La Jolla Casa de Manana v. Hopkins

• Decision Date: 07 July 1950
• Citation: 98 Cal.App.2d 339,219 P.2d 871
• Parties: LA JOLLA CASA DE MANANA v. HOPKINS (two cases). Civ. 3953, 3972.
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Page 871

219 P.2d 871

98 Cal.App.2d 339

LA JOLLA CASA DE MANANA v. HOPKINS (two cases).

Civ. 3953, 3972.

District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, California.

July 7, 1950.

Rehearing Denied Aug. 1, 1950.

Hearing Denied Aug. 31, 1950.

Philip Storer Thacher, Donald A. Stewart, El Cajon, for appellant.

W. I. Titus, Los Angeles, for respondent.

GRIFFIN, Justice.

Action for declaratory relief. The appeal from the interlocutory judgment and the appeal from the final judgment in this action were consolidated for the purpose of filing briefs and will be jointly considered. Defendant, since 1924, owned and operated the Casa deManana Hotel, a resort hotel of approximately 100 rooms located on a tract of 5- 1/2 acres in La Jolla, in the City of San Diego. The property consists of the main hotel building, adjoining which are a number of cottages which are used for the accommodation of hotel guests. Defendant lived in a seven-room cottage centrally located on the hotel grounds and designated as 'Cottage C'.

On June 1, 1944, defendant sold the hotel property to Gerald L. White and wife under a contract of sale, and since that date the hotel property has been operated by them or their successors in interest. In July, 1946, all of the White's interest was transferred to plaintiff corporation by written consent of defendant. The contract of sale provides generally that the consideration was $450,000, payable in certain described installments and contained a special provision that all furnishings and personal property located in Cottage C would be reserved, and defendant reserved the right under paragraph 3, to continue to personally occupy that cottage 'as at present for the 'duration' and until she can reasonably build a home for herself. If first party (defendant) is unable to build within a year and a half of the termination of the present war because of restrictions or unreasonable prices, first party will pay a monthly rental for such year and a half of $150 a month.' On March 24, 1947, Mr. White, who was the owner of one-fourth of the stock of the plaintiff corporation, died. Two months after his death demand was made for possession of the premises occupied by defendant. Upon her refusal this petition was filed seeking declaratory relief. Therein, it is contended by plaintiff that under paragraph 3 as above quoted, at the time the contract was entered into, it was the intention and understanding of the parties to that contract that the term 'duration' and the phrase 'the termination of the present war' means and referred to and should be construed as, the end of armed hostilities between the United States of America and Japan, ordinarily referred to as 'V J Day', which said event occurred on September 2, 1945; that the term 'restrictions' refers to governmental restrictions on the purchase and use of building materials suitable for a dwelling 'and that all such restrictions were removed and became ineffective June 30, 1947, and that ever since said date no governmental restrictions have prevented defendant from building a home nor has such building been restricted because of 'unreasonable prices' inasmuch as prices of building and building materials for homes since V J Day have not been and are not now unreasonable but to the contrary are the accepted standard of prices for the construction of homes.' It is then alleged that all of the time since June 30, 1947, defendant has not been prevented from building a home by reason of any restrictions or any unreasonable prices; that despite this fact defendant failed and refused to build and continues to occupy 'Cottage C' and 'has at all of the times mentioned refused to give up her personal occupancy against the wishes and demands of plaintiff'; that plaintiff immediately required such space for housing hotel guests and that by reason of defendant's refusal to deliver possession of the cottage to plaintiff, plaintiff will, during the hotel season, from February first until October first, 1948, be deprived of hotel revenue in the sum of $25,000, and will suffer damage in that amount; that plaintiff and defendant cannot agree upon the true construction and meaning of paragraph 3 of the contract and that a real controversy exists. It then prays that the court declare the rights and duties of the respective parties in reference to paragraph 3, as prayed; that it be declared that plaintiff is entitled to the immediate possession of Cottage C; and finally that the court grant such further relief to the plaintiff as may be proper under all the circumstances.

By answer defendant admits many of the allegations contained within the petition but specifically alleges that building has been and still is restricted by reason of 'unreasonable prices', and alleges that she was prevented from building by reason thereof. She denied that Cottage C would produce a gross revenue to plaintiff in excess of $5,000 from February 1, 1948, until October 1, 1948. She denied generally that paragraph 3 of the contract should be construed as contended by plaintiff corporation; alleged that she had expended over $2500 in constructing an additional room on Cottage C and prayed that the words and phrases 'duration' and 'termination of the present war' should be declared to mean exactly what they said, namely, the duration or termination of the present war (not hostilities) between the United States of America and Japan, Germany, Italy and others.

On stipulation of counsel it was agreed that paragraph V of plaintiff's complaint be stricken and that there be substituted in place thereof other allegations, namely, that the defendant did commence the construction of a home for herself on or about May 15, 1947, which was completed on or about February 15, 1948, and is now available to the defendant as her home; and that the defendant continues to occupy the said 'Cottage C' and does now refuse to give up the personal occupancy of said 'Cottage C' and continues to occupy the same against the wishes and express demand of the plaintiff. There allegations were denied generally by the defendant.

The first phase of the case was tried on April 7, 1948, and ordered submitted. On June 22, the judge filed his memorandum opinion and on July 20, findings of fact, conclusions of law, and an interlocutory judgment were signed and filed by the court.

The court found generally in favor of the plaintiff in accordance with the contentions set forth in the complaint, declared that it was the intention of the parties to the contract that the term 'restriction' or 'restrictions' as used in paragraph 3 of the contract should mean and refer to governmental restrictions on the purchase and use of building materials suitable for a dwelling, and that such restrictions terminated and became ineffective June 30, 1947, and that ever since that date defendant was not prevented from building a home for herself by reason of governmental restrictions or by reason of any restrictions or any unreasonable prices; that prior to February 15, 1948, defendant built and completed a home for herself in San Diego County; that ever since June 1, 1944, defendant kept Cottage C; that plaintiff made demand for possession and defendant refused it; that it was the intention of the parties that the terms 'duration' and 'termination of the present war', as used in paragraph 3 mean the end of the shooting war, generally known as 'V J Day', which was on September 2, 1945; that defendant's contention that Cottage C would only produce a gross revenue in an amount not to exceed $5000 between the dates alleged, was untrue; that under the contract defendant was entitled to occupy the cottage for 18 months after September 2, 1945, without rental, and that after said 18 months' period defendant agreed to pay plaintiff the sum of $150 per month until defendant could reasonably build a home for herself, which said 18 months' period ended March 2, 1947; that defendant made no payment therefor and is indebted to plaintiff in the sum of $1715.00 as rental in the sum of $150 a month from March 2, 1947, to February 15, 1948, being the date she completed the construction of the home for herself. It then determined that plaintiff was entitled to the immediate possession of Cottage C and specifically found that the amount of damages suffered by plaintiff by reason of being deprived of the use and occupancy of the cottage from February 15, 1948, until delivery of possession thereof to plaintiff should be determined by the court at a subsequent hearing for that purpose. Defendant appealed from the so-called interlocutory judgment that followed.

On June 14, 1949, in this court, plaintiff moved to dismiss this appeal on the grounds that the so-called interlocutory judgment was not a final judgment. This motion was submitted for decision to be determined at this time. It appears that the so-called interlocutory judgment became final as to all its provisions except the portion thereof which was reserved for further determination in reference to the claim of damages. Therefore, the motion to dismiss should be denied. Sec. 963, Code Civ.Proc.; People's Ditch Co. v. Foothill Irr. Dist., 103 Cal.App. 321, 284 P. 514; Orton v. Daigler, 120 Cal.App. 448, 8 P.2d 161.

On October 18, 1948, the trial was resumed for the purpose of ascertaining such damages, if any. Testimony was had and after several continuances, that issue was submitted and the court found, in addition to the findings heretofore mentioned, that on February 15, 1948, plaintiff became entitled to the exclusive possession and use of the cottage until July 27, 1948; that until that date defendant wrongfully occupied and withheld the possession of it from plaintiff; that the value of the use and occupation thereof for that period was $5,474.38; and rendered judgment for damages accordingly. From this judgment defendant also appeals.

The first complaint is that the evidence is insufficient, as a matter of...