Jones v. Citrus Motors Ontario, Inc.

• Decision Date: 22 January 1973
• Citation: 505 P.2d 220,8 Cal.3d 706,106 Cal.Rptr. 28
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: , 505 P.2d 220 William Roy JONES et al., Plaintiffs and Respondents. v. CITRUS MOTORS ONTARIO, INC., Defendant, Cross-Defendant and Appellant, Fred Jackson Teagle, Defendant, Cross-Complainant and Respondent. Mary Ann TEAGLE et al., Plaintiffs and Respondents, v. CITRUS MOTORS ONTARIO, INC., Defendant and Appellant. L.A. 30038. In Bank

Page 28

106 Cal.Rptr. 28

8 Cal.3d 706, 505 P.2d 220

William Roy JONES et al., Plaintiffs and Respondents. v. CITRUS MOTORS ONTARIO, INC., Defendant, Cross-Defendant and Appellant, Fred Jackson Teagle, Defendant, Cross-Complainant and Respondent.

Mary Ann TEAGLE et al., Plaintiffs and Respondents, v. CITRUS MOTORS ONTARIO, INC., Defendant and Appellant.

L.A. 30038.

Supreme Court of California,

In Bank.

Jan. 22, 1973.

Kinkle Rodiger, Graf, Dewberry & Springs, Donald H. Dewberry and James L. Spencer, Ventura, for defendant and appellant and for defendant, cross-defendant and appellant.

Heily, Blase, Ellison & Muegenburg, De Witt F. Blase, Oxnard, Edward L. Lascher, Lascher & Rader, Ventura, West, Girardi & Pierovich, Thomas V. Girardi, Los Angeles, and Etchason, Davidson, Liesch & Thomas, Ontario, for plaintiffs and respondents and for defendant, cross-complainant and respondent.

MOSK, Justice.

This is an action for damages for injuries sustained when an automobile purchased from defendant suddenly veered into oncoming traffic and collided with another vehicle. Plaintiffs are the surviving occupants of both vehicles. They alleged and defendant denied that defendant's negligence in repairing the automobile prior to sale was the proximate cause of the collision. ¹

The jury returned a verdict for defendant, and plaintiffs moved for a new trial on several grounds, including insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict. The court granted the motion. In its three-page order the court identified portions of the testimony, not refuted by defendant, which it believed supported plaintiffs' motion. The order concluded: 'For the foregoing reasons it would appear that the jury was somehow misled into an area of speculation not supported by the evidence.' ²

Section 657 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides: 'When a new trial is granted, on all or part of the issues, the court shall specify the ground or grounds upon which it is granted and the court's reason or reasons for granting the new trial upon each ground stated. . . . On appeal from an order granting a new trial . . . the order shall not be affirmed upon the ground of the insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or other decision . . . unless such ground is stated in the order granting the motion. . . .'

Defendant concedes the order specified Reasons, but contends it failed to specify the Ground for the new trial. While there is superficial validity to this contention, we disagree with its implications. Inclusion of statutory language in the order, although preferable, is not invariably required; the ground for a new trial is adequately specified if the intention of the court is clear. (Aced v. Hobbs-Sesack Plumbing Co. (1961) 55 Cal.2d 573, 578, 12 Cal.Rptr. 257, 360 P.2d 897.) There can be little doubt in this case that the ground upon which the court relied was insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict.

Both the particular phrasing and the general content of the order reveal the court's intention. First, the statement that the jury was 'misled into an area of speculation not supported by the evidence' clearly referred to the insufficiency of the evidence. ³ Second, the lengthy analysis of the evidence included in the order (fn. 2, Ante), which summarized the strengths of plaintiffs' and the weaknesses of defendant's evidence, was undeniably addressed to the issue of insufficiency. Moreover, as defendant concedes, this analysis constituted the 'reason or reasons' required by section 657. It is difficult to conceive of a court specifying a reason without simultaneously revealing an intention as to the ground. Because a reason must be directed to explaining and supporting a particular ground (Mercer v. Perez (1968) 68 Cal.2d 104, 65 Cal.Rptr. 315, 436 P.2d 315), it would seem that the reason necessarily reflects that ground. ⁴

Defendant's second contention is that the trial court abused its discretion in granting the motion for a new trial. This contention must also fail. Section 657 significantly limits the scope of appellate authority to review new trial orders: 'on appeal from an order granting a new trial upon the ground of the insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict . . . it shall be conclusively presumed that said order as to such ground was made only for the reasons specified in said order or said specification of reasons, and such order shall be reversed as to such ground only if there is no substantial basis in the record for any of such reasons.' Thus the trial court is required to state in its order the theory under which it concludes the jury should have returned a verdict for the moving party, and the order must be sustained on appeal unless the opposing party demonstrates that no reasonable finder of fact could have found for the movant on that theory.

In the case at bar the trial court's theory was that the collision was caused by a defect in the steering mechanism of the automobile purchased from defendant, and the defect resulted from defendant's failure to properly reassemble the steering mechanism after disassembling it while repairing the automobile. The record provides substantial support for this analysis. The testimony of an automotive engineer suggests the collision was caused by the mechanical defect specified by the court; the testimony of a witness who saw the automobile while defendant was repairing it and of two experienced automobile mechanics confirms that the steering mechanism was disassembled as indicated by the court. In the absence of any other compelling explanation for the defect the court could infer that it was caused by defendant's improper reassembly. Defendant correctly asserts that the record contains evidence tending to establish alternative explanations of the collision. The court, however, was entitled to disbelieve or discount this evidence in considering the motion for new trial. An abuse of discretion cannot be found in cases in which the evidence is in conflict and a verdict for the moving party could have been reached under the theory expressed in the order for a new trial. (Mercer v. Perez (1968) sup...