Johson v. Harrison

• Decision Date: 28 December 1891
• Citation: 50 N.W. 923,47 Minn. 575
• Parties: JOHNSON v HARRISON.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

47 Minn. 575

50 N.W. 923

JOHNSONvHARRISON.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

Dec. 28, 1891.

(Syllabus by the Court.)

Chapter 46, Laws 1889, entitled “An act to establish a Probate Code,” is not obnoxious to the constitutional provision that “no law shall embrace more than one subject, which shall be expressed in the title.”

Appeal from district court, Ramsey county; CHARLES E. OTIS, Judge.

Mary B. Harrison died intestate April 17, 1890, her residence then being in St. Paul. She died seised of real estate situated in Ramsey county, and her estate comprised no other property of any kind. She left surviving her her husband, Lawrence L. Harrison, but no child or children, and no issue of any deceased child or children. She also left surviving her her mother, Stina Johnson, and two sisters, but no father or brother. Lawrence L. Harrison, her husband, was appointed administrator upon her estate by the probate court of Ramsey county, and on January 8, 1891, he filed a petition in said court asking, among other things, for a final decree assigning the estate of the deceased. At the hearing on this petition, Stina Johnson appeared by counsel and filed written objections to assigning more than one-third of the estate of the deceased to Lawrence L. Harrison, and a claim that two-ninths of the estate should be assigned to her. The probate court makes a final decree assigning the whole of said above-mentioned real estate to Lawrence L. Harrison. From this decree Stina Johnson appealed to the district court. In the district court she filed a complaint setting up substantially the facts above set out, and praying judgment that the final decree in the probate court be reversed, and that an undivided two-ninths of the estate of the deceased be assigned to her. To this complaint Lawrence L. Harrison entered a general demurrer. From an order overruling the demurrer Lawrence L. Harrison appeals. Reversed.

The sole ground of the appeal of Stina Johnson from the final decree of the probate court was that that part of the Probate Code which changes the law of descent of real property is unconstitutional. Before the passage of the Probate Code (chapter 46, Gen. Laws 1889, entitled “An act to establish a Probate Code”) the law governing the descent of real property was chapter 37, Gen. Laws 1876, (chapter 46, Gen. St. 1878.) By this act the above-mentioned real estate of Mary B. Harrison would have descended on her death, if a homestead, to her husband for life only; and if not a homestead, then an undivided one-third only to her husband, and the remaining two-thirds to her mother and to her two sisters, to each a two-ninth. This is the method of descent claimed by respondent in her complaint. Under sections 63 and 64 of the Code, all of the above-mentioned real estate of Mary B. Harrison, whether her homestead or not, descended in fee to her husband. The judge in overruling the demurrer held these provisions of the Probate Code unconstitutional, as obnoxious to section 27, art. 4, of the constitution, which provides that “no law shall embrace more than one subject, which shall be expressed in its title.”

Edward B. Graves, for appellant.

Henry

J. Horn and John W. Lane, for respondents.

MITCHELL, J.

Chapter 46, Laws 1889, entitled “An act to establish a Probate Code,” is divided into 21 subchapters, containing 326 sections. The intention of the legislature obviously was to enact, in the form of one act, a complete system of statutory law relating to or connected with those matters of which, under the constitution, probate courts have jurisdiction, to-wit, “estates of deceased persons and of persons under guardianship.” It is contended that the act is repugnant to section 27, art. 4, of the constitution of the state, which provides that “no law shall embrace more than one subject, which shall be expressed in the title;” that the act embraces several distinct and separate subjects, some of which, particularly subchapter 3, relating to title to real property by descent, is not expressed in the title. The purposes of such a constitutional provision, the mischiefs which it is designed to prevent, the rules to be applied to its construction, and the tests to be applied to determine whether a law is repugnant to it, are so familiar, and have been so often passed upon by this and other courts, that they need only be referred to very briefly. Its purposes are two: First, to prevent what is called “log-rolling legislation” or “omnibus bills,” by which a number of different and disconnected subjects are united in one bill, and then carried through by a combination of interests; second, to prevent surprise and fraud upon the people and the legislature by including provisions in a bill whose title gives nointimation of the nature of the proposed legislation, or of the interests likely to be affected by its becoming a law; and, in deciding whether an act is obnoxious to this provision of the constitution, a very good test to apply is whether it is within the mischiefs intended to be remedied.

Again, while this provision is mandatory, yet it is to be given a liberal, and not a strict, construction. It is not intended, nor should it be so construed as, to embarrass legislation by making laws unnecessarily restrictive in their scope and operation, or by multiplying their number, or by preventing the legislature from embracing in one act all matters properly connected with one general subject. The term “subject,” as used in the constitution, is to be given a broad and extended meaning, so as to allow the legislature full scope to include in one act all matters having a logical or natural connection. To constitute duplicity of subject, an act must embrace two or more dissimilar and discordant subjects that by no fair intendment can be considered as having any legitimate connection with or relation to each other. All that is necessary is that act should embrace some one general subject; and by this is meant, merely, that all matters treated of should fall under some one general idea, be so connected with or related to each other, either logically or in popular understanding, as to be parts of, or germane to, one general subject. The large number of related or cognate matters often treated of under some comprehensive title, such as “Criminal Code,” “Penal Code,” “Code of Civil Procedure,” “Private Corporations,” “Railroad Corporations,” and the like, are familiar illustrations of what may be legitimately included in one act. Any...