Jones v. Bell
| Decision Date | 23 May 1947 |
| Citation | 304 Ky. 827 |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court — District of Kentucky |
| Parties | Jones v. Bell. |
1. Mines and Minerals. — A plaintiff's plea of nul tiel record as to alleged reservation in commissioner's deed, relied on by defendant as a defense to plaintiff's claim of title to oil and gas in place, cast burden on defendant to prove such reservation.
2. Mines and Minerals. — A litigant, having burden of establishing alleged reservation in commissioner's deed relied on by litigant as a defense to opposing litigant's claim of title to oil and gas in place, can only prove alleged reservation by introducing in evidence the judgment authorizing commissioner's sale or certified copy of such judgment, or by filing with petition as an exhibit a certified copy of judgment.
3. Evidence. — An appellate court does not take judicial notice of records of circuit courts in prior cases finally determined by circuit courts.
4. Evidence. — Trial courts do not take judicial notice of their own records in cases finally disposed of, and especially so when the parties, as well as questions involved, are different from those in the case on trial.
5. Evidence. — In action to quiet title to oil and gas in place against defendant claiming title by virtue of reservation in commissioner's deed, trial court could not take judicial notice of the record of the suit in which commissioner's deed was given.
6. Limitation of Actions. — Where master commissioner in executing deed made a mistake or was guilty of oversight in not making the sale or executing his deed in accordance with judgment of court directing him to do so, relief from such mistake or oversight became barred after expiration of ten years from the time the deed was approved by court and delivered to purchaser. KRS 413.130(3).
7. Limitation of Actions. — Where commissioner's deed conveyed absolute title to grantee with sole exception of defendant's rights accruing from a particular oil and gas lease, defendant's rights ceased after termination of such lease, and purchaser from grantee after such termination became owner of both surface and oil and gas in place, and defendant was barred by ten-year limitation from asserting that exception in commissioner's deed did not conform to judgment authorizing deed. KRS 413.130(3).
Appeal from Wayne Circuit Court.
J.M. Kennedy and Ben D. Smith for appellant.
C.C. Duncan and Parker Duncan for appellee.
Before J.S. Sandusky, Judge.
Affirming.
This equity action was filed in the Wayne circuit court on April 20, 1944, by appellee, and plaintiff below, S.J. Bell, against appellant, and defendant below, James W. Jones, seeking to quiet the title of appellee to the oil and gas in place under 670 acres of land in Wayne County. It is alleged in appellee's petition that he was the absolute owner of all the minerals under his tract and that appellant is claiming to be the owner of the same minerals, thereby slandering his title thereto. The answer denied plaintiff's title to the contested minerals — claiming them as his — and sought a similar judgment in his favor. The court upon final submission sustained plaintiff's prayer and adjudged that he "is now and was at the time of the filing of this action the owner of the oil and gas in place" in the 670 acres tract of land and that the alleged title of the defendant, James W. Jones, "is spurious and cast a cloud upon the plaintiff's title to said oil and gas in place," to reverse which defendant prosecutes this appeal.
The undisputed facts out of which this litigation arose are: That a short while prior to the October 1904 term of the Wayne circuit court the then guardian of appellant (he then being an infant) filed an action in that court against his ward and the latter's mother, each of whom owned an undivided one-half interest in a larger tract of 1,000 acres, by which plaintiff sought the sale of such jointly owned tract, which the court finally adjudged and ordered its Master Commissioner to make the sale. This was done October 19, 1906, when the Kentucky Colonel Oil Company became the purchaser at the price of $8,000. The sale was reported by the Commissioner, which was confirmed, followed by the Commissioner's deed to the purchaser. That action will hereinafter be referred to as the "old suit." No part of that record is filed with and made a part of the instant case, except the report of sale by the Master Commissioner and the deed that he executed to the Kentucky Colonel Oil Company, which will be hereinafter referred to as "the company." In the Commissioner's deed there is this reservation:
"Excepting and reserving, however, from the lands above set out and described, to the plaintiff Sue A. Jones and the defendant James W. Jones, the royalty reserved to them as lessors in the oil and gas lease on said land, now owned by the Kentucky Colonel Oil Company." (Our emphasis)
The royalty interest so reserved was created by a lease which appellant's mother, Sue A. Jones, and his guardian, C.J. Bohon, executed to W.J. Geary on February 28, 1903, whereby the lessee therein was given the right to explore and take from the tract of land that was sold, oil and gas for a period of one year "and as long thereafter as oil or gas, or either of them, is produced from said land by the party of the second part."
It will thus be seen that the only reservation contained in the Master Commissioner's deed to the company was the royalty that might accrue to the lessors under the Geary lease. Shortly after its execution Geary assigned and transferred that lease to the company, and it thereafter exercised the privileges conferred upon it by the lease and was doing so at the time the sale was made under the judgment rendered in the old suit, paying the royalty to the guardian of appellant, and his mother, until the latter died, after which the entire royalty was paid to appellant's guardian until he became of age, which was more than 30 years prior to the filing of the instant action, during which period he was a citizen of the state of Texas to which he immigrated after the Commissioner's sale in the old suit.
The company continued the operation of the lease until 1930 when it assigned its rights thereunder to one Daugherty who operated it for one year thereafter when the production became so small as to render it unprofitable. He then abandoned the lease and drew the casing from the wells that had been sunk and moved all his equipment off the tract, thus terminating all of the royalty rights that were reserved in the Master Commissioner's deed.
Neither appellant's mother, nor his guardian while he was an infant, nor he himself after arriving at adult age, listed for taxation or paid taxes on the oil and gas in place underlying the tract of land that the Commissioner sold, nor was any subsequent lease made by appellant for the extraction of such minerals at any time after the company obtained its deed from the Master Commissioner in the old suit, although plaintiff's former ...
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