquiring, receiving, or possessing coupons or authorization cards shall, immediately upon the rendering of such determination, become ineligible for further participation in the program —
(i) for a period of six months upon the first occasion of any such determination;
....
During the period of such ineligibility, no household shall receive increased benefits under this Act 7 USCS §§ 2011 et seq. as the result of a member of such household having been disqualified under this subsection.

7 U.S.C. § 2015(b)(1) (1982) (emphasis added).

Pursuant to 7 U.S.C. § 2013(c), the Secretary promulgated 7 C.F.R. § 273.11(c)(1). Section 2013(c) provides: "The Secretary shall issue such regulations consistent with this Act 7 U.S.C. §§ 2011 et seq. as the Secretary deems necessary or appropriate for the effective and efficient administration of the food stamp program...." 7 U.S.C. § 2013(c) (1982). The Secretary's regulation on sanctions for intentional program violations, codified at 7 C.F.R. § 273.11(c)(1), provides that the income of an individual found ineligible for benefits because of an intentional program violation shall continue to be counted in determining household income. 7 C.F.R. § 273.11(c)(1)(i) (1987). The regulation further provides that the individual shall not be counted in determining the size of the household. 7 C.F.R. § 273.11(c)(1)(ii) (1987).2 The Secretary of the South Dakota Department of Social Services has promulgated rules governing sanctions for intentional violations of the Food Stamp Program that mirror the federal regulations.3

The plaintiffs bring this action for injunctive and declaratory relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaining that the defendants' policies on the imposition of sanctions for intentional violation of the Food Stamp Program violate the Food Stamp Act.4 The plaintiffs charge that the rules promulgated by the state defendant violate 7 U.S. C. § 2020(e)(5) by imposing additional eligibility requirements. In addition, the plaintiffs allege that the regulations issued by the federal defendant violate 7 U.S.C. §§ 2013(c) and 2014(b) because they are neither "necessary or appropriate" for the administration of the Program nor promulgated "in accordance with the provisions of 7 U.S.C. § 2014(b)."5 The plaintiffs also argue that the defendants' policies violate the fifth and fourteenth amendments.

The Court assumes jurisdiction over this action under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 28 U.S. C. § 1343(a)(3). Summary judgment is appropriate in this action because there are no genuine issues of material fact and the defendants are entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. F.R.C.P. 56(c).

II. FACTS

Trudie C. Johnston brings this action on behalf of her children, Rebecca, Isaac, Elizabeth, William, and Daniel Johnston.6 On April 30, 1986, Johnston was arraigned on charges of obtaining money, property, or assistance by fraud from the South Dakota Department of Social Services and forgery. She pled guilty to these charges and, as a result, was declared ineligible for Food Stamp benefits for a period of six months. During the sanction period, Johnston's income was counted in determining her household's income, but she was not counted as a household member.

An administrative hearing was held by the South Dakota Department of Social Services on December 16, 1986. At that hearing, Johnston challenged the application of South Dakota's rules on sanctions for intentional program violators to the Johnston household. Relying on S.D.C.L. § 28-12-1, the hearing examiner held that the amount of the Johnston households benefits during the sanction period was correctly computed. Section 28-12-1 provides that the state agency may adopt rules in accordance with federal regulations implementing the Food Stamp Act. S.D.C.L. § 28-12-1 (1984). Because the agency's rules are in accordance with 7 C.F.R. § 273.11(c)(1), the Department upheld the application of Rules 5510 and 5531 to the Johnston household.

Johnston was ineligible for food stamps from July through December of 1986. As a result of the application of Rules 5510 and 5531, Johnston's household was reduced to five members while her income was counted as available to the household. The five-member household consisting of Johnston's five children received fewer Food Stamp benefits than they would have received were it not for the disqualification of their mother.7

III. DISCUSSION

The plaintiffs assert that the state and federal regulations on sanctions for intentional violations of the Food Stamp Program are contrary to the purposes and goals of the Act because innocent household members suffer the loss of Food Stamp benefits. Johnston argues that the challenged regulations violate the Food Stamp Act because they are inconsistent with the Act's general aim of raising the level of nutrition among low-income households. More specifically, Johnston contends that 7 U.S.C. § 2015(b)(1) does not authorize the reduction or elimination of benefits of a household after a finding of an intentional program violation.

The Federal Regulation

The plaintiffs' challenge to the federal regulation is that 7 C.F.R. § 273.11(c)(1) is inconsistent with the Food Stamp Act. Because the Court holds that the federal sanction regulation is consistent with the Act, the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment against the Secretary of the United States Department of Agriculture (Secretary) on this ground must be denied.

In determining how Congress intended the Food Stamp Act to be implemented, the Court must first look to the language of the statute itself. See Heckler v. Turner, 470 U.S. 184, 193, 105 S.Ct. 1138, 1144, 84 L.Ed.2d 138 (1985). Section 2013(c) of Title 7 authorizes the Secretary to issue regulations "necessary or appropriate for the effective and efficient administration of the food stamp program." 7 U.S.C. § 2013(c) (1982). This language encompasses broad discretion to carry out the Secretary's interpretation of the Act. See Knebel v. Hein, 429 U.S. 288, 293-94, 97 S.Ct. 549, 552-53, 50 L.Ed.2d 485 (1977); State of Missouri v. Block, 690 F.2d 139, 142 (8th Cir.1982); Jacquet v. Westerfield, 569 F.2d 1339, 1344-45 (5th Cir.1978). This authority has been construed to include the authority "to protect the program from those who would abuse it." 569 F.2d at 1345. As stated by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, "unless Congress has specifically removed this administrative power from the Secretary, or unless the regulation is `inconsistent with the Act,' 7 U.S.C.A. § 2013(c), the regulation must be upheld." Id.

The Act expressly provides for the disqualification of members of a food stamp household who engage in fraudulent conduct. See 7 U.S.C. § 2015(b)(1) (1982). Upon disqualification, a sanction of ineligibility for six months is imposed for a first offense of this nature. Id. When a member of a household is sanctioned, the household cannot receive increased benefits during the sanction period. Id. However, to say that household benefits may not be increased does not necessarily preclude a decrease in household benefits, as the plaintiffs contend.

The Secretary's interpretation of 7 U.S.C. § 2015(b)(1) does not give rise to an inconsistency between the Act and the regulation. The plain language of the Act states that the Secretary...

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