Jones v. Carter
| Decision Date | 16 December 2022 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action 21 Civ. 8990 (VEC) (SLC) |
| Parties | ANDRE C. JONES, SR., Plaintiff, v. NYC/DOC/VCBC WARDEN CARTER, NYC/DOC/VCBC HOUSING UNIT 3-AA CAPTAIN GUERRA, NYC/DOC/VCBC FACILITY STOREHOUSE CAPTAIN HORTON, and NYC/DOC/VCBC CAPTAIN JOHN DOE, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York |
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Pro se Plaintiff Andre C. Jones, Sr. (“Jones”) a pretrial detainee at the Vernon C. Bain Center at Rikers Island (“VCBC”), alleges that Defendants[1] violated his constitutional rights by depriving him of toilet paper, soap, and toothbrushes for about three days and depriving him of food and water for about eight hours. (ECF No. 3 (the “Complaint”)). Defendants now move, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (“PLRA”), to dismiss the Complaint for failure to exhaust administrative remedies and failure to state a claim. (ECF Nos. 16 (the “Motion”)).
For the reasons set forth below, I respectfully recommend that the Motion be GRANTED and that this action be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
The Court summarizes the factual allegations in the Complaint, which the Court accepts as true for purposes of the Motion. See N.J. Carpenters Health Fund v. Royal Bank of Scot. Grp., PLC, 709 F.3d 109, 119-20 (2d Cir. 2013); see also Corbett v. City of N.Y., No. 15 Civ. 09214 (GHW), 2016 WL 7429447, at *2-3 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 22, 2016).[2]
Starting on October 5, 2021, in Unit 3-AA at VCBC, Jones “was without toilet paper . . . [,] soap . . . [, and] toothbrushes . . . for ap[p]rox[imately] 2-3 days.” (ECF No. 3 at 4). Jones alleges that Horton “knew or should of [sic] known [that Jones was] in need of these materials.” (Id.) He also alleges that Carter and Guerra “knew or should of [sic] known [of Jones'] living conditions for those 2-3 days” because, “after bring this issue up to Captain Guerra, she pressed her emergency security button[,]” resulting in Jones and other inmates in Unit 3-AA being “put into hand restraints and taken to the . . . intake holding cells.” (Id. at 4-5). In the holding cells, the “toilet water was turned off,” and Jones did not receive food or water “for 7-8 hours[.]” (Id. at 5). As a result of these conditions, Jones was “hungry [and] thirsty for an extremely long time” and suffered physical and psychological harm, including “fatigue[] . . ., naus[e]a/headaches from dehydration[,] and bleeding gums which was painful from not having toothbrushes for 2-3 days.” (Id.)
In the Complaint, which was delivered “to prison authorities for mailing” on October 12, 2021, another VCBC inmate named Michael Lee asserted that the deprivations of toilet paper, soap, toothbrushes, food, and water violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights of 28 VCBC inmates, including himself and Jones, and requested compensatory damages of $1,500 and punitive damages of $5,000 per plaintiff. (ECF No. 3 at 1, 4-5, 7, 10). Named as Defendants were Carter, Guerra, and Horton, as well as Captain “John Doe.” (Id. at 1, 3). The Complaint also sought an order “deterring [Defendants] from using corporal punishment as a means of punishment on Plaintiffs” and requiring that Defendants provide the plaintiffs with “[t]he [h]yg[i]ene material[s] that the N.Y. City Department of Correction [(‘DOC')] policies obligate each facility to provide.” (Id. at 6).
On November 1, 2021, the Honorable Laura Taylor Swain severed the claims of all plaintiffs listed in the Complaint, including Jones, and ordered each action be docketed as a separate civil action (the “Severed Actions”). (ECF No. 1). On December 9, 2021, the Honorable Valerie E. Caproni requested that Defendants waive service, directed the New York City Law Department to ascertain and provide to Jones the identity and badge number of “Captain John Doe,”[3] and directed Jones to file “an amended complaint naming the newly identified individual as a defendant” within 30 days of receiving that information. (ECF No. 8 at 1-2). On January 4, 2022, Defendants returned an executed waiver of service. (ECF No. 10). On February 7, 2022, Defendants served Jones with a letter identifying by name and badge number the three captains who supervised VCBC's intake procedures on October 5, 2021. (ECF No. 13 at 1─2). Jones has not subsequently filed an amended complaint naming the three captains.
On March 14, 2022, Defendants filed the Motion (ECF Nos. 16), with a notice pursuant to Local Rule 12.1 warning Jones that the Court might treat the Motion as one for summary judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, and that his failure to respond with “sworn affidavits as required by Rule 56(c) and/or other documents” could result in dismissal of the Complaint. (ECF No. 18).
Under Local Civil Rule 6.1, Jones' opposition to the Motion was due by March 28, 2022. See S.D.N.Y. Loc. Civ. R. 6.1(b). Given Jones' pro se status, on March 15, 2022, the Court sua sponte extended that deadline, and directed Jones to file either an amended complaint or his opposition to the Motion by April 28, 2022. (ECF No. 19 at 2). The Court “warned [Jones] that, if he elects not to amend his Complaint, the Court is unlikely to recommend granting any future request to amend, particularly with respect to substitution of the John Doe defendant” (the “First Warning”). (Id. (). On May 9, 2022, having received nothing from Jones, the Court again sua sponte extended to May 31, 2022 his deadline to respond to the Motion by filing either an amended complaint or his opposition to the Motion. (ECF No. 20 at 2). The Court repeated the First Warning, and further warned Jones that “failure to respond will result in the Court ruling on the Motion based on Defendants' submissions alone and may result in dismissal of this action with prejudice.” (Id.)
On June 16, 2022, Jones having failed to oppose the Motion, file an amended complaint, or otherwise act, the Court notified Jones that it deemed the Motion fully briefed. (ECF No. 21). Jones has not responded to any of the Court's orders or otherwise contacted the Court regarding the Motion or this case.
In analyzing a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court must assess whether the complaint “contain[s] sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
To survive a motion to dismiss, “the plaintiff must provide the grounds upon which his claim rests through factual allegations sufficient ‘to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.'” ATSI Commc'ns, Inc. v. Shaar Fund, Ltd., 493 F.3d 87, 98 (2d Cir. 2007) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). In evaluating a motion to dismiss, the Court “accept[s] all facts alleged in the complaint as true and draw[s] all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor.” Sanderson v. Leg Apparel LLC, No. 19 Civ. 8423 (GHW), 2020 WL 7342742, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 14, 2020) (citing Burch v. Pioneer Credit Recovery, Inc., 551 F.3d 122, 124 (2d Cir. 2008) (per curiam)). The Court is “‘not required to credit conclusory allegations or legal conclusions couched as factual allegations.'” Id. (quoting Rothstein v. UBS AG, 708 F.3d 82, 94 (2d Cir. 2013)). “[A] complaint that offers ‘labels and conclusions' or ‘naked assertion[s]' without ‘further factual enhancement' will not survive a motion to dismiss.” Id. (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). “‘Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.'” Id. (quoting DeJesus v. HF Mgmt. Servs., LLC, 726 F.3d 85, 87-88 (2d. Cir. 2013)). For purposes of Rule 12(b)(6), “the complaint is deemed to include any written instrument attached to it as an exhibit or any statements or documents incorporated in it by reference.” Chambers v. Time Warner, Inc., 282 F.3d 147, 152 (2d Cir. 2002).
In deciding a motion to dismiss, “the submissions of a pro se litigant must be construed liberally and interpreted ‘to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest.'” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting Pabon v. Wright, 459 F.3d 241, 248 (2d Cir. 2006)). Nonetheless, “a pro se plaintiff must still plead enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Gottesfeld v Anderson, No. 18 Civ. 10836 (PGG), 2020 WL 1082590, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 6, 2020) (citing Hill v. Curcione, 657 F.3d 116, 122 (2d Cir. 2011)). Despite the obligation “to draw the most favorable inferences” from a complaint, the Court “cannot invent factual allegations that [a pro se plaintiff] has not pled.” Chavis v. Chappius, 618 F.3d 162, 170 (2d Cir. 2010). “The Court need not accept allegations that are ‘contradicted by other matters asserted or relied upon or incorporated by reference by a plaintiff in drafting the complaint.'” Tsinberg v. City of New York, No. 20 Civ. 749 (PAE), 2021 WL 1146942, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar....
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