Jones v. Berman
| Decision Date | 09 June 1975 |
| Citation | 37 N.Y.2d 42,332 N.E.2d 303,371 N.Y.S.2d 422 |
| Parties | , 332 N.E.2d 303 In the Matter of Rebecca JONES, on behalf of herself and on behalf of her minor dependent children and on behalf of all other persons similarly situated, Appellant-Respondent, v. Leonard BERMAN, as Commissioner of the Department of Social Services of Westchester County, Respondent, and Abe Lavine, as Commissioner of the Department of Social Services of the State of New York, Respondent-Appellant. Judy DOMINE, on her own behalf and on behalf of her infant children and on behalf of all other persons similarly situated, Appellant-Respondent, v. Francis SCHRECK, as Commissioner of the Ablany County Department of Social Services, et al., Respondents-Appellants. Berry GIPSON, on her own behalf and on behalf of her infant children and on behalf of all other persons similarly situated, Appellant-Respondent, v. Francis SCHRECK, as Commissioner of the Albany County Department of Social Services, et al., Respondents-Appellants. |
| Court | New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
Lawrence S. Kahn and Kartin A. Schwartz, White Plains, for appellant-respondent in the first above-entitled proceeding.
Louis J. Lefkowitz, Atty. Gen. (David R. Spiegel and Samuel A. Hirshowitz, New York City, of counsel), for respondent in the first above-entitled proceeding.
K. Wade Eaton, Rochester, for appellants-respondents in the second and third above-entitled proceedings.
Robert P. Roche, County Atty. (Stanley G. Walker, Jr., and Philip R. Murray, Albany, of counsel), for Francis Schreck, respondent-appellant in the second and third above-entitled proceedings.
Louis J. Lefkowitz, Atty. Gen. (Eileen A. Sullivan and Ruth Kessler Toch, Albany, of counsel), for Abe Lavine, respondent-appellant in the second and third above-entitled proceedings.
These three cases, involving common questions of law, have been consolidated for purposes of our disposition. The central issue presented by the several petitioners is whether subdivision (c) of section 372.2 of title 18 of the Official Compilation of Codes, Rules and Regulations of the State of New York (18 NYCRR 372.2(c)) is invalid and void in that it conflicts with State and Federal law regarding the prerequisites necessary to obtain emergency monetary relief. The above regulation provides that emergency assistance, pursuant to the State statute (Social Services Law, Consol.Laws, c. 55, § 350--j), cannot be granted where the destitution of a child and his family is occasioned by the loss, theft or diversion of a grant of aid previously made.
Petitioner Jones was a recipient of public assistance in the Aid to Dependent Children category from the Westchester County Department of Social Services. Other than benefits obtained from social security, this assistance formed the family's only source of income. On May 1, 1973, Jones cashed her monthly grant of $398 at a local bank and purchased food stamps in the amount of $98. Shortly after placing the stamps and the remaining cash into her pocketbook, the pocketbook was stolen. The theft was reported to local police officials and to the Westchester County Department of Social Services. Later that day, Jones asked the department to replace the money that had been stolen so that she might purchase those items necessary for her two children and three grandchildren during the remainder of the month. The next day, the department granted her request only to the extent of $267 and denied any further relief. The department was of the opinion that the providing of relief in the form of a duplication of a grant already made was solely within its discretion (18 NYCRR 352.2(d)).
Being dissatisfied with the failure of the department to furnish the requested funds, despite the claimed destitution of her family, Jones sought a grant for Emergency Assistance to Needy Families with Children. The department, in denying this relief, set forth two reasons: that the caseworker's manual employed by the county specifically prohibited emergency assistance where a child in the family is eligible for Aid to Dependent Children; and that, under the regulations of the department, such aid was unavailable where the destitution resulted from the theft of an earlier grant (18 NYCRR 372.2(c)). The department also refused Jones an immediate and preferred hearing.
Without exercising her right to request a fair hearing pursuant to the department regulations, Jones commenced an article 78 proceeding alleging that the additional requirements of subdivision (c) of section 372.2 of title 18 of the Official Compilation of Codes, Rules and Regulations of the State of New York conflicted with the State statute (Social Services Law, § 350--j) and Federal provisions (U.S. Code, tit. 42, § 606, subd. (e); 45 CFR 233.120) regarding emergency relief and, further, that the denial of an expedited hearing violated her right to procedural due process. The proceeding was initiated as a class action on behalf of all persons in this State who were denied emergency relief on the basis of subdivision (c) of section 372.2 of title 18 of the Official Compilation of Codes Rules and Regulations of the State of New York and all persons of this State who were not afforded an expedited hearing upon making application for such assistance. Like contentions were made on behalf of all people in Westchester County similarly situated.
In the opinion of Special Term, the regulation in question, being both arbitrary and unlawful, was void. Relying upon Matter of Young v. Shuart, 39 A.D.2d 724, 331 N.Y.S.2d 962, it was held that an expedited procedure must be established by the State and local agencies to conform with due process. The court also determined Jones to be a fair representative of the entire class. The Appellate Division modified this decision by holding that although the suit was properly commenced as a class action, the judgment below described too broadly the class of persons that could be represented. It limited the class, therefore, to those people living in Westchester County similarly situated.
Petitioner Gipson was a victim of the same circumstances as Jones. After having cashed her check, she entered a supermarket in the City of Albany. The money was subsequently stolen, leaving her without financial resources to buy food or to pay her gas and electric bill. Requests to the department in Albany County for emergency assistance to protect the family from destitution met with denials without the benefit of a hearing, and were premised upon subdivision (c) of section 372.2 of title 18 of the Official Compilation of Codes, Rules and Regulations of the State of New York.
A different situation is presented by petitioner Domine. She, like petitioner Gipson, was the recipient of public assistance as part of a Federal program, Aid to Dependent Children. Her rent and fuel bills were paid directly by the Department of Social Services for Albany County and she received $80.50 in semimonthly installments. Rather than being the victim of larceny, Domine merely failed to budget her income wisely and five days prior to the expected receipt of her next check, she was without funds. Emergency relief was sought, but summarily denied.
Both Domine and Gipson initiated article 78 proceedings which were subsequently consolidated. The allegations asserted were materially the same as those found in the Jones petition, and class action relief was likewise sought. Supreme Court on constraint of Matter of Young v. Shuart (supra), granted the relief requested. On appeal, however, the Third Department (44 A.D.2d at p. 101, 353 N.Y.S.2d at p. 824) modified the judgment 'so as to grant relief only to the extent of providing that the interim ordered assistance by the court is not subject to reimbursement and by annulling the determinations that the infants were not entitled to emergency assistance'. In so modifying, the findings of Special Term that this was properly a class action and that an expedited hearing was necessary were rejected. Two Justices, while concurring in the result, stated that in their view the mandates of due process require the County Departments of Social Services to afford each subsequent petitioner in a similar dilemma a hearing Prior to the adjudication of the availability of emergency assistance.
Turning our attention to the merits of the instant appeals, the primary issue, as previously stated, is whether subdivision (c) of section 372.2 of title 18 of the Official Compilation of Codes, Rules and Regulations of the State of New York conflicts with section 350--j of the Social Services Law because of an addition in the regulation not contemplated by the State statute. We hold that such a conflict does exist and, therefore, that the regulation, as presently written, is invalid.
Section 350--j of the Social Services Law provides that:
'1. Any inconsistent provisions of this chapter or of any other law notwithstanding, so long as federal aid is available therefor, a social services district shall provide emergency assistance as herein defined to persons eligible, including migrant workers with families.
'2. The term 'emergency assistance' means aid, care and services furnished for a period not in excess of thirty days in any twelve month period, in the case of a needy child under the age of twenty-one who is living with a person related to him by blood, marriage or adoption who is eligible to receive aid to dependent children on his behalf pursuant to this chapter and regulations of the department.
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