Jolly v. City of Atlanta

Decision Date16 January 1928
Docket Number18198.
Citation141 S.E. 223,37 Ga.App. 666
PartiesJOLLY v. CITY OF ATLANTA.
CourtGeorgia Court of Appeals

Syllabus by Editorial Staff.

Generally municipal corporation is bound to keep its streets and sidewalks in reasonably safe condition for travel in ordinary modes by night as well as by day, and is liable for injuries sustained by failure to do so.

Rule prohibiting joint action against two or more persons or corporations for injuries sustained on account of independent conduct does not prevent maintenance of joint suit, even though actual, voluntary, and intentional concert of action by defendants is lacking, if their separate acts of negligence combined naturally and directly to produce single injury.

Where negligence alleged against city consisted in failure to keep streets in safe condition for travel in ordinary modes, in that city negligently allowed hole to remain in street at point where passengers from street cars were accustomed to alight, and allegations against street car company charged company with negligently and without notice ejecting passenger from car at place in street where hole was and where passenger on alighting was likely to be injured, joint action against municipality and street car company was not subject to demurrer on account of misjoinder of parties.

Error from Superior Court, Fulton County; John D. Humphries, Judge.

Action by Mrs. W. H. Jolly against the City of Atlanta and another. Judgment for defendant named, and plaintiff brings error. Reversed.

C. L Padgett and G. G. Finch, both of Atlanta, for plaintiff in error.

J. L Mayson and Courtland S. Winn, both of Atlanta, for defendant in error.

Syllabus OPINION.

JENKINS P.J.

1. The general rule of law is that a municipal corporation is bound to keep its streets and sidewalks in a reasonably safe condition for travel in the ordinary modes by night as well as by day, and, if it fail to do so, it is liable for damages for injuries sustained in consequence of such failure.

2. The rule which does not permit a joint action against two or more persons or corporations for injuries sustained on account of their independent conduct does not prevent the maintenance of a joint suit, even though actual, voluntary, and intentional concert of action on the part of the defendants is lacking if their separate acts of negligence combine naturally and directly to produce the single injury. Brooks v. Ashburn, 9 Ga. 297 (3); Mashburn v....

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