Johnston v. Vilardi

• Decision Date: 03 October 1991
• Docket Number: No. 01-90-00464-CV,01-90-00464-CV
• Parties: Marvis Nell JOHNSTON, Appellant, v. Paul VILARDI, Appellee. (1st Dist.)
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

Page 794

817 S.W.2d 794

Marvis Nell JOHNSTON, Appellant, v. Paul VILARDI, Appellee.

No. 01-90-00464-CV.

Court of Appeals of Texas Houston (1st Dist.).

Oct. 3, 1991.

Rehearing Denied Nov. 7, 1991.

John Odom, Houston, for appellant.

Stephen P. Munisteri, Houston, for appellee.

Before DUGGAN, MIRABAL and O'CONNOR, JJ.

OPINION

DUGGAN, Justice.

This is an appeal from a take-nothing summary judgment in favor of a physician in a medical malpractice case. We affirm in part and reverse and remand in part.

Appellant, Marvis Nell Johnston, sought medical attention from appellee, Paul Vilardi, M.D., for foot pain and discomfort caused by bone spurs and a chronic ingrown toenail. Vilardi performed a distal amputation to remove the nail and nail bed of Johnston's left great toe, and thereby shortened that toe. The surgery was effective, but because Johnston was unhappy with the physical appearance of her toe, she went to another orthopedic surgeon and to a cosmetic surgeon to modify her toe. As a result of the later procedures, she experienced complications and infections. She then brought a medical malpractice action against her original surgeon, Dr. Vilardi, claiming lack of informed consent and negligence. The trial court granted Dr. Vilardi's motion for summary judgment.

In a single point of error, Johnston contends that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment because genuine issues of fact exist regarding her allegations of lack of informed consent and negligence. We note at the outset that Johnston failed to timely file her amended response opposing Vilardi's summary judgment motion.

Dr. Vilardi filed a motion for summary judgment on February 1, 1990. In his motion, Dr. Vilardi specifically requested the trial court to consider his motion for summary judgment on the informed consent issue separately from his motion for summary judgment on the cause of action based on medical negligence during the surgery. His summary judgment evidence consisted of his own affidavit and excerpts from the deposition testimony of his nurse, Glenda Forbes; of the plaintiff, Johnston; and of her now deceased husband, Clyde Johnston; along with a copy of the disclosure and consent form signed by Johnston prior to her surgery. Johnston filed her initial response to Vilardi's motion for summary judgment on March 19, 1990, and attached to it the affidavit of her expert witness, John Bishop, M.D., and her own unsworn narrative allegations.

On March 23, 1990, three days before the summary judgment hearing, Johnston filed a motion for leave to file opposition and a corrected affidavit, together with portions of her own and her late husband's depositions. No order granting leave to file was signed. The summary judgment in favor of Dr. Vilardi was rendered on March 28, 1990, and consists of two separately signed orders granting summary judgment, one on the informed consent cause of action, and one on the cause of action based on medical negligence. The order recites that the court considered the "pleadings, motion and supporting affidavit and considered the arguments of counsel." The record is silent about whether the court considered appellant's untimely filed proof.

Rule 166a of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure provides, in relevant part, that "[e]xcept on leave of court, the adverse party not later than seven days prior to the day of hearing may file and serve opposing affidavits or other written response." This rule has been construed to mean that an untimely response is void unless the record affirmatively reflects the trial court's acceptance of the late filing. Pinckley v. Gallegos, 740 S.W.2d 529, 532 (Tex.App.--San Antonio 1987, writ denied) (no abuse of discretion in refusing to accept late-filed affidavits); see also INA v. Bryant, 686 S.W.2d 614, 615 (Tex.1985) (it is presumed that the court did not consider a late summary judgment response where no record appears indicating leave to file).

Here, because nothing affirmatively shows that the court accepted Johnston's late-filed corrected affidavit and depositions, the presumption is that the trial court did not accept them. Bryant, 686 S.W.2d at 615. Thus, appellant may not rely upon them to defeat the summary judgment. Id. Therefore, this Court may consider only Johnston's timely-filed first response to the motion for summary judgment along with the attached affidavit of Dr. Bishop, her expert, in determining if Johnston raised a material fact issue to defeat summary judgment.

In reviewing a summary judgment, this Court must determine whether a disputed material fact issue exists. Nixon v. Mr. Property Management Co., 690 S.W.2d 546, 548-49 (Tex.1985). We accept as true the nonmovant's version of the facts as supported by the record and the admissible summary judgment evidence. Id. All reasonable inferences are indulged in favor of the nonmovant and any doubts are resolved in her favor. Id. The movant bears the burden of demonstrating that there is no genuine issue of material fact regarding any essential element of the nonmovant's case and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id.

Johnston's cause of action for lack of informed consent...