Jones v. Collins

• Decision Date: 09 January 1998
• Docket Number: No. 96-41192,96-41192
• Citation: 132 F.3d 1048
• Parties: 122 Ed. Law Rep. 1223 Ethel JONES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Gary COLLINS, Superintendent of Texarkana Independent School District, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

Page 1048

132 F.3d 1048

122 Ed. Law Rep. 1223

Ethel JONES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Gary COLLINS, Superintendent of Texarkana Independent School District, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 96-41192.

United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit.

Jan. 9, 1998.

Rehearing Denied Feb. 12, 1998.

Lawrence Bradley Hancock, Laurence W. Watts, Watts & Associates, Houston, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Ronald S. Scott, Christopher Blewer Gilbert, Tracie Jo Renfroe, Bracewell & Patterson, Houston, TX, for Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas.

Before KING, DUHE and WIENER, Circuit Judges.

KING, Circuit Judge:

Defendant-appellant Gary Collins, the superintendent of Texarkana Independent School District, appeals the district court's partial denial of his motion for summary judgment on the ground that a fact issue exists as to whether he possesses qualified immunity from liability for plaintiff-appellee Ethel Jones's claim, asserted under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, that Collins violated her First Amendment rights. Because we find that the evidence in the summary judgment record, construed in the light most favorable to Jones, indicates that Collins did not violate Jones's First Amendment right to free expression, we reverse the district court's order denying Collins's motion for summary judgment on his defense of qualified immunity and remand for entry of judgment granting this portion of the motion.

I. FACTS & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

This case arises out of the transfer of plaintiff-appellee Ethel Jones from her position as principal of Dunbar Elementary School ("Dunbar") to the position of assistant principal of Westlawn Elementary School ("Westlawn") in July 1993. Defendant-appellant Gary Collins, the superintendent of Texarkana Independent School District ("TISD"), recommended this transfer, and the TISD Board of Trustees (the "Board") approved it.

Jones served as Dunbar's principal from the 1986-87 school year through the 1992-93 school year. Her performance evaluations for the 1987-88 through the 1990-91 school years reflect that Collins gave Jones ratings of "clearly outstanding" or "exceeds expectations" in most of the evaluation categories.

On February 22, 1992, Jones attended a Board retreat at which Board members discussed possible locations for a proposed alternative education program for the school district to cope with the educational needs of emotionally disturbed and at-risk students. Jones later asked Collins if Dunbar was a potential site for the alternative education program. Collins responded that this was possible because Dunbar had extra rooms available that could be allocated to the program. Collins contends that he discussed the possibility of Dunbar serving as the site of the alternative education program with no one other than Jones.

In May or June of 1992, after Jones's conversation with Collins regarding the location of the alternative education program, representatives from the community appeared at a Board meeting and voiced opposition to the prospect of placing the alternative education program at Dunbar. The Board president informed the parents that the Board did not intend to place the alternative education program at Dunbar. Collins surmised that the parents must have received the information regarding the possibility of placing the program at Dunbar from Jones because he had discussed the matter with no one else. When confronted by Collins, Jones denied leaking information to the community.

In Jones's 1991-92 employment evaluation, Collins stated that Jones "[i]sn't supportive of controversial approaches [and] doesn't like to be in [the] line of fire on any decision." In an attachment to the evaluation, Collins explained that, after discussing with Jones the possibility of placing the alternative education program at Dunbar, various members of the faculty and parents of Dunbar students complained about locating the program at Dunbar. The attachment also stated the following with regard to the alternative education program's location:

The Board of Trustees, when making decisions as to the utilization of facilities, makes their determination in the best interest of all students in this district. Before that decision is made, options will be discussed, alternatives weighed, and a rational decision arrived at by consensus. Up until that event occurs, you are to support the administration and Board of Trustees in their attempts to determine the best use of facilities for the students and instructional program of this district. You are not to work behind our backs in an effort to salvage what you consider the most important use of a facility nor use other individuals to carry out your point of view.

Collins recommended that Jones's contract be renewed for another year.

In Jones's evaluation for the 1992-93 school year, Collins rated Jones's performance in many evaluation categories as "unsatisfactory" and recommended that the district not renew her contract. In a memorandum accompanying the evaluation form, Collins listed a number of alleged deficiencies in Jones's performance, and discussed in particular her alleged "gamesmanship" in inciting unrest in the community regarding district policy affecting Dunbar. The evaluation states that Jones's "community involvement consisted of creating controversy over items [she] did not want on the Dunbar campus." The evaluation also reiterated Collins's belief that Jones had spoken negatively with members of the community regarding the possibility of placing the alternative education program on the Dunbar campus.

Jones's contract with TISD covering the 1992-93 and 1993-94 school years provided that Jones could be transferred between administrative positions within the district at the sole discretion of the superintendent so long as her salary was not reduced as a result of the transfer. On July 21, 1993, Collins attempted to transfer Jones to a teaching position. However, counsel for the school district informed him that, under the terms of the contract then in effect between Jones and TISD, Collins could not transfer Jones from an administrative position to a teaching position. Collins thereafter reassigned Jones to the position of assistant principal of Westlawn.

Jones exhausted her administrative remedies and, on September 29, 1995, filed suit against TISD and Collins both in his individual capacity and his official capacity as superintendent of TISD (collectively "Defendants"). Jones alleged various violations of the U.S. Constitution, including claims that her transfer deprived her of property and liberty interests without due process and a claim that her reassignment constituted retaliation for exercise of her First Amendment right to free speech. Jones also asserted parallel claims under the Texas Constitution. Defendants answered and affirmatively pleaded the defense of qualified immunity on behalf of Collins in his individual capacity. Defendants moved for summary judgment on all claims, including Collins's claim of qualified immunity. The district court granted Defendants' motion for summary judgment except as to Jones's First Amendment retaliation claim and Collins's defense of qualified immunity. Collins appeals the district court's refusal to grant summary judgment on Jones's First Amendment retaliation claim on grounds of qualified immunity.

II. APPELLATE JURISDICTION

Although Jones has not argued that this court lacks jurisdiction over the instant appeal, we nonetheless address the issue sua sponte. See Joseph v. City of New Orleans, 110 F.3d 252, 253 (5th Cir.1997); Pemberton v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 996 F.2d 789, 791 (5th Cir.1993). The Supreme Court has held that "[a]ppeals from district court orders denying summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity are immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine, when based on an issue of law." Cantu v. Rocha, 77 F.3d 795, 802 (5th Cir.1996) (citing Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 2816, 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985)). In this context, an appeal is based on "issues of law" if the issues it raises "concern only application of established legal principles, such as whether an official's conduct was objectively reasonable in light of clearly established law, to a given (for purposes of appeal) set of facts." See id. (citing Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 313, 115 S.Ct. 2151, 2156, 132 L.Ed.2d 238 (1995)). However, if the appeal involves a matter of evidentiary sufficiency, i.e., if the party moving for summary judgment merely disputes the district court's determination that the nonmoving party may be able to prove at trial a fact that is material to the appellant's entitlement to qualified immunity, then the district court's denial of summary judgment is not immediately appealable. See id.

Collins contends on appeal that the summary judgment evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to Jones, indicates that he did not violate Jones's constitutional rights. He does not contend that the district court erroneously determined that the summary judgment record indicates that disputes exist as to factual issues material to Jones's claim. We therefore possess jurisdiction over Collins's appeal and proceed to its merits.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

"This court reviews de novo the denial of a public official's motion for summary judgment predicated on qualified immunity." Southard v. Texas Bd. of Criminal Justice, 114 F.3d 539, 548 (5th Cir.1997); see also Johnston v. City of Houston, 14 F.3d 1056, 1059 (5th Cir.1994). We therefore apply the same criteria used by the district court in the first instance. See Texas Manufactured Housing Ass'n v. City of Nederland, 101 F.3d 1095, 1099 (5th Cir.1996), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 117 S.Ct. 2497, 138 L.Ed.2d 1003 (1997). Summary judgment is proper only "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the...