Jones v. Comm'r of the Soc. Sec. Admin.
| Decision Date | 18 May 2020 |
| Docket Number | No. CV-19-02854-PHX-ESW,CV-19-02854-PHX-ESW |
| Parties | Mary Joann JONES, Plaintiff, v. COMMISSIONER OF the SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Arizona |
Mark Ross Caldwell, Mark Caldwell PC, Phoenix, AZ, for Plaintiff.
Marcelo N. Illarmo, Social Security Administration, San Francisco, CA, for Defendant.
Pending before the Court is Mary Joann Jones’ ("Plaintiff") appeal of the Social Security Administration's ("Social Security") denial of her application for disability insurance benefits. The Court has jurisdiction to decide Plaintiff's appeal pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), the Court has the power to enter, based upon the pleadings and transcript of the record, a judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security, with or without remanding the case for a rehearing. Both parties have consented to the exercise of U.S. Magistrate Judge jurisdiction. (Doc. 10).
After reviewing the Administrative Record ("A.R.") and the parties’ briefing (Docs. 15, 18, 22), the Court finds that the Administrative Law Judge's ("ALJ") decision contains harmful legal error. For the reasons explained in Section II below, the decision is reversed and the case is remanded to the Commissioner of Social Security for an immediate award of benefits.
The Social Security Act (the "Act") provides for disability insurance benefits to those who have contributed to the Social Security program and who suffer from a physical or mental disability
. 42 U.S.C. § 423(a)(1). To be eligible for benefits based on an alleged disability, the claimant must show that he or she suffers from a medically determinable physical or mental impairment that prohibits him or her from engaging in any substantial gainful activity. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). The claimant must also show that the impairment is expected to cause death or last for a continuous period of at least 12 months. Id.
To decide if a claimant is entitled to Social Security benefits, an ALJ conducts an analysis consisting of five questions, which are considered in sequential steps. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a). The claimant has the burden of proof regarding the first four steps:1
If the analysis proceeds to the final question, the burden of proof shifts to the Commissioner:2
Step Five: Can the claimant perform other work in the national economy in light of his or her age, education, and work experience? The claimant is entitled to disability benefits only if he or she is unable to perform other work. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(g). Social Security is responsible for providing evidence that demonstrates that other work exists in significant numbers in the national economy that the claimant can do, given the claimant's residual functional capacity, age, education, and work experience. Id.
The Court must affirm an ALJ's decision if it is supported by substantial evidence and is based on correct legal standards. Molina v. Astrue , 674 F.3d 1104, 1110 (9th Cir. 2012) ; Marcia v. Sullivan , 900 F.2d 172, 174 (9th Cir. 1990). Although "substantial evidence" is less than a preponderance, it is more than a "mere scintilla." Richardson v. Perales , 402 U.S. 389, 401, 91 S.Ct. 1420, 28 L.Ed.2d 842 (1971) (quoting Consolidated Edison v. NLRB , 305 U.S. 197, 229, 59 S.Ct. 206, 83 L.Ed. 126 (1938) ). It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Id.
In determining whether substantial evidence supports the ALJ's decision, the Court considers the record as a whole, weighing both the evidence that supports and detracts from the ALJ's conclusions. Reddick v. Chater , 157 F.3d 715, 720 (9th Cir. 1998) ; Tylitzki v. Shalala , 999 F.2d 1411, 1413 (9th Cir. 1993). If there is sufficient evidence to support the ALJ's determination, the Court cannot substitute its own determination. See Morgan v. Comm'r of the Social Sec. Admin. , 169 F.3d 595, 599 (9th Cir. 1999) (); Magallanes v. Bowen , 881 F.2d 747, 750 (9th Cir. 1989). This is because the ALJ, not the Court, is responsible for resolving conflicts and ambiguities in the evidence and determining credibility. Magallanes , 881 F.2d at 750 ; see also Andrews v. Shalala , 53 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 1995).
The Court also considers the harmless error doctrine when reviewing an ALJ's decision. This doctrine provides that an ALJ's decision need not be remanded or reversed if it is clear from the record that the error is "inconsequential to the ultimate nondisability determination." Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1038 (9th Cir. 2008) (citations omitted); Molina , 674 F.3d at 1115 () (citations omitted).
Plaintiff, who was born in 1962, has worked as a business owner by running her own bar. (A.R. 26, 68). In 2015, Plaintiff filed application for disability insurance benefits. (A.R. 140-41). Plaintiff's applications alleged that on February 15, 2014, Plaintiff became unable to work due to bipolar disorder
, extreme depression, and anxiety. (A.R. 68). Social Security denied the applications on April 27, 2015. (A.R. 84-87). Upon Plaintiff's request for reconsideration, Social Security affirmed the denial of benefits. (A.R. 93-95). Plaintiff sought further review by an ALJ, who conducted a hearing in November 2017. (A.R. 34-53).
In his April 26, 2018 decision, the ALJ found that Plaintiff is not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act. (A.R. 18-28). The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's request for review, making the ALJ's decision the final decision of the Social Security Commissioner. (A.R. 1-6). On May 6, 2019, Plaintiff filed a Complaint (Doc. 1) requesting judicial review and reversal of the ALJ's decision.
The ALJ determined that Plaintiff has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since February 15, 2014 (the alleged disability onset date) through December 31, 2017 (the date last insured). (A.R. 20). Neither party disputes this determination.
The ALJ found that Plaintiff has the following severe impairments: bipolar disorder /depression and anxiety. (A.R. 20). The ALJ's step two determination is undisputed.
The ALJ determined that Plaintiff does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically equals an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 of the Social Security regulations. (A.R. 21-22). Neither party disputes the ALJ's determination at this step.
The ALJ found that Plaintiff has retained the residual functional capacity ("RFC") to perform the full range of work at all exertional levels, subject to the following non-exertional limitations: Plaintiff "can understand, remember, and carry out simple and semi-skilled instructions, follow work-like procedures, and make simple work related decisions." (A.R. 22).
After considering Plaintiff's RFC, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff is unable to perform her past relevant work as a business owner. (A.R. 26). Although Plaintiff does not challenge the ALJ's determination that Plaintiff is unable perform her past work, Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ's decision does not adequately consider all work-related limitations. (Doc. 15 at 20-22).
At the final step, the ALJ found that Plaintiff is able to perform other jobs existing in significant numbers in the national economy. (A.R. 27). In making this finding, the ALJ relied on the Medical-Vocational Guidelines (the "Grids"). Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred at Step Five by relying on the Grids. (Doc. 15 at 18-20).
When evaluating a claimant's testimony regarding subjective pain or symptoms, the ALJ must engage in a two-step analysis. Vasquez v. Astrue , 572 F.3d 586, 591 (9th Cir. 2009)....
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