Jones v. Allen, Civil Action No. 2:06cv986-MHT.
| Decision Date | 17 April 2007 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 2:06cv986-MHT. |
| Citation | 483 F.Supp.2d 1142 |
| Parties | Aaron Lee JONES, Plaintiff, v. Richard ALLEN, Commissioner, Alabama Department of Corrections, in his individual and official capacities, and Grantt Culliver, Warden, Holman Correctional Facility, in his individual and official capacities, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Alabama |
Heather K. McDevitt, Stephanie L. Cohen, Vincent R. Fitzpatrick, Jr., White & Case LLP, New York, NY, for Plaintiff.
James Clayton Crenshaw, Office of the Attorney General, James William Davis, State of Alabama Office of the Attorney General, Montgomery, AL, for Defendants.
Plaintiff Aaron Lee Jones is scheduled to be executed by the State of Alabama on May 3, 2007. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Jones has filed this civil action claiming that the method and procedure the State intends to use to execute him pose an unjustifiable risk of causing him extreme pain in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution. He names the Commissioner of the Alabama Department of Corrections and the Warden of Holman Prison as defendants. Jurisdiction is proper under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343. There are currently two motions pending: the defendants' motion for summary judgment on the ground of statute-of-limitations, and Jones's motion for a stay of execution. For the reasons that follow, both motions will be denied.
Jones is a death-row inmate in the custody of the Alabama Department of Corrections. The facts underlying his capital offense are detailed in the Eleventh Circuit's opinion denying him habeas relief. Jones v. Campbell, 436 F.3d 1285, 1289-92 (11th Cir.2006), cert. denied sub nom. Jones v. Allen, ___ U.S. ___, 127 S.Ct. 619, 166 L.Ed.2d 428 (2006) (mem.). On November 10, 1978, Jones and another person were responsible for shooting and stabbing three children, their parents, and their grandmother in Blount County, Alabama. The parents, Willene and Carl Nelson, died as a result of the attacks. The following is a chronology giving rise to the issues before the court:
A. State-Court Direct Proceedings
1979: An Alabama jury found Jones guilty of capital murder and recommended that he be sentenced to death. The trial court agreed with the jury and sentenced him to death by electrocution.
1982: Jones was retried for his offense after the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals, pursuant to Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 100 S.Ct. 2382, 65 L.Ed.2d 392 (1980), reversed and ordered a new trial. Jones v. State, 403 So.2d 1 (Ala.Crim.App. 1981). An Alabama jury again found him guilty of capital murder, and the trial court again sentenced him to death.
January 10, 1984: The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed Jones's conviction and death sentence. Jones v. State, 520 So.2d 543, 545 (Ala.Crim.App. 1984).
January 8, 1988: The Alabama Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals. Ex parte Jones, 520 So.2d 553 (Ala.1988).
October 3, 1988: The United States Supreme Court denied certiorari review. Jones v. Alabama, 488 U.S. 871, 109 S.Ct. 182, 102 L.Ed.2d 151 (1988) (mem.).
B. State-Court Collateral Proceedings
March 1990: Jones filed a petition for post-conviction relief, challenging his conviction and sentence pursuant to Ala. R.Crim. P. 32.
May 1994: Jones amended his Rule 32 petition, reiterating claims alleged in his original petition, and raising numerous other claims for relief.
June 1996: The state trial court denied post-conviction relief to Jones.
April 30, 1999: The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the trial court's June 1996 order. Jones v. State, 753 So.2d 1174 (Ala.Crim.App.1999).
December 17, 1999: The Alabama Supreme Court denied certiorari review.
C. Federal-Habeas Proceedings
December 15, 2000: Jones filed a federal habeas petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Jones raised numerous claims including a method-of-execution claim that challenged Alabama's use of electrocution.
July 1, 2002: Alabama switched from electrocution to lethal injection as the primary form of execution, and gave deathrow inmates 30 days to elect death by electrocution instead. 1975 Ala.Code § 15-18-82.1.
February 6, 2004: The district court denied federal habeas relief to Jones.
January 20, 2006: The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. Jones v. Campbell, 436 F.3d 1285 (11th Cir.2006).
November 13, 2006: The United States Supreme Court denied certiorari review. Jones v. Allen, ___ U.S. ___, 127 S.Ct. 619, 166 L.Ed.2d 428 (2006) (mem.).
D. Federal Challenge to Lethal Injection
November 1, 2006: Jones filed the instant method-of-execution § 1983 suit, claiming that there is an unreasonably high risk that Alabama's current execution protocol will be carried out improperly and thereby cause him extreme pain at the moment of execution, a risk that Jones asserts is both unjustifiable and avoidable. Jones contends that if his execution is `botched' as described, it would violate the Eighth Amendment (), which prohibits "unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain." Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 49 L.Ed.2d 859 (1976).
December 4, 2006: With federal-habeas review complete, the State filed a motion with the Alabama Supreme Court to set an execution date for Jones.
December 22, 2006: The parties filed in this court a joint report, pursuant to Fed. R.Civ.P. 26(f), setting forth proposed dates and deadlines for discovery, motions, and a trial date of October 1, 2007.
January 8, 2007: This court adopted the parties' proposed trial date of October 1, 2007.
February 26, 2007: In response to the State's December 4 motion to set a date of execution, the Alabama Supreme Court set Jones's execution date for May 3, 2007.
March 1, 2007: The defendants informed this court of the execution date, and the court ordered Jones to indicate whether he intended to seek a stay of execution.
March 2, 2007: Jones filed a statement of intent to seek a stay.
March 13, 2007: The defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, raising a statute-of-limitations defense.
March 14, 2007: Jones filed a motion to stay execution.
As stated, Jones asks this court to enter a stay of execution so that his lethal-injection challenge can proceed on the merits. The defendants offer two responses. First, they contend that, because Jones's claim is barred by the statute of limitations, summary judgment should be entered in their favor. Second, they argue that Jones's motion for a stay of execution should be denied because of the "strong equitable presumption against the grant of a stay where a claim could have been brought at such time to allow consideration of the merits without requiring entry of a stay." Hill v. McDonough ("Hill I"), 547 U.S. ___, ___, 126 S.Ct. 2096, 2104, 165 L.Ed.2d 44 (2006) (quoting Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U.S. 637, 650, 124 S.Ct. 2117, 158 L.Ed.2d 924 (2004)).
The court will therefore divide its discussion into two parts. First, the court will consider whether the defendants are entitled to summary judgment based on the statute-of-limitations defense, that is, whether "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, ... show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the [defendants are] entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). Then, the court will consider Jones's motion for a stay of execution.
The court first addresses the defendants' motion for summary judgment based on their statute-of-limitations defense.1 in a case such as this one strikes the court as anomalous to say the least: the defendants are essentially arguing that the statute of limitations has already run on an injury that has not yet occurred.
According to the defendants, Jones is time-barred from bringing his § 1983 claim because his claim accrued in 2002, when Alabama adopted lethal injection as its method of execution, and expired two years later, in 2004. The defendants rely primarily on Cooey v. Strickland, 479 F.3d (6th Cir.2007), in which the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held, in a 2-1 decision, that the statute of limitations for a § 1983 method-of-execution claim accrues when direct review of the conviction and sentence becomes final and the State has adopted its current method of execution, not when collateral habeas proceedings are complete, an execution date is set, or execution becomes imminent. Thus, the defendants argue, because Jones's conviction was already final in 2002 when Alabama adopted lethal injection as its method of execution, Jones's § 1983 lawsuit, filed in 2006 when his habeas proceedings were nearly complete, is untimely.
As Cooey makes clear, the federal courts look to state law to determine the limitations period for a § 1983 claim. 479 F.3d at 416; see Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. ___, 127 S.Ct. 1091, 1094, ___ L.Ed.2d ___ (2007). Because a § 1983 suit is best characterized as a constitutional tort action, federal courts borrow the state statute of limitations for personal injury actions. Wallace, 127 S.Ct. at 1094; Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 276-78, 105 S.Ct. 1938, 85 L.Ed.2d 254 (1985). Although state law determines the limitations period, federal law governs when the statute of limitations begins to run, or when the claim accrues. Wallace, 127 S.Ct. at 1095.
According to the Cooey majority, federal law dictates that "accrual occurs when the plaintiff has complete and present cause of action," that is, "when the plaintiff can file suit and obtain relief." Cooey, 479 F.3d at 416 (quoting Wallace, 127 S.Ct. at 1095) (Internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). With that principle in mind, the (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). With that principle in mind,...
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