Jones v. Commonwealth
| Decision Date | 27 October 1942 |
| Citation | 291 Ky. 719,165 S.W.2d 566 |
| Parties | JONES v. COMMONWEALTH. |
| Court | Kentucky Court of Appeals |
Appeal from Circuit Court, Whitley County; J. C. Bird, Special Judge.
O. C Jones was convicted of larceny and knowingly receiving stolen property, and he appeals.
Judgment reversed with directions.
L. O Siler, of Williamsburg, for appellant.
Hubert Meredith, Atty. Gen., and Frank A. Logan, Asst. Atty. Gen for appellee.
Apparently without objection, O. C. Jones was tried under an indictment charging him with grand larceny and knowingly receiving stolen property. He was found guilty and his punishment fixed at three years in the penitentiary. It is conceded that the evidence was sufficient to sustain a conviction on either count. Jones is urging that the judgment be reversed because the court erroneously instructed the jury.
The instruction to which complaint is first directed follows Before one charged with knowingly receiving stolen property may be convicted of a felony, the property stolen and received must be of the value of $20 or more. KRS 433.290, 433.220 (K.S. §§ 1199, 2739g-58). While the first instruction, which had to do with the charge of grand larceny, properly referred to the value of the stolen article, this would not cure the defect in Instruction No. III, because the jury may have concluded that Jones was not guilty under the first count, but was under the second, which also charged the commission of a felony. It was held expressly in Botnick v. Commonwealth, 266 Ky. 419, 99 S.W.2d 188, that an instruction authorizing a conviction of a felony, without regard to the value of the property received, was erroneous.
The last sentence of KRS 433.290 (K.S. § 1199) provides "The possession by any person of any stolen property shall be prima facie evidence of his guilt under this section." Instruction No. 7 follows: "The possession of any stolen goods, under the law, shall be prima facie evidence of the guilt of the one accused." Jones insists that this instruction virtually...
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Marcum v. Com.
...was reversed for the same reasons as expressed in Botnick. 1 In a knowingly-receiving-stolen-property case, Jones v. Commonwealth, 291 Ky. 719, 165 S.W.2d 566 (1942), Botnick and Mabe were again To refute Marcum's argument of error in the instructions, the Commonwealth cites State v. Myers,......
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Wells v. Com.
...evidentiary presumption of guilty knowledge which arises from the possession of recently stolen moveable property. Jones v. Commonwealth, 291 Ky. 719, 165 S.W.2d 566 (1942); Botnick v. Commonwealth, 266 Ky. 419, 99 S.W.2d 188 (1936). The arguments of the Commonwealth do not persuade us to e......
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Morgan v. Shirley, 89-5992
...v. Commonwealth, 266 Ky. 419, 99 S.W.2d 188 (1936), Mabe v. Commonwealth, 279 Ky. 432, 130 S.W.2d 805 (1939), Jones v. Commonwealth, 291 Ky. 719, 165 S.W.2d 566 (1942), and Marcum v. Kentucky, 483 S.W.2d 122 (Ky.1972), the jury charge included no comment on the weight or effect of any porti......
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Com. v. Collins
...all the evidence. See Commentary to Palmore and Cooper, Kentucky Instructions to Juries, 4th ed., Section 7.59, Jones v. Commonwealth, Ky., 291 Ky. 719, 165 S.W.2d 566 (1942); Mason v. Commonwealth, Ky., 565 S.W.2d 140 (1978); and Wells v. Commonwealth, Ky., 561 S.W.2d 85 (1978); State v. M......