Jones v. Cochran
| Decision Date | 07 December 1960 |
| Citation | 125 So.2d 99 |
| Parties | Billie (William) JONES, Petitioner, v. H. G. COCHRAN, Jr., Director, Division of Corrections, Respondent. |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
William Jones, in pro. per.
Richard W. Ervin, Atty. Gen., and Odis M. Henderson, Asst. Atty. Gen., for respondent.
By an original application for a writ of habeas corpus petitioner Jones seeks release from the State Prison where he is serving a term for larceny of an automobile.
We must decide whether Jones was denied due process of law account of the failure of the trial judge to appoint a lawyer to represent him at his arraignment when he pleaded guilty to the charge.
The petition impressed us as having prima facie merit. By opinion in Jones v. Cochran, Fla., 121 So.2d 657, we indicated concern over the allegation that petitioner was under seventeen at the time of his trial and, therefore, subject to the jurisdiction of the juvenile court, rather than the circuit court. We were also concerned over the alleged denial of due process because of failure of the trial judge to appoint counsel for the accused. We thereupon appointed Honorable Roger A. Barker, a circuit judge, as commissioner, to take testimony and make recommendations on the points of concern. Judge Barker appointed Kenneth Morton, a member of The Florida Bar to represent the petitioner in the proceedings before the Commissioner. By his report the Commissioner advises that Mr. Morton, at substantial personal expense in time and money, has represented the petitioner in a manner meriting the commendation of the Court. The record suggests that Judge Barker's recommendation is well-grounded. We preface our opinion by adding our own commendation of Mr. Morton for conduct consistent with the best traditions of the profession.
The report of the Commissioner finds that the petitioner was seventeen years and six months old at the time he committed the offense involved. The record supports this finding. Consequently, our concern over the original trial jurisdiction of the circuit court is now allayed.
We proceed to consider the contention that the failure of the trial judge to appoint a lawyer to represent the accused impinges on his right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and Section 12, Florida Declaration of Rights, F.S.A. To arrive at a sound conclusion we must extract from the record the significant facts bearing on the contention.
Petitioner Jones as a seventeen year old boy left his home in Indiana a few months prior to the commission of the crime for which he now stands convicted. He was thereafter arrested twice for vagrancy and once for taking a motor vehicle. For this theft he either received a suspended sentence or the case was later dismissed. The record is not entirely clear. He had reached the ninth grade in school when he left home. In July, 1958, he arrived in Titusville, Florida. His first night there he slept in someone's automobile. The next day he proceeded to a used car lot and drove off in an automobile. Some eight miles north of Titusville the car was involved in a wreck which also severely injured the petitioner. He subsequently admitted stealing the car. He said that at the time of the wreck he was turning around to 'go back and give himself up' in the hope that the penalty would be less severe. Before the circuit judge he pleaded guilty to the offense and was sentenced to an indeterminate term. At the recent hearing before the Commissioner he repeated his confession of guilt. His decision to institute the instant proceeding, according to his testimony, was inspired by the fact that some of the other prisoners had received shorter terms for the same offense and he had hopes that this proceeding might have the effect of shortening his own term. As is often the case with petitions drafted by prison inmates the instant petition was heavily flavored with allegations of abuse and ill treatment prior to the trial and confession of guilt. Petitioner testified that none of these allegations were true but, on the contrary, that he had been well treated while in the hospital and during the period prior to his appearance in court. Practically all of the material allegations of the petition were admitted to be false. In the ultimate his principal complaint seems to be that he received a longer prison sentence than he felt his offense deserved.
In addition to the points of concern indicated in our prior opinion, the Commissioner heard testimony on the subject of notice to petitioner's parents as required by Section 932.38, Florida Statutes, F.S.A. The record supports the conclusion that the father of the petitioner was notified of the charge against him prior to the trial. The service of the notice was sufficient to meet the requirements of the cited statute and our decision in Snell v. Mayo, Fla., 84 So.2d 581.
When the petitioner was arraigned and pleaded guilty to the crime of theft of an automobile there was no record indication that he was represented by counsel. At the same time there is no indication that he requested the assistance of anyone or that he felt that the services of a lawyer would be helpful. We will, of course, indulge the presumption that the trial judge adequately guarded the fundamental rights of the accused in the absence of a showing to the contrary. We are here merely confronted with the problem of deciding whether under all of the circumstances reflected by the record, this petitioner has shown that he was denied due process because of failure of the trial judge to appoint a lawyer to represent him. The Commission concluded that he was. We must now review this conclusion.
It is unnecessary for us to expound on the Florida Rule regarding right to counsel in cases less than capital. By virtue of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, the defendant in criminal cases in the federal courts is always entitled to representation by counsel. This is not so in many of the state courts, including Florida. Since Powell v. State of Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53 S.Ct. 55, 77 L.Ed. 158, assistance of counsel is an absolute essential of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment in all cases where capital punishment could...
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