Jones v. Artis
| Decision Date | 08 June 2015 |
| Docket Number | Civ. No. 13-5734 (RBK) (KMW) |
| Parties | FLOYD M. JONES, Plaintiff, v. LAWRENCE ARTIS, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of New Jersey |
Plaintiff is proceeding pro se with a civil rights complaint filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. On April 4, 2014, the Court screened the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A and permitted the complaint to proceed in part. Presently before the Court is Warden Artis, Sergeant Thompson, Lieutenant Hall, and Captain Larkins (hereinafter the "Defendants") motion for summary judgment. For the following reasons, the motion for summary judgment will be denied.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) provides that summary judgment should be granted "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a); see also Tolan v. Cotton, 134 S. Ct. 1861, 1866 (2014); Kreschollek v. S. Stevedoring Co., 223 F.3d 202, 204 (3d Cir. 2000). In deciding a motion for summary judgment, a court must construe all facts and inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Cotton, 134 S. Ct. at 1863. The moving party bears the burden of establishing that no genuine issue of material fact remains. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). "[W]ith respect to an issue on which the nonmovingparty bears the burden of proof . . . the burden on the moving party may be discharged by 'showing' - that is, pointing out to the district court - that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case." Id. at 325.
If the moving party meets its threshold burden, the opposing party must present actual evidence that creates a genuine issue as to a material fact for trial. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c) (). "[U]nsupported allegations . . . and pleadings are insufficient to repel summary judgment." Schoch v. First Fid. Bancorporation, 912 F.2d 654, 657 (3d Cir. 1990); see also Scheidemantle v. Slippery Rock Univ. State Sys. of Higher Educ., 470 F.3d 535, 538 (3d Cir. 2006) ()
As the Court noted in its screening opinion, this case centers on Plaintiff's allegations that Artis, Hall, Larkins, and Thompson, who are officials at the Burlington County Jail, knew that Plaintiff needed a special diet, that he was not receiving said special diet, and that they did nothing about this fact. Plaintiff's allegations gave rise to an Eight Amendment deliberate indifference claim against all four Defendants. See ECF No. 2.
In support of their motion for summary judgment, Defendants rely on two cases from the Third Circuit for the proposition that non-medical personnel cannot be held liable for deliberate indifference when medical personnel are either mistreating or not treating a prisoner. See Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218 (3d Cir. 2004); Durmer v. O'Carroll, 991 F.2d 64 (3d Cir. 1993). Defendants submit, through counsel, internal paperwork from Plaintiff's initial intake that showsPlaintiff's high blood pressure and special diet are documented by the prison. See ECF No. 14-4. Defendants also submit food service provider Aramark's "Medical Diet Order" and the prison's detailed diet sheets, both showing that Plaintiff was ordered to receive a low sodium diet and what his diet was meant to consist of. See ECF Nos. 14-5, 14-6. Defendants also submit documentation showing that the prison medical staff checked and maintained Plaintiff's blood pressure regularly, and that Plaintiff's blood pressure problem and diet needs were documented in numerous places. See ECF Nos. 14-7, 14-8, 14-9. Defendants also submit, in support of their motion for summary judgment, a certification of Mildred Scholtz, Captain of the Burlington County Department of Corrections. See ECF No. 14-2 ¶ 1.
Captain Scholtz certifies to the Court that Plaintiff is listed as being on a low sodium diet, id. ¶ 7, that Aramark is in charge of the food service for the prison, id. ¶ 8, and that the prison nurse consistently marks that Plaintiff is to be on a low sodium diet, id. ¶ 12. Captain Scholtz also alleges that Plaintiff's official grievance was "not received by [the] Administration." Id. ¶ 11. Indeed, Defendants appear to be arguing that, because all of the necessary paperwork is in order, Plaintiff's claims must be frivolous.
Plaintiff opposes the motion for summary judgment. In his response, Plaintiff argues that Defendants cannot simply "remove themselves" from the situation by relying on Spruill and Durmer. ECF No. 16 at 2. Plaintiff also alleges that he put Defendants on notice, both verbally and through a written grievance, and nothing was ever done about his problem. ECF No. 1 at 6. In his Response in Opposition to Defendants' motion for summary judgement, Plaintiff points out that there are no Aramark employees on-site at mealtime to whom to complain, just prison officials. ECF No. 16 at 2. Therefore, Plaintiff writes, even if he were supposed to file a complaint with Aramark, such action was impossible. See id. at 3.
Plaintiff's deliberate indifference claim against Defendants proceeded past screening. Defendants make only two arguments in support of their motion for summary judgment. Defendants first argue that they cannot be held responsible as a matter of law because they are non-medical personnel and Plaintiff was under the care of the prison's doctors. Alternatively, Defendants argue that the record contains no evidence that they were deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff's receipt of his medically prescribed meals. The Court will address each argument in turn.
(1) Non-Medical Personnel
Defendants first argue that they cannot be sued for deliberate indifference as a matter of law because they are non-medical personnel and Plaintiff was under the care of prison doctors at all times relevant to his complaint. See ECF No. 14-1. In support of this position, Defendants rely on two cases from the Third Circuit - Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218 (3d Cir. 2004) and Durmer v. O'Carroll, 991 F.2d 64 (3d Cir. 1993). However, neither case fits the present facts.
First, Defendants cite to Spruill for the proposition that non-medical personnel cannot be held liable for deliberate indifference if the prisoner is under a doctor's care. See 372 F.3d at 236 (). In Spruill, the plaintiff fell and suffered severe injuries at the prison wherein he was incarcerated, and the prison doctor refused to see or treat the plaintiff in any way. See id. at 224-225. The Court then held that the plaintiff could not sue both the medical personnel and the prison officials for the actions of the medical personnel. See id. In this case, by contrast, Plaintiff is suing only the prison officials for failing to implement a medically prescribed special diet. This is an issue of implementation, not diagnosis or mistreatment.
It is also worth noting in analyzing Defendants' motion for summary judgment that prison officials are not liable for deliberate indifference when they are not involved beyond "reviewing [a] grievance and deferring to the judgment of medical personnel." See Davis v. Brown, 556 F. App'x 87, 90 (3d Cir. 2014) (per curiam) (). In this case, however, the medical personnel's judgement is not disputed - to wit, Defendants' own exhibits make clear that medical personnel want Plaintiff on a low-sodium diet. It is also clear that the prison officials are directly involved. Indeed, "[w]hether an inmate has a legitimate, medically prescribed diet is a question wholly within the province of the prison administration." Laufgas v. Speziale, No. 04-1697, 2006 WL 2528009, at *5 (D.N.J. Aug. 31, 2006); see also Hughes v. Balicki, No. 07-4554, 2008 WL 2835257, at *2 (D.N.J. July 18, 2008) (); Gerber v. Sweeney, No. 02-241, 2003 WL 1090187, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 7, 2003) (). It is also clear that the paperwork regarding the low-sodium diet is proper, and Plaintiff is scheduled to receive the low-sodium diet. ECF Nos. 14-5, 14-6. What is not clear, however, is whether Plaintiff is actually receiving the special diet he requires.
The second case relied upon by Defendants, Durmer, is similarly inapposite. In Durmer, the plaintiff suffered a stroke and was allegedly mistreated by the prison doctors during his period of incarceration. See 991 F.2d at 66. Durmer's holding that non-medical actors cannot be considered deliberately indifferent "simply because they failed to respond directly to the medical complaints of a prisoner who is already being treated by the prison doctor," does not fit the facts here. Id. at 69. Again, the facts here do not involve either lack of treatment or mistreatment bymedical personnel. Rather, in this case, the issue as presented is a lack of implementation by prison officials after the medical personnel issued a prescribed course of action. Plaintiff's complaint simply cannot be remedied by the medical staff, as it is within the purview of the...
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