Johnston v. Metro. Life Ins. Co.

• Decision Date: 04 November 1919
• Citation: 85 W.Va. 70
• Parties: James E. Johnston, Adm'r, v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Company.
• Court: West Virginia Supreme Court

85 W.Va. 70

James E. Johnston, Adm'r,

v.Metropolitan Life Ins. Company.

Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.

Submitted October 28, 1919.

Decided November 4, 1919.

1. Insurance Recovery Where Beneficiary Murdered Insured.

The beneficiary in a policy of life insurance who murders the insured will be denied the right to recover thereon upon grounds of public policy. (p. 71).

2. Same Assignment by Beneficiary Who Murdered Insured.

Where the beneficiary in a policy of life insurance murders the insured, and subsequently assigns his interest in the policy to another, such assignee will acquire no better right than his assignor, and will not be entitled to recover upon the policy. (p. 71).

3. Same Liability of Insurer on Murder of Insured by Bene-

ficiary.

Where the beneficiary in a life insurance policy murders the insured, the doctrine of public policy will extend no further than to denying to such beneficiary the right to recover. The liability of the insurance company to pay the fund is not thereby extinguished, and ordinarily a recovery will be allowed upon such policy in the name of the personal representative of the insured for the benefit of his estate. (p. 72).

4. Descent and Distribution Devolution of Property on Murder

of Deceased.

Under our law prohibiting the forfeiture of estates upon conviction of crime, the estate of one who is murdered will pass by devolution to the person designated by law to take the same, notwithstanding such person may have been guilty of murder in taking the life of the one from whom he inherits. (p. 73).

5. Insurance Recovery by Personal Representative on Murder of Insured by Distributee.

The personal representative of one who is murdered may not recover the amount of a policy of insurance on his life, where the murder was committed by the party who is the sole distributee of such insured person. (p. 74).

(Lynch, Judge, absent.)

Error to Circuit Court, Cabell County.

Action by James E. Johnston, administrator, etc., against the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company. Judgment in the court of common pleas in favor of defendant, and on writ of error the circuit court reversed, and rendered judgment for plaintiff, and defendant brings error.

Reversed, and judgment of Common Pleas Court affirmed.

Fitzpatrich. Campbell, Brown & Davis, for plaintiff in error. Daugkerty & Riggs, for defendant in error.

Ritz, Judge:

The defendant, for the consideration of certain premiums to be regularly paid, issued a policy of insurance by which it agreed to pay to one Frank Pickens the face value of the policy in case he was living at the end of twenty years from the date of issue, or to pay to his beneficiary Susie Pickens, his wife, an equal sum in case of his death before the expiration of said twenty years The premiums were regularly paid until the time of Pickens' death. Some years after the issuance of the policy the insured was murdered by his wife, the beneficiary therein. She was convicted of the crime and sentenced to the penitentiary for life. Shortly after the commission of the murder she assigned all of her right under the policy to 1). B. Daugherty and H. W. Shields. Pickens left no children surviving him, and owed no debts at the time of his death. The defendant company declined to pay the policy, either to the beneficiary, or to her assignees, or to the administrator of the estate of Pickens, and this suit was brought by the administrator to recover thereon, The Court of Common Pleas rendered a judgment in favor of the defendant, and upon a writ of error to that judgment the Circuit Court of Cabell County reversed the same and rendered judgment for the plaintiff for the amount of the policy, to review which this writ of error is prosecuted.

That Susie Pickens, the beneficiary, has no right to recover upon this policy of insurance can scarcely be doubted. The liability of the company became fixed by the death of the insured, and this was brought about by the felonious act of the beneficiary. It would be monstrous for the courts to lend their aid to anyone for the purpose of enriching himself by the commission of murder, and to entertain suit on behalf of the beneficiary to recover upon this policy of insurance would be doing that very thing. It is against the policy of our law to reward one for the commission of crime, and whenever the effect of the enforcement of a right which one would otherwise have would be to give him an advantage by reason of his felonious act, the courts will decline to entertain it. This is well established by the authorities. New York Mutual Life Insurance Company v. Armstrong, 117 TJ. S. 591; Cooley's Briefs on the Law of Insurance, 3153; 14 R. C. L. p. 1228, title "Insurance," section 409, and authorities there cited. Nor can the assignees of the beneficiary stand on any higher ground than the beneficiary herself. At the time she made the assignment to them she had nothing to transfer. She had voluntarily placed herself in a status which disqualified her to be beneficiary under the policy. Consequently the assignment to Daugherty and Shields was ineffectual to transfer any interest in the fund.

This denial of the right of the beneficiary or her assignees to recover under such circumstances is not, however, based upon lack of liability of the insurer to pay. The policy of insurance is not avoided for such cause by its express terms, and there is no reason why such an exception should be read into it when the interest of other parties is affected. This doctrine of public policy will not be carried by the courts any further than is necessary to prevent resort to them for the purpose of effecting a fraudulent purpose. It is not for the purpose of relieving the insurance company from liability, and if there is any person without fault who has a right to the benefit of the policy the same will be enforced. In other words, there is no condition in the policy avoiding it in case of the murder of the insured, and the liability of the company is just the same where death is the result of murder as where it is produced by any other cause. The only difference is that in case the murderer is the beneficiary named in the policy he is denied recovery, not because the company is not liable, but because he has placed himself in such a position that he cannot invoke the aid of the courts. But does the fact that the beneficiary named in the policy cannot recover discharge the company from liability in all cases? It is very generally held that where the specific beneficiary named in a policy of life insurance dies the policy of insurance nevertheless remains in force, and recovery may be had thereon by the personal representatives of the insured upon his death for the benefit of his estate. What is the effect when the beneficiary by some act of his puts himself in a position where he cannot invoke the aid of the courts to enforce his claim? He forfeits his right to claim the money to which he would otherwise be entitled. The rule of public policy, as before stated, will not be extended further than is necessary to prevent a felon from reaping benefit from his crime, and it may be said that when by this rule the murderer, who is the beneficiary, is deprived of his right to recover, the doctrine is extended as far as is warranted. This would leave in the hands of the insurer a fund or estate created by the insured. The insurance company is not entitled to it, and the party that the insured desired to have it cannot take it. He forfeited his right to it. What then is the result? Naturally it becomes the property of the estate of the insured, very much in the same way as an estate which is left by will to a particular...