Jones v. Clark Cnty.
| Decision Date | 03 August 2016 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 5: 15-337-DCR |
| Parties | DAVID JONES, Plaintiff, v. CLARK COUNTY, KENTUCKY, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Kentucky |
Plaintiff David Jones alleges that the defendants violated his constitutional rights by arresting and prosecuting him for promoting child pornography where the charge was ultimately dismissed. [Record No. 1, ¶ 2] He also asserts related state law claims. The matter is pending for consideration of a motion to dismiss filed by Defendants Clark County, Berl Perdue, Jr., and Lee Murray and a motion to amend the Complaint filed by Plaintiff Jones. [Record Nos. 4; 7] The defendants argue that the action should be dismissed because: (i) both the federal and state law claims of false arrest/imprisonment and malicious prosecution are barred by the grand jury's finding of probable cause; (ii) certain claims are barred by the applicable statute of limitations; (iii) sovereign immunity bars the state law claims against Clark County; and (iv) the plaintiff fails to plead a claim of outrage. [Record No. 4-1, pp. 1, 9] Conversely, Jones contends that the tendered First Amended Complaint properly states a claim of malicious prosecution to overcome the rebuttable presumption that probable cause existed based on the grand jury's determination. [Record No. 7] For the reasons outlined below, the defendants' motion to dismiss will be granted and the plaintiff's motion to amend the Complaint will be denied.
Jones alleges that, on October 11, 2013, the Lexington Metro Division of Police ("LMDP") identified IP address 107.217.129.83 as the download source of a 39-second video depicting child pornography. [Record No. 1, ¶ 9] The LMDP contacted Officer Lee Murray, who secured a warrant on October 22, 2013, to obtain subscriber information for the IP address from AT&T Internet Services. [Id.] Following service of the warrant, AT&T identified Jones as the subscriber and provided his home address to Murray. [Id., ¶ 10] On October 26, 2013,1 Murray secured a search warrant for the residence. [Id.]
That day, Murray executed the search warrant, seizing a tablet, cellphone, modem, printer, and DVDs. [Id., ¶ 11] The officer also arrested Jones for promoting a minor under 16 years of age in a sexual performance under KRS § 531.320(2)(b).2 Jones was then taken to the Clark County Detention Center. [Id.] On October 31, 2013, Jones was transported tothe Clark County Sheriff's Office for an interrogation. [Id., ¶ 12] He waived his right to counsel and answered all questions, denying any knowledge of activities related to child pornography. [Id.]
On December 12, 2013, a state grand jury indicted Jones for violating KRS § 531.320(2)(b).3 [Record No. 4-3] In November 2014, Jones' public defender had an expert examine the devices seized from the residence during execution of the search warrant. [Record No. 1, ¶ 13] The forensic analysis uncovered no evidence of child pornography. [Id.] As a result, on December 8, 2014, Jones filed a motion to dismiss the indictment or, alternatively, for bond modification. [Record No. 4-4] Following a hearing, Jones was released from custody on December 15, 2014. [Record No. 1, ¶ 13] Subsequently, the charge against him was dismissed on April 2, 2015. [Id.] Thus, Jones spent a total of fourteen months in jail during the investigation and prosecution of the underlying charge. [Id., ¶ 14]
The Complaint asserts four counts against the defendants, with Perdue and Murray sued only in their individual capacities. [Id., pp. 1, 6-8] Count I alleges Fourth Amendmentsearch and seizure and Fifth/Fourteenth Amendment due process claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 due to the defendants' alleged deliberate indifference or malice in investigating, arresting, imprisoning, and prosecuting Jones for the child pornography charge. [Id., ¶¶ 16-19] Additionally, the first count includes claims of unlawful imprisonment and malicious prosecution under the umbrella of § 1983. [Id.] The second count asserts that the defendants were negligent and grossly negligent under Kentucky common law. [Id., ¶¶ 20-21] Next, Count III asserts claims of wrongful arrest, unlawful imprisonment, and malicious prosecution under Kentucky common law. [Id., ¶¶ 22-23] Finally, the fourth count contends that the defendants intentionally inflicted emotional distress upon the plaintiff. [Id., ¶¶ 24-25] Ultimately, Jones seeks damages to cover for mental pain and suffering, the deprivation of his liberty and loss of wages for fourteen months, and punitive damages. [Id., p. 8]
When evaluating a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court must determine whether the Complaint alleges "sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). The plausibility standard is met "when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). Although the Complaint need not contain "detailed factual allegations" to survive a motion to dismiss, the "plaintiff's obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires more than labels andconclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Further, in considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court is required to "accept all of plaintiff's factual allegations as true and determine whether any set of facts consistent with the allegations would entitle the plaintiff to relief." G.M. Eng'rs & Assoc., Inc. v. W. Bloomfield Twp., 922 F.2d 328, 330 (6th Cir. 1990). However, the Court need not accept as true legal conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations if those conclusions cannot be plausibly drawn from the facts, as alleged. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (); see also Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986) (). Thus, Rule 12(b)(6) essentially "allows the Court to dismiss, on the basis of a dispositive issue of law, meritless cases which would otherwise waste judicial resources and result in unnecessary discovery." Glassman, Edwards, Wade & Wyatt, P.C. v. Wolf Haldenstein Adler Freeman & Herz, LLP, 601 F. Supp. 2d 991, 997 (W.D. Tenn. 2009).
The defendants request that the Court convert their motion to dismiss to a motion for summary judgment because of the attached affidavit and supporting documents. [Record No. 4-1, p. 4] Under Rule 12(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, if "matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion must be treated as one for summary judgment under Rule 56." However, according to Rule 10(c), a "copy of awritten instrument that is an exhibit to a pleading is a part of the pleading for all purposes." The purpose of Rule 10(c) is to prevent a plaintiff with a legally deficient claim from surviving a motion to dismiss "simply by failing to attach a dispositive document upon which it relied." Weiner, 108 F.3d at 89. As a result, documents referenced in the Complaint and central to the plaintiff's case may be attached to a motion to dismiss and considered in the ruling without converting the motion to one for summary judgment. See id.
It is not necessary to convert the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment. The only document that the Court may not consider under the Rule 12(b)(6) standard is Officer Murray's affidavit. [Record No. 4-2] And this affidavit is not material in its resolving the issues presented in the motion to dismiss. Further, "[c]onsidering the early stage of the litigation in this case," it would be "premature" to evaluate the motion under the summary judgment standard. See, e.g., Mackie v. Green Tree Servicing, LLC, No. 15-12741, 2016 WL 1640417, *3 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 26, 2016). Therefore, the Court will exclude the affidavit while considering the parties' arguments and address the issues under the Rule 12 standard.4 See id.
The defendants first assert that the Fourth and Fifth Amendment seizure/due process, unlawful imprisonment, and malicious prosecution claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 should be dismissed due to the grand jury's determination that probable cause supported the underlying charge. [Record No. 4-1, pp. 5-6] The defendants also allege that some of the federal claims are barred by the statute of limitations. [Id., p. 5] They raise similar arguments regarding the state law claims, and Clark County also asserts that it is protected by sovereign immunity with respect to those claims. [Id., pp. 6-7]
The defendants argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity for the § 1983 claims. [Record No. 4-1, p. 4] Government officials performing "discretionary functions" are shielded from civil damages liability "as long as their actions could reasonably have been thought consistent with the rights they are alleged to have violated." Solomon v. Auburn Hills Police Dep't, 389 F.3d 167, 172 (6th Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). First, the Court determines whether the facts as pleaded "show the officer's conduct violated a constitutional right." Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001). Second, the Court examines "whether the right was clearly established." Id. Once a defendant raises this defense, the plaintiff...
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