Jones v. Com.

• Decision Date: 04 December 1967
• Citation: 208 Va. 370,157 S.E.2d 907
• Parties: Ronald Louis JONES v. COMMONWEALTH of Virginia (two cases).
• Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Page 907

157 S.E.2d 907

208 Va. 370

Ronald Louis JONES v. COMMONWEALTH of Virginia (two cases).

Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia.

Dec. 4, 1967.

Stanley E. Sacks, Norfolk, (Herman A. Sacks, Sacks, Sacks & Kendall, Norfolk, on brief), for plaintiff in error.

A. R. Woodroof, Asst. Atty. Gen., (Robert Y. Button, Atty. Gen., on brief), for defendant in error.

Before EGGLESTON, C.J., and BUCHANAN, SNEAD, I'ANSON and GORDON, JJ.

EGGLESTON, Chief Justice.

At the March, 1966 term of the lower court separate indictments were found against Ronald Louis Jones. Indictment No. 1 charged that he 'feloniously and burglariously did break and enter the dwelling house of one Bessie F. Brown * * * with intent then and there in said dwelling house feloniously and burglariously to commit robbery.' Indictment No. 2 charged that he 'on and upon one Bessie F. Brown * * * feloniously did make an assault, and by partial strangulation and by suffocation, and by striking and beating, and by other violence to the person of the said Bessie F. Brown, did feloniously attempt to commit the crime of robbery * * * with intent when and there by the means aforesaid, the goods, chattels and moneys of the said Bessie F. Brown, from the person, presence, custody and control and against the will of the said Bessie F. Brown, then and there feloniously and violently to steal, take and carry away.'

Upon arraignment the defendant pleaded not guilty to each of the indictments. By consent of the parties and with the concurrence of the trial court a jury was waived and the two cases were heard together by the court. At the conclusion of the Commonwealth's evidence, and the conclusion of all of the evidence, the defendant, by counsel, moved to strike the Commonwealth's evidence on the ground of its insufficiency to sustain his conviction. These motions were overruled and the court found 'the defendant guilty of burglary as charged in Indictment numbered One and guilty of attempt to commit robbery as charged in Indictment numbered Two.' After consideration of a probation report a single judgment order was entered sentencing the defendant to confinement in the penitentiary for a term of five years on Indictment No. 1 and one year on Indictment No. 2, the sentences to run consecutively, subject to a credit for time spent in jail awaiting trial.

On appeal the defendant contends that (1) the evidence was insufficients to sustain the conviction under either indictment, and (2) he could not be found guilty and punished under both indictments, because, he says, the alleged breaking and entering the dwelling house of Bessie F. Brown in the nighttime with the intent to rob her and the alleged attempted robbery were 'one continuous act' and constituted a single offense for which only one penalty may be imposed.

The evidence stated in the light most favorable to the prosecution is this: On January 27, 1966 Bessie F. Brown, an elderly woman who resided on Middle Avenue in the city of Norfolk, notified the police that she had heard that her 'house was going to be robbed' and asked for protection. Acting on this information, Detective D. C. Scott and another police officer were sent to the Brown residence. They arrived about 9:15 P.M., and Detective Scott took a position at a window in the living room where he could not be seen from the outside but could observe the street. The other officer took a position in the dining room from which he operated a radio telephone, while Mrs. Brown stood in the hall at the front door.

A few minutes later Detective Scott saw Jones and another man, later identified as Waddell Flood, walking along the street toward the Brown house. Both men walked up the steps and onto the porch. One of the men knocked on the door and said that he had a telegram for Mrs. Brown. She opened the door and on envelope was handed to her. Flood jumped through the door and grabbed her. Detective Scott immediately came to her rescue, knocked Flood down, and subdued him.

After leaving Flood in the custody of the other officer, Scott went through the front door in the effort to apprehend Jones whom he had seen standing on the porch. However, when he reached the porch Jones fled and Scott was unable to overtake him. By radio telephone Scott notified other police officers in the vicinity of Jones' escape and asked their assistance in apprehending him. Within five minutes thereafter Jones was picked up by an officer about one block from the Brown house. Jones was taken to the Brown house and was positively identified by Scott as one of the two men he had seen come onto the porch just before Flood's entrance. When searched Jones was found to be carrying on his person a straight razor in a brown leather case.

At the trial Jones denied that he was with Flood at the time of the alleged burglary and attempted robbery. He said that at the time of his apprehension he was returning home from a neighborhood restaurant. While he admitted at the trial that he was at Flood's home about two hours prior to the incident which had occurred at the Brown house, he further admitted that he had previously testified falsely in the police court that he did not know Flood and had not been with him during the day of the alleged offense.

A principal in the first degree is the actual perpetrator of the crime. A principal in the second degree, or an aider or abettor as he is sometimes termed, is one who is present, actually or constructively, assisting the perpetrator in the commission of the crime. In order to make a person a principal in the second degree actual participation in the commission of the crime is not necessary. The test is whether or not he was encouraging, inciting, or in some manner offering aid in the commission of the crime. If he was present lending countence, or otherwise aiding while another did the act, he is an aider and abettor or principal in the second degree. 1A Mich.Jur. Accomplices and Accessories §§ 3, 4, pp. 64, 65, and cases there collected.

Code § 18.1--11 (Repl.Vol.1960) provides: 'In the case of every felony, every principal in the second degree and every accessory before the fact may be indicted, tried, convicted and punished in all respects as if a principal in the first degree, * * *.'

In the present case the trial court sustained the contention of the Commonwealth that Jones, although not the actual perpetrator of the crimes of burglary and attempted robbery, was present lending countenance while Flood perpetrated the acts. The defendant admits that Detective Scott's positive identification of him warrants the court's finding that he was present at the scene. But he contends on appeal, as he did in the trial court, that such evidence merely shows that he (Jones) was present while Flood perpetrated the crimes and fails to show that he was the aider and abettor in the commission of the offenses.

It is, of course, well settled that mere presence and consent are not sufficient to constitute one an aider and abettor in the commission of a crime. 'There must be something done or said by him showing (a) his consent to the felonious purpose and (b) his contribution to its execution. To make him an aider or abettor, he must be shown to have 'procured, encouraged, countenanced, or approved' the commission of the crime. * * * To constitute one an aider and abettor, it is essential that he share the criminal intent of the principal or party who committed the offense.' 1A Mich.Jur. Accomplices and Accessories § 4, pp. 66, 67, and cases there collected.

As was said in Triplett v. Commonwealth, 141 Va. 577, 586, 127 S.E. 486, 489, 'To constitute one an aider and abettor, he must be guilty of some overt act, or he must share the criminal intent of the principal or party who commits the crime.' See also, Stone v. Commonwealth, 176 Va. 570, 576, 11 S.E.2d 728, 730, 731, and cases there cited; Foster v. Commonwealth, 179 Va. 96, 100, 18 S.E.2d 314, 316.

In the present case the evidence adduced by the Commonwealth falls short of this requirement. There is no showing of any overt act by Jones which indicated his participation in the illegal conduct of Flood. Nor is there any direct evidence that Jones shared the criminal intent of Flood. There is no evidence from either Mrs. Brown or the police officers that Jones was involved in a plot to burglarize the Brown house. There is no evidence that Mrs. Brown had any money or other valuable property at her home, or that Jones thought she had such.

The only evidence which would tend to support the inferences that Jones was acting in concert with Flood is the fact that the two men were together a short time before the incident, approached the Brown house together and walked onto the porch, and that Jones remained on the porch while Flood entered the house and attacked Mrs. Brown. But as we have frequently said, mere presence of a party when a crime is committed is not sufficient to constitute one an aider and abettor in the commission of a crime. Snyder v. Commonwealth, 202 Va. 1009, 1015, 121 S.E.2d 452, 457, and cases there cited.

At the trial below and on appeal the Commonwealth stressed the fact that Jones fled the scene when he observed that the police officer had interrupted Flood's attack on Mrs. Brown. It is true that we have said that evidence of flight to avoid arrest is admissible as tending to show consciousness of guilt on the part of the accused. Sturgis v. Commonwealth, 197 Va. 264, 268, 88 S.E.2d 919, 921; Bowie v. Commonwealth, 184 Va. 381, 392, 35 S.E.2d 345, 350, and cases there cited. But as we pointed out in Jenkins v....