Joiner v. State

• Decision Date: 12 August 1986
• Docket Number: 1 Div. 193
• Citation: 500 So.2d 81
• Parties: Henry Rufus JOINER v. STATE.
• Court: Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals

Page 81

500 So.2d 81

Henry Rufus JOINER v. STATE.

1 Div. 193.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama.

Aug. 12, 1986.

Rehearing Denied Sept. 9, 1986.

Certiorari Denied Dec. 5, 1986

Alabama Supreme Court 85-1516.

Lynn E. Quinley, Daphne, for appellant.

Charles A. Graddick, Atty. Gen., and Martha Gail Ingram, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

TAYLOR, Judge.

Henry Rufus Joiner was convicted of sexual abuse in the first degree of the 12-year-old daughter of his nine-year common law wife, and was sentenced to six years' imprisonment. On appeal, he raises only one issue: whether the fact of a custody hearing for the child in juvenile court estops the state from proceeding criminally against him in this case.

When the child first made complaint, the Baldwin County Department of Pensions and Security investigated and then petitioned the juvenile court for temporary custody of the child. The petition alleged that the child was "dependent" in that she reported having been sexually abused by the accused. After a hearing, District Judge Phillip Nesbitt, acting as judge of the juvenile court, entered an order granting temporary custody of the 12-year-old child to the Baldwin County Department of Pensions and Security. The facts were presented to the next term of the grand jury and an indictment was returned against the appellant. He preserved this issue by moving to dismiss, contending that the state was relitigating the issue of whether he had sexually abused the alleged victim. In Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 90 S.Ct. 1189, 25 L.Ed.2d 469 (1970), the United States Supreme Court incorporated the doctrine of collateral estoppel into the fifth amendment prohibition against double jeopardy. The fifth amendment prohibition applies to the states through the fourteenth amendment. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 89 S.Ct. 2056, 23 L.Ed.2d 707 (1969).

The Supreme Court in Ashe stated:

" 'Collateral estoppel' is an awkward phrase, but it stands for an extremely important principle in our adversary system of justice. It means simply that when an issue of ultimate fact has once been determined by a valid and final judgment, that issue cannot again be litigated between the same parties in any future lawsuit...."

Judge John C. Tyson III, of this court, at 37 Alabama Lawyer 208 (1976), reviewed the application of Ashe to state criminal proceedings.

In White v. State, 378 So.2d 239 (Ala.Cr.App.1979), Judge Clark, speaking for this court, stated in pertinent part:

" ... [B]ut collateral estoppel is not applicable unless some material issue in the second case between the same parties, or their privies, as to another cause of action, was actually decided, expressly or by necessary implication in the first case. Stone v. William Steinen Manufacturing Co., 7 N.J.Super. 321, 70 A.2d 803, 807 (1949); In re Williams Estate, 36 Cal.2d 289, 223 P.2d 248, 22 A.L.R.2d 1116 (1950)."

The petition of the Department of Pensions and Security for temporary custody of a child alleged to have been abused is the former proceeding relied on by appellant. The second proceeding is, of course, a proceeding of the State of Alabama against the appellant--a prosecution for sexual abuse in the first degree.

Judge Nesbitt's order in the juvenile proceeding read, in part: "The court having noted the facts of the case showing that the child is being subjected to physical or emotional harm or threatened harm and the court having noted that immediate removal from the...