Johnston v. Johnston
| Decision Date | 12 January 1918 |
| Docket Number | 30287 |
| Parties | LIZZIE W. JOHNSTON, Appellant, v. R. A. JOHNSTON, Appellee |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
Appeal from Wapello District Court.--FRANK R. EICHELBERGER, Judge.
THE plaintiff and appellant instituted suit for divorce against the appellee, and obtained decree. From this there is no appeal. Into the divorce suit was injected the construction and application of an antenuptial contract. The trial court established a lien in favor of the appellee upon land owned by the appellant, for the sum of $ 1,750, payable at the death of the plaintiff, without interest. This is the order appealed from.
Affirmed.
Lowenberg & Maddy, for appellant.
F. G Orelup and E. R. Mitchell, for appellee.
I.
Shortly before the parties were married, they made a writing stipulating that, "for valuable considerations hereby acknowledged and receipted for, and in anticipation of entering into the marriage relation with each other," it was agreed as follows:
(a) The intending husband, "in consideration of the covenants herein contained, and for other valuable consideration," agrees and does forever relinquish and disclaim any interest which he might obtain through or by his said marriage in a certain farm described, and in certain personal property described.
(b) The intending husband is to have possession of said farm, and improve the farm land of the intending wife in a good and workmanlike manner.
(c) He is "to be entitled and have as his share of the improvements made by him on said farm from its present condition and value, and for the purpose of this contract the parties hereto consent that a fair valuation of said farm land at the present time would be $ 25 per acre."
(d) The indebtedness of the former husband of plaintiff, amounting to approximately $ 350, is to be paid and liquidated by these parties from the proceeds of said farm and certain described stock and increase thereof.
The essential position of the appellant is this:
a. A fair construction of the contract works that defendant is to receive nothing except "his share of the improvements made by him on said farm."
b. Its language makes evident the parties contemplated that defendant should be compensated only for improvements made by him. It is a fair construction of the contract that he should receive no more than a share of the value added to the farm "by reasons of improvements made by him."
c. It was not contemplated by either of the parties that defendant should have a share in the natural increase in the value of the farm coming from a general increase of values not due to any effort on the part of either of the parties.
d. The evidence conclusively shows defendant did not improve the farm, and there is no competent testimony that its value was increased by reason of any improvements defendant made thereon. Defendant tacitly admits that, aside from general increase in value, the farm is worth no more now than it was on the day contract was made. Therefore, the court was not justified in giving defendant a judgment for anything.
e. The evidence upon which plaintiff obtained decree of divorce shows that defendant, by his conduct, made it impossible for the plaintiff to continue the marriage relation with him. Thereby, he has put his case within the rule which prevents one from taking a benefit under a contract if, by his own conduct, he has made it impossible for the other to carry the contract to final completion under the terms thereof.
The citations for appellant further clear up her position. The proposition is made that, where one party to a contract declares that he will not perform his part, or so acts as to make it impossible for him to do so, he thereby releases the other from the contract and its obligations (9 Cyc. 641) that discharge by renunciation and by acts rendering performance impossible may take place while the contract is still wholly executory (9...
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