Jones v. Arnette
| Decision Date | 06 February 2018 |
| Docket Number | 1:16-cv-01212-DAD-GSA-PC |
| Parties | JEREMY JONES, Plaintiff, v. ARNETTE, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California |
ORDER DISMISSING FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM, WITH LEAVE TO AMEND
(ECF No. 19.)
Jeremy Jones ("Plaintiff") is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis with this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. On August 16, 2016, Plaintiff filed the Complaint commencing this action. (ECF No. 1.) The court screened the Complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A and issued an order on August 21, 2017, dismissing the Complaint for failure to state a claim, with leave to amend. (ECF No. 12.) On January 16, 2018, Plaintiff filed the First Amended Complaint, which is now before the court for screening. (ECF No. 19.)
The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally "frivolous or malicious," that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2). "Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that the action or appeal fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
A complaint is required to contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not required, but "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). While a plaintiff's allegations are taken as true, courts "are not required to indulge unwarranted inferences." Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). To state a viable claim, Plaintiff must set forth "sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79; Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). While factual allegations are accepted as true, legal conclusions are not. Id. The mere possibility of misconduct falls short of meeting this plausibility standard. Id.
Plaintiff is presently incarcerated at California State Prison-Los Angeles County in Lancaster, California. The events at issue in the First Amended Complaint allegedly occurred at Corcoran State Prison (CSP) in Corcoran, California, when Plaintiff was incarcerated there in the custody of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. Plaintiff names as defendants Correctional Officer (C/O) Arnette, C/O Flores, C/O Lopez, C/O Zamora, C/O Vasquez, Sergeant Gonzalez, Lieutenant Keener, and Dr. Kim, who were employed at CSP during the relevant time period.
Plaintiff's allegations follow. Plaintiff suffers from a lower back condition causing chronic nerve irritation in both legs and excruciating pain on a daily basis. Plaintiff ambulates using a wheelchair and walker.
On August 11, 2012, while ambulating with his walker to visit with his parents at CSP, Plaintiff felt and heard a loud "pop" in his lower back, and his pain intensified. Plaintiff's mother ran to alert the staff about Plaintiff's medical emergency. The parental visit was terminated and medical staff transported Plaintiff to medical via a wheelchair. At medical, Plaintiff was given his routine noon medications and told to go back to his cell. The routine noon medications did not constitute treatment for Plaintiff's emergency condition. Plaintiff tried to explain that he had not been seen or evaluated for his back condition, but the on-call doctor, Dr. Kim, denied Plaintiff treatment and forcefully removed him from the clinic in the wheelchair. Plaintiff was taken to his cell where defendant Flores nearly intentionally dumped him on the floor, with no regard to his injuries.
Past treatment for Plaintiff's condition consisted of prescribed medication and shots for the immediate pain, with evaluation, x-rays, and scans to make sure no further damage was done. Instead, Dr. Kim did not inquire into Plaintiff's history and intended to leave Plaintiff in "unnecessary and wanton" pain. Something drastically went wrong, because Plaintiff has been wheelchair bound ever since.
The next day, on Plaintiff's birthday, his parents returned to check on him. Defendant Arnette cut up Plaintiff's I.D. card and threw it out the window of the program office in order to deny Plaintiff access to his visit. Out of discrimination and for no other reason, Plaintiff was not allowed to visit his loved ones because he belonged to a protected class: Americans with disabilities. While Plaintiff's inmate caregiver ran back to retrieve Plaintiff's bedcard so he could attend the visit, Plaintiff was "easy pickens" for the frustrations of the officers because he could not walk and was in a wheelchair. (ECF No. 19 at 23.) Defendants Gonzales, Flores, Arnette, Lopez, and Zamora used the Greenwall tactic of intimidation by surrounding Plaintiff, making threats, hurling insults, using profane language, and making fun of Plaintiff's disability in direct violation of CCR Title 15 1391 and codes of conduct. They laughed and told him that if he couldn't walk, he couldn't attend the visit. Another officer had compassion and radioed to the floor staff to retrieve Plaintiff's walker.
/// While the caregiver was retrieving his walker, Plaintiff told the officers that he had not kissed his parents' faces in more than 2 1/2 years, and if it took him another 2 1/2 hours he was going to kiss his mother's face. Defendants Lopez and Zamora then told Plaintiff that his bedcard was not valid identification. Under defendant Gonzalez' supervision these officers discriminated against Plaintiff, refusing to allow him to use the basic form of identification used by able-bodied inmates when their ID's were missing. The officers denied Plaintiff access to his family visit because he couldn't walk, violating his Fourteenth Amendment rights. The harassment and tortuous treatment continued until Plaintiff was immediately and abruptly moved out by defendant Vasquez of the only building medically equipped for Plaintiff to shower.
Once it was discovered that Plaintiff was improperly housed, they requested that Plaintiff be moved back to Building 5. But defendant Vasquez and Building 5 tower staff stopped the move and banned Plaintiff from his building. This was brought to the attention of defendants Keener and Gonzalez, and Plaintiff was again denied proper accommodations and was unable to bathe for over a month until he was given a special transfer. This was deliberate indifference and cruel and unusual punishment because they were aware that Plaintiff could not bathe himself in his cell. This created a substantial risk of harm to his health and safety.
After this ordeal, Plaintiff's father was diagnosed with a brain tumor, lost eyesight, and was diagnosed with Parkinson's, dementia, and Alzheimer's disease.
These officers, under the direct supervision of Sergeant Gonzalez and Lieutenant Keener, cost Plaintiff his last opportunity to have a meaningful visit with his father before his health deteriorated. Plaintiff is in the mental health program and deals with anguish daily. Plaintiff's deprivation of constitutional rights to this degree constitutes a physical injury. The emotional pain of losing the last chance to see his father alive is definitely more than "de minimus." (ECF No. 19 at 12.) Dr. Kim is "without a doubt" liable for emotional distress, because the lack of treatment contributed to Plaintiff being confined to a wheelchair. (Id. at 12:15.)
Plaintiff requests monetary damages, including punitive damages, and a bench trial.
The Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress . . . .
42 U.S.C. § 1983.
"[Section] 1983 'is not itself a source of substantive rights,' but merely provides 'a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.'" Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979)); see also Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 618 (1979); Hall v. City of Los Angeles, 697 F.3d 1059, 1068 (9th Cir. 2012); Crowley v. Nevada, 678 F.3d 730, 734 (9th Cir. 2012); Anderson v. Warner, 451 F.3d 1063, 1067 (9th Cir. 2006). "To the extent that the violation of a state law amounts to the deprivation of a state-created interest that reaches beyond that guaranteed by the federal Constitution, Section 1983 offers no redress." Id.
To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that (1) the defendant acted under color of state law and (2) the defendant deprived him or her of rights secured by the Constitution or federal law. Long v. County of Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th Cir. 2006); see also Marsh v. Cnty. of San Diego, 680 F.3d 1148, 1158 (9th Cir. 2012) (). A person...
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