Jones v. Christensen
| Decision Date | 31 March 2021 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 1:19-cv-00428-REB |
| Parties | LESTER LAURAL JONES, Petitioner, v. JAY CHRISTENSEN, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Idaho |
Petitioner Lester Laural Jones (Petitioner) filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus challenging his state court sentence from a criminal action in the Seventh Judicial District Court in Madison County, Idaho. (Dkt. 3.) Respondent Jay Christensen responded with a Motion to Dismiss the Petition, which is now fully briefed. (Dkt. 12, 17.) All named parties have consented to the jurisdiction of a United States Magistrate Judge to enter final orders in this case. (Dkt. 7.) See 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 73.
When a petitioner's compliance with threshold procedural requirements is at issue, a respondent may file a motion for summary dismissal, rather than an answer. White v. Lewis, 874 F.2d 599, 602 (9th Cir. 1989). Rule 4 of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases authorizes the Court to summarily dismiss a petition for writ of habeas corpus or any of its claims when "it plainly appears from the face of the petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court." The Court takes judicial notice of the records from Petitioner's state court proceedings, lodged by the parties. See Fed. R. Evid. 201(b); Dawson v. Mahoney, 451 F.3d 550, 551 (9th Cir. 2006).
Having reviewed the parties' briefing and the record in this matter, including the state court record, the Court concludes that the Petition is untimely and non-meritorious, warranting dismissal.
In 2011, Petitioner, then 48 years old, began flirting with a 16-year-old female, D.R., who was vulnerable after having suffered a recent break-up with her boyfriend. Petitioner's relationship with D.R. progressed into a sexual relationship when she was 17 years old. D.R. became pregnant and gave birth to a daughter in December 2011. Petitioner was named the father on the child's birth certificate, and Petitioner was involved with raising and providing for the child after she was born. Petitioner wanted to marry D.R., and her parents were amenable to that plan, but D.R. refused his proposal, saying she was not ready for marriage.
In 2012, an investigation ensued. Petitioner told the police investigator that he knew it was wrong to engage in a sexual relationship with a 17-year-old, "but felt she was close enough to being 18 that it would be OK." (State's Lodging A-1, p. 17.) The investigator told Petitioner "that he would be going to jail and explained to him the reasons why." (Id.) Petitioner already knew the reasons why. (Id.) As the sentencing judge aptly observed: "In society we owe it to our community to protect those that can'tprotect themselves and by preying upon—whether you're an opportunist or a predator, by preying upon young people you're picking upon the very weakest in our society, people that society has a responsible to protect from those that would take advantage of them." (State's Lodging A-2, p. 46.)
Following the investigation, a criminal charge of statutory rape under Idaho Code § 18-61-1 disrupted Petitioner's plans to help support and raise his infant daughter. Because this was Petitioner's second sexual misconduct charge with a minor—the first was twenty years earlier with a 12-year-old female victim whom Petitioner similarly groomed—it would warrant a harsher prison sentence. Another complication was a persistent violator charge, a further threat of extended incarceration.
Petitioner was first represented by public defender R. James Archibald, who did not perform up to Petitioner's expectations. Petitioner fired Archibald and hired Josh Garner. With the advice of Garner, Petitioner pleaded guilty to statutory rape; in exchange, the State agreed not to seek the minimum mandated sentence of 15 years for a second sexual misconduct conviction and it dismissed the persistent violator charge. Judgment was entered on February 12, 2013. Petitioner was sentenced to a unified prison term of thirty years, with the first ten years fixed.
Petitioner filed a direct appeal action, challenging his sentence as excessive, and, much later, a Rule 35 motion, challenging his sentence as illegal. The Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed Petitioner's sentences in both actions, and the Idaho Supreme Court denied the petitions for review. Idaho v. Jones, Op. No. 40863, 2014 WL 280371 (IdahoCt. App. January 24, 2014); Idaho v. Jones, Op. No. 46574, 2019 WL 8129440 (Idaho Ct. App. August 30, 2019).
Petitioner also filed a post-conviction action asserting ineffective assistance of both of his attorneys as to their advice on whether to enter a guilty plea or take the case to trial, and as to their performance during sentencing. After summarily dismissing the claims against Archibald and holding an evidentiary hearing on Garner's performance, the state district court denied and dismissed the petition. The Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision, and the Idaho Supreme Court denied review. See Jones v. Idaho, Op. No. 44529, 2017 WL 3033943 (Idaho Ct. App. July 18, 2017).
Federal habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 is available to petitioners who show that they are held in custody under a state court judgment and that such custody violates the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). Summary dismissal is appropriate where "it plainly appears from the face of the petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court." See Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases. Id. The following additional standards of law are applicable to the parties' arguments and the Court's analysis.
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) requires a petitioner to seek federal habeas corpus relief within one year from several triggering dates specified in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A)-(D). One year means 366 days, for example, fromJanuary 1, 2000, to January 1, 2001. See Patterson v. Stewart, 251 F.3d 1243, 1246 (9th Cir. 2001) (applying Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6(a) to AEDPA).
The most common trigger is the first one, "the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review." 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). That date can be calculated as follows.
Action Taken Finality Occurs No appeal is filed after state district court order or judgment 42 days later, see
Idaho Appellate Rule 14 Appeal is filed and Idaho Court of Appeals issues a decision, but no petition for review is filed with the Idaho Supreme Court
21 days later, see
Idaho Appellate Rule 118 Appeal is filed and Idaho Supreme Court issues a decision or denies a petition for review of an Idaho Court of Appeals decision, and Petitioner does not file a petition for writ of certiorari with the United States Supreme Court
90 days later, see
United States Supreme Court Rule 13 After Idaho Supreme Court issues a decision or denies a petition for review, Petitioner files a petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court, and the petition is denied Date of denial After Idaho Supreme Court issues a decision or denies a petition for review, Petitioner files a petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court, the petition is granted, and the United States Supreme Court issues a decision Date of decision
In each instance above, "finality" is measured from entry of the final judgment or order, not from a remittitur or mandate, which are mere formalities. Gonzales v. Thaler,132 S.Ct. 641, 653 (2012); Clay v. United States, 537 U.S. 522, 529 (2003); Wixom v. Washington, 264 F.3d 894, 898 n.4 (9th Cir. 2001).
AEDPA also contains a tolling provision that stops or suspends the one-year limitations period from running during the time in "which a properly filed application for State postconviction or other collateral review . . . is pending." 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). Because this particular statutory provision applies only to "pending" actions, the additional 21-, 42- and 90-day time periods associated with the calculation of finality after direct appeal are not applied to extend the tolling periods for post-conviction actions. However, unlike direct appeal "finality," the term "pending" does extend through the date of the remittitur.1
The federal statute is not tolled between the date the direct appeal is "final" and the filing of a proper post-conviction application, or between post-conviction finality and any successive collateral review petition. Id. Each time statutory tolling ends, the statute of limitations does not restart at one year, but begins running at the place where it stopped before the post-conviction action was filed.
Once a federal statute of limitations has expired, it cannot be reinstated or resurrected by a later-filed state court action. See Ferguson v. Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820, 822 (9th Cir. 2003) ().
If a petition is deemed untimely, a federal court can hear the claims if the petitioner can establish that "equitable tolling" should be applied. In Pace v. DiGuglielmo, the Supreme Court clarified that, "[g]enerally, a litigant seeking equitable tolling bears the burden of establishing two elements: (1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstances stood in his way." 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005). In addition, there must be a causal link between the lateness and the extraordinary circumstances. The petitioner bears the burden of bringing forward facts to establish a basis for equitable tolling. United States v. Marolf, 173 F.3d 1213, 1318, n. 3 (9th Cir. 1999).
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