Jones v. City of Atlanta
Decision Date | 25 June 2021 |
Docket Number | A21A0370 |
Citation | 360 Ga.App. 152,860 S.E.2d 833 |
Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
Parties | JONES v. CITY OF ATLANTA. |
James W. Hurt Jr., Watkinsville, John Floyd Woodham, Atlanta, for Appellant.
Matthew James Calvert, Eric Jon Taylor, Laura Thayer Wagner, Atlanta, Ra Olusegun Amen, for Appellee.
A. Thomas Jones filed a class action complaint in the Superior Court of Fulton County alleging that certain fees imposed by the Department of Watershed Management ("DWS") of the City of Atlanta (the "City") constituted illegal taxes, and thus he was entitled to a refund of these fees under OCGA § 48-5-380. The superior court granted the City's motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, reasoning that Jones had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, and, in the alternative, granted the City's motion for judgment on the pleadings. On appeal, Jones argues, among other things, that the trial courted erred in dismissing his complaint for lack of jurisdiction. We agree, and for the reasons set forth infra, reverse in part, vacate in part, and remand.
Viewed in the light most favorable to Jones, as the non-moving party below,1 the record shows the following. In his complaint, Jones took issue with two fees imposed by DWS: (1) a franchise fee; and (2) a payment in lieu of taxes ("PILOT").2 According to the City, the franchise fee was used to recoup costs for DWS's use of streets and rights-of-way, and the PILOT was meant to mirror an ad valorem real estate tax that would normally be assessed against privately owned utilities for services such as firefighting, police protection, and use of public works. Jones contended that these were illegal fees, alleging that the fees were paid to the City's general fund, were used for the sole purpose of raising revenue, and did not correspond to actual DWS-related costs to the City.
Jones originally filed a complaint with the commissioner of DWS on March 24, 2017, disputing application of these fees. The commissioner denied Jones's complaint, finding that the fees were lawful. Jones then appealed this decision to the DWS appeals board. On January 26, 2018, the appeals board denied the appeal, determining that it was without jurisdiction to rule on the legality of the City's ordinances. Jones filed the instant complaint in superior court on June 19, 2018.
The City moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction, arguing that Jones had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. The City contended that, under City Ordinance § 154-31 and OCGA §§ 5-4-1 and 5-4-6, Jones only had 30 days to seek judicial review of the appeal board's decision, and that he had failed to meet this 30-day deadline. The City also filed a motion for a judgment on the pleadings regarding the merits of Jones's claims. Jones responded to the City's motions and filed a motion for partial summary judgment.
The trial court granted the City's motion to dismiss, finding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Jones's claims. The court reasoned that, because Jones "initiated administrative review, he was required to see it through[,]" which included the 30-day deadline for applying for a writ of certiorari under OCGA § 5-4-6. In the alternative, the court ruled that the fees were not illegal taxes, and thus granted the City's motion for judgment on the pleadings and denied Jones's motion for partial summary judgment.
Jones appealed the court's decision to the Supreme Court of Georgia, seeking to invoke the Supreme Court's jurisdiction over constitutional claims. The Supreme Court transferred the case to this Court. The Supreme Court held that the trial court's dismissal was based on lack of jurisdiction, and the trial court erred in addressing additional issues — including Jones's constitutional claims — once it determined that it lacked jurisdiction. The Supreme Court additionally stated: "If the Court of Appeals determines that the trial court erred in its jurisdictional ruling, it should remand the case to the trial court for the entry of a proper order on the other issues raised in [the City's] motion to dismiss." Consequently, although the parties extensively briefed the legality of the franchise and PILOT fees, we address in this appeal only whether the trial court had jurisdiction to consider Jones's claims.
"[W]e review de novo a trial court's grant of a motion to dismiss due to lack of subject matter jurisdiction."3 Moreover, "the interpretation of a statute is a question of law, which is reviewed de novo on appeal."4 With these guiding principles in mind, we now turn to Jones's claim of error regarding the court's jurisdiction.
Jones argues that the trial court erred in dismissing his complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. He contends that he was not required to seek a writ of certiorari under OCGA § 5-4-1. We agree.
OCGA § 48-5-380 (a) (1) requires counties and municipalities to refund to taxpayers any taxes that "have been erroneously or illegally assessed[.]" OCGA § 48-5-380 further provides the process in which taxpayers may challenge erroneous or illegal taxes:
To summarize, OCGA § 48-5-380 provides that a taxpayer may choose from two alternative procedures to seek a tax refund: it allows a taxpayer to either directly file suit or to first file a claim with the municipality before seeking judicial review. We note that the previous version of this statute, before it was amended in 2014, required the taxpayer to first file a claim with the municipality before filing suit.6
"As a general rule, one aggrieved by an administrative decision must exhaust his administrative remedies before pursuing a judicial remedy."7 "[T]he rationale for requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies is that resort to the administrative process will permit the agency to apply its expertise, protect the agency's autonomy, allow a more efficient resolution, and result in the uniform application of matters within the agency's jurisdiction."8 However, ...
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...facts that would suggest officers acted with actual malice).52. Hardigree, 992 F.3d at 1233.53. Id.54. O.C.G.A. § 48-5-380 (2021). 55. 360 Ga. App. 152, 860 S.E.2d 833 (2021).56. Id. at 156, 860 S.E.2d at 837.57. O.C.G.A. § 48-5-380.58. Jones, 360 Ga. App. at 152, 860 S.E.2d at 834.59. Id. ......