Jones v. Carswell Prop. Maint. Inc.
| Decision Date | 19 January 2012 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 09-22027-CIV-GOODMAN |
| Parties | VINCENT JONES, et al., Plaintiffs, v. CARSWELL PROPERTY MAINTENANCE, INC., et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Florida |
[CONSENT CASE]
This cause is before me on Defendants' Motion for New Trial. [ECF No. 176]. The Court has reviewed the motion, Plaintiffs' response, Defendants' reply, and is otherwise familiar with the facts of this case.1 [ECF Nos. 179; 192]. For the reasons below, Defendants' motion is DENIED.
In this lawsuit, Plaintiffs seek unpaid overtime wages pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 201, et seq., Article X, § 24 of the Florida Constitution, and the Florida Minimum Wage Act, § 448.110, Florida Statutes. [ECF No. 58]. The Court held a trial on Plaintiffs' claims from September 12 through September 16, 2011 and the jury returned its verdicts on September 19, 2011. The jury found that Defendants were liable on all claims and awarded a total of $61,475.00 to the eight Plaintiffs. [ECF No. 169]. On October 12, 2011, theCourt granted Plaintiffs' unopposed motion for liquidated damages in an amount equal to Plaintiffs' actual damages and entered a Final Judgment in Plaintiffs' favor.
In their motion for new trial, Defendants raise four general arguments, each of which will be discussed below. Defendants however, cite little legal authority and neither refer to nor provide a copy of the trial transcript in support of their arguments. Instead, they often ask the Court to rely on its recollection of the trial testimony. Plaintiffs frequently take issue with the factual representations provided by Defendants but they too fail to support their contentions with the trial transcript. For the reasons below, the Undersigned concludes that Defendants failed to carry their burden and therefore the motion is DENIED.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59 provides that a Court may grant a new trial "after a jury trial, for any reason for which a new trial has heretofore been granted in an action at law in federal court." "[M]otions for a new trial are committed to the discretion of the trial court." Montgomery v. Noga, 168 F.3d 1282, 1295 (11th Cir. 1999). "Because it is critical that a judge does not merely substitute his judgment for that of the jury, 'new trials should not be granted on evidentiary grounds unless, at a minimum, the verdict is against the great-not merely the greater-weight of the evidence.'" Lipphardt v. Durango Steakhouse of Brandon, Inc., 267 F.3d 1183, 86 (11th Cir. 2001) (quoting Hewitt v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 732 F.2d 1554, 1556 (11th Cir. 1984)).
Defendants did not provide in their new trial motion the grounds that purportedly support their argument that the verdict was contrary to the great weight of the evidence. Defendants attempted to do so for the first time in reply to Plaintiffs' response. [ECF No. 192]. But cf. S.D.Fla. L. R. 7.3(c) (). In their reply, Defendants contend that the only evidence supporting Plaintiffs' claims was "their own self-serving testimony corroborated only by the vague and uncertain testimony of Baldwin." [ECF No. 192, p. 2]. Defendants also essentially cherry-pick from the large amount of evidence presented at trial in an attempt to demonstrate that the jury did not receive sufficient evidence to find for Plaintiffs. [Id. at pp. 3-5].
In a nearly-simultaneously-issued Order Denying Defendants' Renewed Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law, the Court already thoroughly detailed the evidence presented at trial and concluded that it supported the jury's verdicts. Therefore, the Court will only briefly summarize the evidence here.
In that order, the Court noted that Plaintiffs testified they worked the claimed unpaid hours, that non-party witnesses (Phyllis Carswell's neighbor, Jeannette Baldwin, and two of Defendants' foremen) substantiated Plaintiffs' testimony, and that Phyllis Carswell herself acknowledged the time sheets were incomplete. While Phyllis Carswell testified she made cash payments to Plaintiffs, she could not substantiate these claims using Defendants' time sheets and eventually admitted these payments were intended as bonuses and not to compensate for overtime. One of the two foremen, Clarence Jeffries, also testified that he never actually saw any cash in Plaintiffs' pay envelopes.
Based on the evidence presented at trial, the Court concludes that the verdict was not against the great weight of the evidence.
Before trial, the parties stipulated to the following:
[ECF No. 132, p. 3]. During trial, however, Defendant Phyllis Carswell testified that Thomas & Carswell, Inc. had been owned by her ex-husband and that Carswell Property Maintenance, Inc. was a new corporation which she established in 2006 after her divorce. Phyllis Carswell also testified that Carswell Property Maintenance, Inc. was not a successor corporation to Thomas & Carswell, Inc., that she had not been Plaintiffs' employer during the time Plaintiffs worked for Thomas & Carswell, Inc., and that her counsel made these stipulations without her knowledge or approval. Subsequently, the Court allowed Plaintiffs to impeach Phyllis Carswell using her pretrial stipulation.2
Defendants now contend that allowing Plaintiffs to impeach Phyllis Carswell using the stipulation is grounds for a new trial. The precise reasoning underlining Defendants' argument is somewhat unclear, but it appears they contend: (1) that it is improper to allow a witness to be impeached by her own stipulation (and that it was doubly improper in this case because Plaintiffs used the stipulation to imply that, contrary to testimony she had already given, Phyllis Carswellstipulated that Carswell Property Maintenance, Inc. was the successor entity to Thomas & Carswell, Inc.); (2) that to the extent the stipulation could be construed to support Plaintiffs' successor entity theory, it is only because the stipulation is ambiguous and the Court improperly construed it against Defendants; and (3) Plaintiffs used the stipulation to imply a false, hypothetical relationship between Phyllis Carswell and her company with Thomas & Carswell.
Plaintiffs respond that their use of the stipulation to impeach Phyllis Carswell was proper and was necessary because her trial testimony was contrary to the stipulation. Moreover, Plaintiffs contend the stipulation is not ambiguous and directly states the propositions for which it was used. According to Plaintiffs, Defendants' objections to the stipulation's use are merely an attempt to retract and contort a validly made stipulation.
The Court notes first that it is not improper to impeach a party witness with her own stipulation when the witness testifies contrary to the stipulated facts. United States v. Michtavi, 155 F. App'x 433, 435 (11th Cir. 2005); see also Busby v. City of Orlando, 931 F.3d 764, 771 n.4 (11th Cir. 1991) (). In Michtavi, the defendant signed a stipulation agreeing that individual newspaper articles were published on certain dates but then disputed the publication dates when he was cross-examined. When asked whether he had lied in the stipulation or was incorrect in his testimony, the defendant "stated that he signed the stipulation because his attorney gave it to him, and did not notice the dates." The Eleventh Circuit held that the trial court "did not abuse its discretion . . . in allowing the Government to impeach Michtavi with his own stipulation." The Eleventh Circuit also noted that the plaintiff in that case was not denied a fair trial merely by virtue of a brief inquiry into "whether he was lying or mistaken when he signed the stipulation."3
Defendants are therefore not entitled to a new trial merely because the Court allowed impeachment through the stipulation. The Court also finds that, even if the impeachment were improper (which it was not), then it would have been harmless error. Betterbox Commc'n Ltd. v. BB Techs., Inc., 300 F.3d 325, 329 (3d Cir. 2002) (). This is because Defendants' own foreman testified that Phyllis Carswell was "the boss" and ran the company during the time Plaintiffs were employed by Thomas & Carswell, Inc. and, as Defendants acknowledged in their motion, Phyllis Carswell testified that she was a 50% owner of Thomas & Carswell, Inc.
Defendants' second argument must also be rejected because the stipulation is not ambiguous. To support this argument, Defendants cite Henry Hanger & Display Fixture Corp. of America v. Sel-O-Rak Corp., 270 F.2d 635 (5th Cir. 1959). In Henry Hanger, a patent infringement case, Defendants' president testified before a special master that defendants were no longer manufacturing a rack resembling the patented rack and he drew a picture of the new type of rack defendants currently produced, in order to show the differences. Afterwards, the special master stated that ...
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