Jolley v. Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co.

• Decision Date: 20 August 1930
• Docket Number: 55.
• Citation: 154 S.E. 400,199 N.C. 269
• Parties: JOLLEY v. JEFFERSON STANDARD LIFE INS. CO.
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

154 S.E. 400

199 N.C. 269

JOLLEY v. JEFFERSON STANDARD LIFE INS. CO.

No. 55.

Supreme Court of North Carolina

August 20, 1930

Appeal from Superior Court, Martin County; Devin, Judge.

Action by Mrs. Addie Jolley against the Jefferson Standard Life Insurance Company. From a judgment of nonsuit, plaintiff appeals.

Affirmed.

Ordinary "incontestable" clause cannot be used as means of rewriting into contract risks and hazards positively excluded by policy.

On April 15, 1919, the defendant issued to Joseph Henry Jolley a policy of life insurance. Thereafter on May 26, 1929 plaintiff's intestate, "while sitting in the hall of his home and through no fault of his own, and being sane and sober, and being engaged in no fight, affray or other unlawful enterprise, was intentionally shot from ambush by some person, alleged to have been one Frank Cox." There has been no default in the payment of any premium and no waiver of any premium on account of disability and the insured had never engaged in military or naval service or any allied branch thereof. The said policy of insurance obligated to pay $2,500 to the insured's estate upon due proof of death. The policy also contained the following double indemnity clause: "The Company will pay the beneficiary in full settlement of all claims hereunder double the face amount of this policy, if during the premium paying period and before default in the payment of any premium, and before waiver of any premium on account of disability, and before any non-forfeiture provision is in effect, the death of the Insured results from bodily injury within ninety days after the occurrence of such injury, provided death results directly and independently of all other causes, from bodily injuries effected solely through external, violent and accidental means while the Insured is sane and sober; except these provisions do not apply if the insured shall engage in military or naval service, or any allied branch thereof, in time of war, or in case death results from bodily injuries inflicted by another person or by the Insured himself, or in case of self-destruction." Under the head of "General Provisions" occurs the following incontestable clause: "After one year from date this policy shall be incontestable for any cause except for non-payment of premiums and violation of the provisions relating to military or naval service or any allied branch thereof in time of war, when the Double Indemnity and Total and Permanent Disability provisions shall not apply."

The defendant paid the plaintiff, administratrix of the insured, the full face amount of said policy, to wit, $2,500, but declined to pay the sum of $2,500 claimed by plaintiff under the double indemnity clause.

The trial judge, being of the opinion that the plaintiff was not entitled to recover "any sum whatsoever on account of the double indemnity provisions of the policy," nonsuited the case, from which judgment plaintiff appealed.

Jos. W. Bailey, of Williamston, for appellant.

Brooks, Parker, Smith & Wharton, of Greensboro, for appellee.

BROGDEN J.

Does the incontestable clause in the policy preclude the insurance company from asserting that the risk producing the death was not covered by the terms thereof? Stated baldly, the proposition of law is this: Does the incontestable clause modify, extend, or enlarge the coverage clause?

An examination of the provisions of the policy involved in this litigation discloses that the double indemnity clause by express terms does not cover accidental injuries resulting in death occasioned and brought about by (a) participation in military or naval service or any allied branch thereof in time of war; (b) bodily injury inflicted by another person upon the insured; (c) bodily injury inflicted by the insured himself; (d) self-destruction at any time whether during the first policy year or afterwards.

It is clear, therefore, that accidental death resulting from bodily injury inflicted by a third party is not a risk covered by the policy or assumed by the insurance company. The plaintiff, however, insists that the incontestable clause of the policy withdraws from the company any and all right to contest the payment of double indemnity unless it should appear that death resulted from participation in military or naval service or any allied branch thereof in time of war. Thus the effect of plaintiff's contention is that, while injury inflicted by a third person resulting in death is withdrawn in the double indemnity clause, such risk is written back into the policy by virtue of the application of the incontestable clause.

It is thoroughly established that, if there should be doubt as to the true meaning of the language used in an insurance policy such policy should be construed against the company, and all such doubts resolved against the insurer. Crowell v. Ins. Co., 169 N.C. 35, 85 S.E. 37, Ann. Cas. 1917D, 50; Allgood v. Insurance Co., 186 N.C. 415, 119 S.E. 561, 30 A. L. R. 652. Furthermore, "when a policy of insurance contains contradictory provisions, or has been so framed as to leave room for construction, rendering it doubtful whether the parties intended the exact truth of the applicant's statements to be a condition precedent to any binding contract, the court should lean against that construction which imposes upon the assured the obligations of a warranty. The company cannot justly complain of such a rule. Its attorneys, officers, or agents prepared the policy for the purpose, we shall assume, both of protecting the company against fraud, and of securing the just rights of the assured under a valid contract of insurance. It is its language which the court is invited to interpret, and it is both reasonable and just that its own words should be construed most strongly against itself." First National Bank of Kansas City v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 95 U.S. 673, 678, 24 L.Ed. 563; Underwood v....