Jones v. Asa G. Candler, Inc.

• Decision Date: 16 October 1918
• Docket Number: 9471.
• Citation: 97 S.E. 112,22 Ga.App. 717
• Parties: JONES v. ASA G. CANDLER, INC.
• Court: Georgia Court of Appeals

97 S.E. 112

22 Ga.App. 717

JONES v. ASA G. CANDLER, INC.

No. 9471.

Court of Appeals of Georgia, Second Division

October 16, 1918

Syllabus by the Court.

Under the undisputed facts of the instant case the plaintiff entered the office building to see a tenant on business of her own, and was therefore a licensee only, and was not there by the invitation, express or implied, of the owner of the building. The trial judge did not err, under the evidence as disclosed by the record, in granting a nonsuit.

Error from Superior Court, Fulton County; W. D. Ellis, Judge.

Action by S. H. Jones against Asa G. Candler, Incorporated. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiff brings error. Affirmed.

Westmoreland Anderson & Smith, of Atlanta, for plaintiff in error.

Candler Thomson & Hirsch, of Atlanta, for defendant in error.

HARWELL J.

Mrs Sallie H. Jones brought suit against Asa G. Candler Incorporated, for damages for personal injuries alleged to have been sustained when she was visiting what is known as the Candler Building for the purpose of transacting certain business with a tenant of said building. The petition alleges that the Candler Building has offices that are rented to various persons for business purposes, open to patrons of the persons renting offices therein and those who call to see them on business; that as she was proceeding along the hallway on the sixth floor of the building, in prosecution of her business, and in front of Dr. Hansell Crenshaw's office, the hall at this point being somewhat dark and not well lighted, the plaintiff stumbled and fell over some scantlings or pieces of timber negligently allowed to be on the floor in the path of persons passing along the hall; that these pieces of timber were left in the hall by employés of the defendant, engaged in repairing Dr. Crenshaw's office, and that the defendant was negligent in leaving said pieces of timber in the hall in a place where persons using the hall could stumble over them. The petition further sets out the extent of the injuries. Upon the conclusion of plaintiff's testimony the trial judge granted a nonsuit, and to this judgment the plaintiff excepted.

It is undisputed that the plaintiff went to Dr. Crenshaw's office, not as a patient of his, but on business of her own. She went for the purpose of securing from him a contribution for a phonograph she was buying for the students of Oglethorpe University. She went to his office to ask him to contribute to that fund. It is insisted by the defendant that the plaintiff was not in the building by the invitation of the owner of the building, either expressed or implied, but as a licensee only, and for that reason the owner of the building owed her no duty, except such as is due to a licensee; in other words, that the owner of the building is not liable to her for negligence, and for that reason, under the facts of the instant case, there can be no recovery in her behalf. "Where the owner or occupier of land, by express or implied invitation, induces or leads others to come upon his premises for any lawful purpose, he is liable in damages to such persons for injuries occasioned by his failure to exercise ordinary care in keeping the premises and approaches safe." Civ. Code 1910, § 4420. This duty to exercise ordinary care in keeping the premises, as stated in the section just quoted, is owing by the owner of land to those who come upon his premises by express or implied invitation. No such duty arises to trespassers or licensees who may come upon the premises. The rule is thus laid down in 1 Thompson on Negligence, § 946:

"As a general rule the owner of private grounds is under no obligation to keep them in a safe condition for the benefit of trespassers, intruders, idlers, bare licensees, or others who come upon them, not by any invitation, express or implied, but for their own purposes, their pleasure, or to gratify their curiosity, however innocent or laudable their purpose may be."

This writer further says (section 987):

"But he [the owner] is under no such obligation towards those who elect to come upon his business premises, not for the purpose of doing such business with him as he invites the public to do, but for other purposes of their own. Such persons stand on the footing of trespassers or bare licensees, and, on a principle already considered, they take the premises as they find them, and, if they are hurt in consequence of any defect in them, they cannot recover damages. Suppose, for example, that an accident due to a negligent defect in business premises had happened to a book canvasser, or a life insurance agent, or a lightning rod man, clearly the conclusion of the law would be otherwise, on the ground that no implied invitation had been given to such a person to come upon the premises. Accordingly it has been held that one who for her own convenience goes into a building containing offices, to obtain information from an occupant in regard to a matter wholly disconnected with his business, or with the business of any occupant, or with the business for which the building was used or designed, is a mere licensee, and cannot recover from the owner of the building for personal injuries sustained by reason of its defective condition."

In Plummer v. Dill, 156 Mass. 426, 31 N.E. 128, 32 Am.St.Rep. 463, one of the leading cases on this question, it is said:

"If we assume that it was the duty of the defendant to keep the entrance, stairway, and halls of his building reasonably safe for persons using them on an invitation express or implied, and if we further assume that he negligently permitted them to be unsafe, and that his negligence caused the injury to the plaintiff, and that she was in the exercise of due care, some of which propositions are at least questionable, we come to the inquiry whether the plaintiff was a mere licensee in the building, or was there by the defendant's implied invitation. She did not go there to transact with any occupant of the building any kind of business in which he was engaged, or in the transaction of which the building was used or designed to be used. She was in search of a servant; and, for her own convenience, she went there to inquire about a matter which concerned herself alone. It has often been held that the owner of land or a building, who has it in charge, is bound to be careful and diligent in keeping it safe for those who come there by his invitation, express or implied, but that he owes no such duty to those who come there for their own convenience, or as mere licensees. * * * The mere fact that premises are fitted conveniently for use by the owner or his tenants, and by those who come to transact such business as is carried on there, does not constitute an implied invitation to strangers to come and use the place for purposes of their own. To such persons it gives no more than an implied license to come for any proper purpose. * * * It is well settled * * * that to come under an implied invitation, as distinguished from a mere license, the visitor must come for a purpose connected with the business in which the occupant is engaged, or which he permits to be carried on there. There must at least be some mutuality of interest in the subject to which the visitor's business relates, although the particular thing which is the object of the visit may not be for the benefit of the occupant."

The case of Plummer v. Dill has...