Jones v. Anderson Cotton Mills

• Decision Date: 21 September 1944
• Docket Number: 15679.
• Parties: JONES v. ANDERSON COTTON MILLS et al.
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

31 S.E.2d 447

205 S.C. 247

JONES v. ANDERSON COTTON MILLS et al.

No. 15679.

Supreme Court of South Carolina

September 21, 1944

Leon W. Harris and Harold Major, both of Anderson, for appellant.

Watkins & Prince, of Anderson, for respondents.

TAYLOR Justice.

This case comes by way of appeal from Anderson County upon the following statement of facts:

On August 25, 1937, R. L. Jones was, and had been for several years, employed by Anderson Cotton Mills at Anderson, South Carolina, and on that date he sustained a hernia which was compensable under the South Carolina Workmen's Compensation Act. Liability was accepted by the employer an Aetna Casualty and Surety Company, the insurance carrier.

On October 15, 1937, Jones was operated on and was treated by physicians from that date until December 19, when he was advised by one of the attending physicians that he was able to return to his work and was told to do so. The mill was closed at that time for Christmas Holidays and did not resume operations until January 1 1938, at which time Jones reported for duty and was put to work.

Compensation was paid from the date of the injury until December 19, as well as medical, doctors and hospital bills incident to the operation.

After Jones had worked but a day or two, a burning and stinging sensation set up at the site of the operation, and a little knot about the size of the end of a finger appeared also. This was reported to the physicians who operated upon him. Within a few days thereafter small pimples began to appear in the wound, and this was reported to the physicians, and sometime thereafter, in January, 1938, the incision broke down completely. This was reported to the physicians and according to Jones' testimony, to the superintendent of Anderson Mills, and a truss was provided for him and paid for by the respondents. The appellant's condition grew steadily worse; however, he continued to work with Anderson Cotton Mills until July 3, 1942, when he left the employ of Anderson Cotton Mills, as he testified, because he was not able to do his work on account of the hernia breaking down.

Under date of August 30, 1942, the appellant's condition was brought to the attention of the South Carolina Industrial Commission, and thereafter a hearing of the case was set by the Industrial Commission for January 12, 1943 at which time part of the testimony was taken and the hearing continued because of the absence of Dr. Latimer and Mr Seigler, superintendent of the mills, defendants' witnesses, until March 20, 1943; when the hearing was resumed. Also additional testimony was taken on behalf of the defendants at the hearing of the full Commission.

Under date of May 4, 1943, the hearing Commissioner made an award in favor of the claimant, Jones, and thereafter in due time the defendants made application for review to the entire Commission, which was held on July 24, 1943, and thereafter, on August 6, 1943, the full Commission upheld the hearing Commissioner and affirmed his award.

In due time the defendants appealed to the Circuit Court upon grounds set out in the Transcript of Record, and the appeal was heard on the 8th day of December, 1943, by the Honorable M. M. Mann, who, by his order bearing date the 11th day of December, 1943, reversed the full Commission and set aside the award.

From this order of Judge Mann, the claimant, Jones, does now appeal to this Court upon the following exceptions:

"1. It was error for the presiding Judge to rule and hold: 'and it must be assumed, in view of the award of the full Commission, that it passed upon the sufficiency of the grounds and held that the bar above referred to was adequately set out.' The error being that there is nothing in the record to show that this statement in Judge Mann's order is a correct one and said matter is prejudicial to the interests of claimant.

2. It was error for the Court to rule and hold 'Regardless of this, however, I find and so hold that the grounds of appeal to the full Commission were sufficient to include and set up the limitations contained in Section 46 of the Workmen's Compensation Act; and in view of the fact that the plaintiff did not on appeal to this Court by the defendants make this contention as additional sustaining grounds, I hold that there is no merit in his present contention on that point,' for the reason that the rules set forth what is necessary to be contained in the grounds of appeal, and plaintiff's grounds of appeal did not meet the requirements with reference to the statute of limitations and the court's ruling was prejudicial to the interests of the plaintiff.

3. It was error for the Court to rule and hold: 'There is some difference in the testimony as to the date of this payment, but in the view most favorable to the plaintiff, that payment was made in July of 1939. It is admitted that thereafter the next time any mention of this case was made to anyone (with the possible exception of the doctors because the testimony does not show the date it was last brought to the doctors' attention) was by a letter from plaintiff's present attorney to the Industrial Commission in October, 1942, or three years and three months after the truss was paid for, if that was in July, 1942.' The error being (a) that Judge Mann was making the Circuit Court the fact finding body which prerogative was invested in the Industrial Commission; (b) the matter was discussed with Superintendent Seigler of the Anderson Mills, and Dr. Latimer testified he filed a report with the insurance company in 1939. Therefore the Court's ruling was contrary to the evidence, invading the fact finding body's jurisdiction and was prejudicial to plaintiff's rights. 4. It was error for the Circuit Court to rule and hold that the defendants had not 'waived the provisions of Section 46 of the Act and are now estopped from interposing that section as a defense or a bar to this claim, and that their position with reference to Section 46 is analogous to their position under Section 24(a).' For the reason that the two sections are analogous the position of plaintiff is the stronger with reference to Section 46 than it is with Section 24(a) and this plaintiff was prejudiced thereby.

5. It was error for the Court to rule and hold: 'In the event of a changed condition of the claimant, the Commission upon its own motion may review the case, but if it does not do so and the claimant does not make an application therefor to the Commission within a period of twelve months from the date of the last payment of compensation, the file is closed, and the Commission had no further jurisdiction of the case. If this were not so, the Commission could never close its file in any case and authorize the insurer to withdraw its reserve against the claim. I find and so hold that under the provisions of Section 46, the application on the part of the claimant must be made not to the issuer, not to the employer, but to the Industrial Commission itself, and having failed to make this application to the Commission within the period of twelve months from the date of the last payment of compensation, the plaintiff in this case is barred from now asserting this claim.' For the reason that all matters pertaining to the handling of claims is possible and capable of being waived, including the statute of limitations; and if the Industrial Commission itself desires to waive this provision it has authority to do so; by proceeding to hear the matters the Commission has shown that it did waive this provision with reference to a closing of the file; and, in fact, all parties connected with the case proceeded upon the theory that said matter was waived until upon oral hearing before the full Commission on appeal. Therefore this plaintiff was prejudiced by said ruling.

6. It was error for the Court to fail to sustain the decision of the Industrial Commission, and reversing and dismissing the claim of the plaintiff,

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