People v. Gates
| Decision Date | 05 March 1990 |
| Docket Number | Docket No. 83363 |
| Citation | 434 Mich. 146,452 N.W.2d 627 |
| Parties | PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Gregory Steven GATES, Defendant-Appellee. 434 Mich. 146, 452 N.W.2d 627 |
| Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
Robert H. Cleland, President, Pros. Attys. Ass'n of Michigan by Susan L. LeDuc, Asst. Pros. Atty., Ingham County Prosecutor's Office, Lansing, on brief, for amicus curiae.
Before the entire bench.
In view of a jury verdict of "no jurisdiction" in a child-protective probate proceeding, we are asked to determine whether the doctrine of collateral estoppel bars subsequent prosecution of the defendant for criminal sexual conduct where the factual allegations against defendant in both proceedings are essentially the same. Because the prior probate court verdict did not necessarily determine the guilt or innocence of the defendant, we hold that the principles of collateral estoppel do not apply.
In February, 1986, the Michigan Department of Social Services petitioned the juvenile division of the Jackson County Probate Court to take jurisdiction of a child, then three years and ten months old, on the basis of allegations that defendant, her father, had sexually abused her. 1 The petition initiated child-protective proceedings, the adjudicative phase of which leads to a determination of whether statutory grounds exist for juvenile court jurisdiction. 2 If such grounds are found to exist and the court assumes jurisdiction, dispositional proceedings are conducted thereafter to determine what action, if any, should be taken with respect to the child. MCR 5.961 et seq.
At the time the petition was filed in probate court, the defendant-father had been divorced from the child's mother for a period of two months. Although the child lived with her mother, defendant had been awarded joint custody of the child from the date of the couple's legal separation in February, 1985, and prior to the filing of the petition, he had physical custody of the child every weekend. However, following the filing of the petition, unsupervised visitations by the child in the home of her father were suspended.
Defendant contested the petition and requested a jury trial. 3 After the petition was filed, but prior to the jury trial held in probate court, the prosecuting attorney, who represented the DSS in the probate proceeding, filed a criminal complaint and warrant in the Jackson Circuit Court, charging defendant with second-degree criminal sexual conduct, on the basis of the same facts alleged in the probate court petition. 4
In the probate court trial which took place on June 16 and 17, 1986, the testimony dealt almost exclusively with the allegations of sexual abuse. 5 At the close of the trial, the probate court instructed the jury that the issue it was to decide was whether the child came within the jurisdiction of the court. The jury was further instructed that a child comes within the jurisdiction of the court if the child's home or environment is unfit for the child by reason of neglect, cruelty, criminality, or depravity on the part of a parent.
The jury was given a verdict form which allowed it to check off one of two verdicts: jurisdiction, or no jurisdiction. The jury returned a verdict of "no jurisdiction."
The judge then asked the jury, "Do you say upon your oath that you find the minor ... is not a neglected minor in the manner and form as the People have in their information in this cause charged?" Each of the jury members responded affirmatively.
On July 28, 1986, the probate judge granted a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, and then ordered a new trial. However, the Jackson Circuit Court subsequently reversed, reasoning that the jury verdict deprived the probate judge of jurisdiction to grant such relief.
Thereafter, the Jackson Circuit Court dismissed the criminal charges against defendant on the ground that the jury verdict in probate court determined "that the prosecution had not proved a case of sexual abuse by a preponderance of the evidence." The Court of Appeals affirmed. 168 Mich.App. 384, 423 N.W.2d 668 (1988). We then granted leave to appeal, limited to the issue whether, in view of the prior proceedings in probate court, principles of collateral estoppel prohibited the subsequent prosecution of defendant. 6 431 Mich. 904 (1988).
Collateral estoppel precludes relitigation of an issue in a subsequent, different cause of action between the same parties where the prior proceeding culminated in a valid, final judgment and the issue was (1) actually litigated, and (2) necessarily determined. 7 Jacobson v. Miller, 41 Mich. 90, 93, 1 N.W. 1013 (1879); Howell v. Vito's Trucking & Excavating Co., 386 Mich. 37, 42, 191 N.W.2d 313 (1971); Restatement Judgments, Sec. 68, p 293. 1 Restatement Judgments, 2d, Sec. 27, p 250. 8
We believe it is important at the outset to recognize that in the body of case law applying this principle the vast majority of cases involve the applicability of collateral estoppel where there are two civil proceedings. Cases involving "cross-over estoppel," where an issue adjudicated in a civil proceeding is claimed to be precluded in a subsequent criminal proceeding, or vice versa, are relatively recent and rare. 9
There is no set formula for determining whether relitigation of an issue is precluded by collateral estoppel. Initially it is necessary, according to the First Restatement of Judgments, to establish that the same parties are involved in both proceedings. 10 This Court last affirmed the "same party" requirement in Howell, supra at 42, 191 N.W.2d 313, wherein we said that one of the "critical factors" in applying collateral estoppel is the determination of whether the respective litigants were parties or privy to a party to an action in which a valid judgment has been rendered.
Although the named-party plaintiff in the instant case is the People of the State of Michigan, in practical terms the party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted is the Jackson County Prosecutor, who also represented the Department of Social Services in the probate court proceeding. Defendant argues that even though the Department of Social Services was the nominal party in the earlier proceeding, both the department and the prosecutor's office are creatures of the state and thus should be considered to be the same party. 11 We agree. A functional analysis of the role of the prosecutor in both proceedings is appropriate in this case, and leads us to conclude that privity is sufficient to satisfy the "same party" requirement. 12 In analyzing whether an issue was "actually litigated" in the prior proceeding, the Court must look at more than what has been pled and argued. We must also consider whether the party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted has had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue. Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc v. Univ of Illinois Foundation, 402 U.S. 313, 329, 91 S.Ct. 1434, 1443, 28 L.Ed.2d 788 (1971).
It is clear that the issue of defendant's alleged sexual abuse of his daughter was the factual focus of the jury trial in probate court. The transcript reveals that the testimony of the witnesses and the arguments of the parties centered on the allegation of sexual abuse that is also the basis of the criminal charge. At least in this sense, it can be said that the issue whether defendant sexually abused the child was "actually litigated."
We do not overlook that the rules governing child-protective proceedings in probate court are significantly different than the rules which apply to criminal trials. 13 As we will later discuss, such procedural differences raise serious doubt about the soundness of applying "cross-over estoppel" in situations such as this case presents. However, we do not base our decision on a finding that the prosecutor was seriously disadvantaged or otherwise denied a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue of defendant's alleged criminal conduct. Indeed, in its brief the amicus curiae Prosecuting Attorneys Association stated that it is "fair to say that the issue was fully litigated."
We move now to a discussion of the principal ground on which our decision rests.
Assuming arguendo that the issue as to which collateral estoppel is asserted has been fully litigated, we conclude that the instant case falls short with respect to another requirement, i.e., that the issue be "necessarily determined" by the judgment in the prior proceeding. An issue is necessarily determined only if it is "essential" to the judgment. 1 Restatement Judgments, 2d, Sec. 27, p 250, comment h, p 258. In order for collateral estoppel to operate as a bar to a subsequent prosecution, the jury in the earlier probate proceeding must necessarily have determined that defendant was not guilty of the criminal sexual conduct charged in the prosecutor's complaint. MacKenzie v. Union Guardian Trust Co, 262 Mich. 563, 581-582, 247 N.W. 914 (1933).
The inability of a court to determine upon what basis an acquitting jury reached its verdict, is, by itself, enough to preclude the defense of collateral estoppel. See anno: Modern status of doctrine of res judicata in criminal cases, 9 ALR3d 203, 240. Collateral estoppel applies only where the basis of the prior judgment can be ascertained clearly, definitely, and unequivocally. See Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. ----, 110 S.Ct. 668, 107 L.Ed.2d 708 (1990); Sealfon v. United States, 332 U.S. 575, 68 S.Ct. 237, 92 L.Ed. 180 (1948).
The verdict in the first proceeding need not explicitly have addressed the issue to be precluded, however. The fact that a verdict is a general...
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