Johnston v. Wetzel

• Decision Date: 27 December 2019
• Docket Number: Case No. 1:16-cv-00268 (Erie)
• Parties: Norman JOHNSTON , Plaintiff v. John WETZEL , Secretary of the Pennsylvania DOC and Michael Overmyer, Superintendent SCI Forest
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Pennsylvania

431 F.Supp.3d 666

Norman JOHNSTON , Plaintiff

v. John WETZEL , Secretary of the Pennsylvania DOC and Michael Overmyer, Superintendent SCI Forest

Case No. 1:16-cv-00268 (Erie)

United States District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania.

Signed December 27, 2019

John F. Mizner, Joseph P. Caulfield, Mizner Law Firm, Erie, PA, for Plaintiff.

Scott A. Bradley, Office of the Attorney General Litigation Section, Pittsburgh, PA, for John Wetzel, Michael Overmyer.

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT; DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

ECF No. 46

ECF No. 50

RICHARD A. LANZILLO, United States Magistrate Judge

I. Introduction

The cross-motions for summary judgment filed by Plaintiff Norman Johnston (ECF No. 46) and Defendants John Wetzel and Michael Overmyer (ECF No. 50) present primarily four issues:

• Are Johnston's § 1983 claims barred to any extent by the applicable two-year statute of limitations? The Court holds that they are not.

• Does the 17-year duration of Johnston's conditions of solitary confinement distinguish his case from the otherwise comparable conditions addressed in Peterkin v. Jeffes , 855 F.2d 1021 (3d Cir. 1988), such that it is for a jury to determine whether these conditions and their duration violated Johnston's Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment? The Court holds that it does and that disputed issues of material fact preclude summary judgment for Johnston or the Defendants on this claim.

• Did Johnston receive meaningful review of his continuing solitary confinement consistent with Fourteenth Amendment due process requirements? The Court holds that disputed issues of material fact remain for trial as to both Defendants' responsibility for a process that a reasonable jury could find to have been pro forma and essentially meaningless.

• Are the Defendants nevertheless entitled to summary judgment on Johnston's Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment claims based on qualified immunity? The Court holds that they are not.¹

II. Material Facts

The following factual background is largely undisputed. Johnston was committed to the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (DOC) in 1980 following a conviction for homicide. ECF No. 47 ¶ 1. He is serving a life sentence. Id. at ¶ 2. While incarcerated at the State Correctional Institution (SCI) at Huntingdon, he escaped from that facility on August 1, 1999. Id. at ¶ 3. Johnston was apprehended twenty days later, re-incarcerated at SCI-Camp Hill, and placed in solitary confinement.²

As a consequence of his escape attempt, Johnston was placed on disciplinary status and kept in solitary confinement for eighteen months. Id. at ¶ 7. He remained so confined even after the conclusion of this eighteen-month period, until February of 2005, when he was transferred to SCI-Forest. Id. at ¶¶ 8-9. During his incarceration at SCI-Camp Hill, Johnston was confined to a cell measuring approximately sixty square feet. Johnston remained in solitary confinement for approximately six years at that institution.³ Id. at ¶ 14.

Upon his transfer to SCI-Forest in 2005, Johnston was immediately placed in solitary confinement and housed in a cell that measured ninety-one square feet, but which provided only fifty-six square feet of practical space. Id. at ¶ 12. This cell had one narrow, five-inch window. Id. at ¶ 27. Johnston was isolated in this cell for twenty-three hours per day, seven days per week, for approximately eleven years. Id. at ¶ 14. His cell also contained a light fixture that he claims was left on twenty-four hours a day.⁴ Id. at ¶ 30. Johnston ate meals alone, was prohibited from speaking with other inmates, and only permitted to shower three times each week. Id. at ¶ 31-32. He was given visitation privileges once a week and had to conduct visits through a glass partition. Id. at ¶ 33-34.

Johnston was allowed time in an "exercise cage" five days per week for one hour from 2005 until 2012. Id. at ¶ 15. Starting in 2012, he was permitted two hours in the exercise cage. Id. This cage measured seventy-five square feet and Johnston was not permitted access to any exercise equipment. Id. Access to this outdoor facility was withheld during inclement weather. Id. at ¶ 18. Johnson was not issued a single misconduct after April 7, 2013. Id. at ¶ 36. Approximately four months after filing this action, Johnston was released from solitary confinement, marking approximately seventeen years in solitary confinement. Id. at ¶ 43.

Between 2003 and 2005, the DOC instituted a program under which it placed certain inmates on a "Restricted Release List" or "RRL." Placement on the RRL meant that the inmate would be subjected to indefinite solitary confinement.⁵ See Johnson v. Wetzel , 209 F. Supp. 3d 766, 772 (M.D. Pa. 2016). Only the Secretary of the DOC could authorize the release of an inmate on the RRL to re-enter the general prison population. Id. See also ECF No. 53-7, p. 16 (Wetzel Deposition). Without the Secretary's express authorization, the inmate would remain indefinitely in solitary confinement. ECF No. 53-7, p. 39. Until 2012, the DOC Secretary did not review the inmate's status on the RRL unless the facility's Superintendent and Deputy Superintendent, along with the Regional Deputy Secretary and Executive Deputy Secretary, unanimously agreed that the inmate should be released from the RRL. Id. ; see also Johnson , 209 F. Supp. 3d. at 772.

In or around 2012, the policy changed to include the Secretary's annual review of an inmate's status on the RLL. Since 2012, as to each RLL inmate, the Secretary annually receives a "vote sheet" that records a vote in favor or against release from solitary confinement and possible comments from the Superintendent and the Deputy Superintendent of the inmate's facility as well as from the Regional Deputy Secretary and the Executive Deputy Secretary. Following receipt of the vote sheet, the Secretary, as the sole decisionmaker, then determines whether an inmate will remain on or be removed from the RRL. Id. at pp. 41, 43. Between April 7, 2003 and the present, Johnston was not cited for misconduct or disciplined for any reason. The only concern ever expressed by a prison official in support of continuing his status on the RLL that he was "dangerously manipulative, simply by being so nice and polite all the time." (2016 Vote Sheet). Despite this assessment and no meaningful change in circumstances since it was made, Johnston was released to General Population at SCI-Forest on March 13, 2017.⁶ ECF No. 52, ¶114.

III. Procedural History

Johnston initiated this action pro se on November 7, 2016. ECF No. 1. His Complaint alleged that the conditions and duration of his confinement violated the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment and that the absence of any meaningful means to challenge that confinement violated his right to due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. Attorney John F. Mizner entered his appearance on Johnston's behalf on March 1, 2017. ECF Nos. 11, 12.

On May 20, 2019, following a lengthy period of discovery, this Court approved the stipulated dismissal of several defendants. ECF No. 45. John Wetzel, Secretary of the DOC, and Michael Overmyer, Superintendent of SCI-Forest, are now the sole remaining defendants in this action. Both Johnston and Defendants Wetzel and Overmyer filed cross-motions for summary judgment, supporting briefs and concise statements of material facts on May 21, 2019. ECF Nos. 46, 47, 48; ECF Nos. 50, 51, 52. Each filed a response to the opposing party's concise statement of material facts. See ECF Nos. 59, 60, 61, 62. The parties' cross-motions for summary judgment are appropriate for simultaneous disposition. See Swanberg v. PNC Fin. Servs. Grp., Inc. 2016 WL 4493684, at *10 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 26, 2016).

IV. Summary Judgment Standard

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) requires the court to enter summary judgment "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Under this standard "the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 247-48, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A disputed fact is "material" if proof of its existence or nonexistence would affect the outcome of the case under applicable substantive law. Anderson , 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505 ; Gray v. York Newspapers, Inc. , 957 F.2d 1070, 1078 (3d Cir. 1992). An issue of material fact is "genuine" if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Anderson , 477 U.S. at 257, 106 S.Ct. 2505 ; Brenner v. Local 514, United Bhd. of Carpenters and Joiners of Am. , 927 F.2d 1283, 1287-88 (3d Cir. 1991).

When determining whether a genuine issue of material fact remains for trial, the court must view the record and all reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom in favor of the nonmoving party. Moore v. Tartler , 986 F.2d 682 (3d Cir. 1993) ; Clement v. Consol. Rail Corp. , 963 F.2d 599, 600 (3d Cir. 1992) ; White v. Westinghouse Elec. Co. , 862 F.2d 56, 59 (3d Cir. 1988). To avoid summary judgment, however, the nonmoving party may not rest on the unsubstantiated allegations of his or her pleadings. Instead, once the movant satisfies its burden of identifying evidence that demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, the nonmoving party must to go beyond his pleadings with affidavits, depositions, answers to interrogatories or other record evidence to demonstrate specific material facts that give rise to a genuine issue. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).

Further, under Rule 56, a defendant may seek summary judgment by pointing to the...