Jones v. City of Albany

• Decision Date: 22 December 1896
• Parties: JONES v. CITY OF ALBANY.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

151 N.Y. 223

45 N.E. 557

JONES

v.CITY OF ALBANY.

Court of Appeals of New York.

Dec. 22, 1896.

Appeal from supreme court, general term, Third department.

Action by Emma Jones against the city of Albany for personal injuries. From a judgment dismissing the complaint, plaintiff appeals. Reversed.

Hugh Reilly, for appellant.

John A. Delahanty, for respondent.

ANDREWS, C. J.

The action was commenced on the 18th day of March, 1890, to recover damages alleged to have been sustained by the plaintiff from an injury which happened on the 15th day of November, 1889, by reason of a defective sidewalk, which the defendant negligently permitted to be out of repair. The complaint was dismissed on the trial upon the sole ground that the action was prematurely brought, and the correctness of this ruling presents the only material question on this appeal. The plaintiff presented her claim to the common council on the 24th day of January, 1890; and it was referred by that body to the law department of the city at the first regular meeting of the common council after its presentation,held on the 3d day of February, 1890. In the absence of any statute regulating the time of commencing an action of this character, it is clear that the action was not premature. When the action was commenced, the right of action was complete, according to the general rule; and the action could be brought at any time, subject to be defeated if the bringing of it was delayed beyond the period fixed by the general statute of limitations. But the legislature may regulate the right to bring an action against a municipal corporation for a tort or upon contract, by imposing conditions precedent to be observed by the plaintiff, or it may make a special staute of limitations, thereby changing the ordinary rule and restricting the usual remedy in such cases. Reining v. City of Buffalo, 102 N. Y. 308, 6 N. E. 792. It was upon the ground that the legislature had interfered, and, by the charter of the city, had suspended the right to sue the city for a personal injury caused by negligence, until the lapse of a period after the presentation of a claim therefor to the common council, and that this action was brought before the expiration of that period, that the complaint was dismissed at the trial.

The whole question turns upon the construction of the charter provisions. Title 3 of the charter (Laws 1883, c. 298) is entitled the ‘Legislative Power’; and under the subtitle ‘Audit of Claims' are embraced seven sections (Nos. 45 to 51, inclusive) which regulate the presentation, audit, and enforcement of claims against the city. Section 45 relates solely to claims for personal injuries caused by defects or obstructions in the streets, and sections 46 to 50 relate exclusively to claims on contract or on account for work, labor, and materials. Section 45 is as follows: ‘Sec. 45. All claims against the city for damages for injuries to the person, claimed to have been caused or sustained by defects, want of repair or obstructions from snow or ice or other causes, in the highways, streets, sidewalks or crosswalks of the city, or because of negligence of the city as to the highways, streets, sidewalks or crosswalks of the city, shall be presented to the common council, in writing, within three months after said injury is received. Such writing shall describe the time, place, cause and extent of the injury, so far as then practicable, verified by the oath of the claimant. The omission to present said claim, as aforesaid, within three months, shall be a bar to any claim or action therefor against the city, and the law department shall consider said claim and report thereon to the common council within three months from the date of the reference of such claim, but no such claim shall be settled or paid except as prescribed in section ten of title five of this act.’ The section of the charter referred to in the last clause of section 45 authorizes the corporation counsel, by agreement in writing, subject to the approval of the mayor and board of finance, to compromise and settle any claims against the city, and requires such agreement, when made, to be reported to the common council at its next meeting, and which agreement the section declares ‘shall be and constitute a valid obligation against the city.’ There is nothing in section 45 which, in terms, restricts the right to bring an action for personal injury at any time after the injury happened, except that the claim must be first presented to the common council within three months after the injury had been received. It is manifest that the main purpose of this limitation was to prevent fraud in the assertion of unfounded claims, and to apprise the city in case of claims against it, so as to enable it to investigate the circumstances before the benefit...