Jones v. Consolidated Freightways Corp. of Delaware

• Decision Date: 12 November 1985
• Docket Number: No. 17,No. 83-2126,17,83-2126
• Parties: 120 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3286, 103 Lab.Cas. P 11,697 David D. JONES, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CONSOLIDATED FREIGHTWAYS CORPORATION OF DELAWARE, a Delaware corporation; Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers Local; and Western Conference of Teamsters, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit

Page 1458

776 F.2d 1458

120 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3286, 103 Lab.Cas. P 11,697

David D. JONES, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CONSOLIDATED FREIGHTWAYS CORPORATION OF DELAWARE, a Delaware corporation; Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers Local No. 17; and Western Conference of Teamsters Defendants-Appellees.

No. 83-2126.

United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit.

Nov. 12, 1985.

Barry D. Roseman, Denver, Colo., for plaintiff-appellant.

Walter V. Siebert of Sherman & Howard, Denver, Colo., for defendant-appellee Consolidated Freightways Corp., and John A. Criswell of Criswell, Patterson & Myles, Englewood, Colo., for defendant-appellee Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, Local 17.

Before HOLLOWAY, Chief Judge, SEYMOUR, Circuit Judge, and BOHANON, District Judge. ^*

SEYMOUR, Circuit Judge.

The question in this case is whether the decision in DelCostello v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 103 S.Ct. 2281, 76 L.Ed.2d 476 (1983), should be applied retroactively. ¹ We hold that it should not under the circumstances of this case.

I.

David D. Jones was employed as a warehouseman by Consolidated Freightways Corporation in Denver, Colorado. The terms and conditions of his employment were governed by a collective bargaining agreement between Consolidated Freightways and Local No. 17 of the Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers. Jones was discharged on August 15, 1980. On November 5, his discharge was upheld by a committee of employer and union representatives. Twenty months later, Jones filed this action under section 301 of the National Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. Sec. 185 (1982) (NLMRA), claiming (1) that Consolidated Freightways had breached the collective bargaining agreement in discharging him, and (2) that Local No. 17 and the Western Conference of Teamsters had breached their duty of fair representation in handling his grievance against the company. Defendants moved for summary judgment on the ground that the action was time barred. In denying their motion, the district court ruled that the case was governed by a Colorado statute mandating a limitations period of at least two years for any suit brought under a federal statute. Three months later, in DelCostello, the Supreme Court held that the six-month statute of limitations contained in section 10(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. Sec. 160(b) (1982) (NLRA), was to govern all section 301 actions against both employer and union. The district court subsequently reconsidered its original decision, determined that DelCostello should be applied retroactively, and dismissed the complaint. Jones then appealed.

II.

In United Steelworkers of America v. Flowers, the case consolidated with DelCostello, the Court applied section 10(b) to bar Flowers' claim, thereby giving retroactive effect to the newly-minted limitations period. The preliminary question thus arises whether the DelCostello Court implicitly determined that its ruling is to be applied retroactively in pending cases as well. ²

The Supreme Court generally restricts its review to questions fairly presented in the petition for certiorari. Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 440 U.S. 391, 398, 99 S.Ct. 1171, 1175, 59 L.Ed.2d 401 (1979). Exceptions are well-recognized and have been limited thus far to cases involving questions of subject matter jurisdiction, plain error, or significant matters of federal judicial administration. See National Association of Broadcasters v. Federal Communications Commission, 554 F.2d 1118, 1124 n. 15 (D.C.Cir.1976). Moreover, when the Court has decided a question which was not raised by the parties, "it has invariably done so explicitly." Id. (emphasis in original) (reviewing cases).

In DelCostello, the issue of retroactivity was not raised in the petitions for certiorari; it was apparently neither briefed nor argued by the parties; and it was not explicitly considered or mentioned by the Court. Therefore, to conclude that the issue has been resolved definitively would be premature. Smith v. General Motors Corp., 747 F.2d 372, 376 (6th Cir.1984) (en banc) (Merritt, J., concurring specially); accord, Zemonick v. Consolidation Coal Co., 762 F.2d 381 (4th Cir.1985); cf. United States v. Stewart, 650 F.2d 178, 179-80 (9th Cir.1981) (retroactivity of search and seizure decision).

III.

Three factors are relevant to the nonretroactive application of judicial decisions: (1) whether the decision establishes "a new principle of law, either by overruling clear past precedent on which litigants may have relied ... or by deciding an issue of first impression whose resolution was not clearly foreshadowed"; (2) whether retroactivity would advance or contravene the decision's underlying purpose(s); and (3) whether retroactive application could result in substantial inequity. Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 106-07, 92 S.Ct. 349, 355-56, 30 L.Ed.2d 296 (1971). "This 'approach has consistently been utilized where changes in statutes of limitations or other aspects of the timeliness of a claim are at issue.' " Jackson v. City of Bloomfield, 731 F.2d 652, 654 (10th Cir.1984) (en banc) (quoting Occhino v. United States, 686 F.2d 1302, 1308 n. 7 (8th Cir.1982)).

A proper assessment under Chevron Oil focuses upon the relative significance of the individual Chevron factors. It is not necessary that each factor compel prospective application. See id. at 655; see also Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701, 706, 89 S.Ct. 1897, 1900, 23 L.Ed.2d 647 (1969); England v. State Board of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 422, 84 S.Ct. 461, 468, 11 L.Ed.2d 440 (1964). While nonretroactivity generally depends upon the existence of clear past precedent, Cash v. Califano, 621 F.2d 626, 629 (4th Cir.1980), "the final determination involves pulling together the three factors for a careful balancing." Id.; see also Jackson, 731 F.2d at 655.

A.

Jones relies upon a Colorado statute which mandates a limitations period of not less than two years for actions brought under federal statutes. See Colo.Rev.Stat. Sec. 13-80-106 (1973). ³ Since actions under section 301 of the NLMRA are created and governed by federal law, Textile Workers of America v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 77 S.Ct. 912, 1 L.Ed.2d 972 (1957), the language of the Colorado statute would clearly encompass Jones' claim.

Before the filing of this action, decisions in the Tenth Circuit consistently had confirmed that section 13-80-106 governs actions brought under federal statutes where state law is construed as the source of an appropriate limitations period. See, e.g., Denny v. Hutchinson Sales Corp., 649 F.2d 816, 820 (10th Cir.1981) (civil rights action); Zuniga v. AMFAC Foods, Inc., 580 F.2d 380, 384-85 (10th Cir.1978) (same) (citing cases), overruled on other grounds by Garcia v. Wilson, 731 F.2d 640 (10th Cir.1984) (en banc); Ohio v. Peterson, Lowry, Rall, Barber & Ross, 472 F.Supp. 402, 405 (D.Colo.1979) (securities case), aff'd on other grounds, 651 F.2d 687 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 895, 102 S.Ct. 392, 70 L.Ed.2d 209 (1981); Carpenters & Millwrights Health Benefit Trust Fund v. Domestic Insulation Co., 387 F.Supp. 144, 148 (D.Colo.1975) (Sec. 301 action by employee trust). ⁴ These cases reason that section 13-80-106 creates "a presumptive two year limitations period" in the case of federal actions, subject only to the priority of any longer period "specified for comparable actions arising under state law." Ohio v. Peterson, 472 F.Supp. at 405; see also Zuniga, 580 F.2d at 385. "Under no circumstances is the applicable statute of limitations less than two years." Denny, 649 F.2d at 820. Although none of the cited cases specifically concerned a hybrid action under section 301, the district court in this case did not hesitate to apply section 13-80-106 prior to the Supreme Court's decision in DelCostello. ⁵

Considering the clear language of the two-year statute, the broad range and reasoning of the cases applying it, and the absence of cases in this circuit employing a contrary analysis, we conclude that clear past precedent existed upon which Colorado litigants could reasonably have relied. ⁶ See Marino v. Bowers, 657 F.2d 1363, 1367 (3d Cir.1981).

Federal decisions prior to DelCostello confirm that Jones could justifiably have relied upon state law as the source of an appropriate limitations period. The seminal case of United Auto Workers v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 86 S.Ct. 1107, 16 L.Ed.2d 192 (1966), held that federal courts should apply the most analogous state statute to section 301 suits involving claims by an employee against an employer. The Court reserved the question whether other types of section 301 actions might necessitate different rules of timeliness. Id. at 705 n. 7, 86 S.Ct. at 1113 n. 7. After Hoosier Cardinal was decided, the circuits consistently relied upon state law as the source of appropriate limitations periods for hybrid actions against both employer and union. See Perez v. Dana Corp., 718 F.2d 581, 586 (3d Cir.1983) (reviewing cases). Despite the Supreme Court's intimation that a different standard might apply, and notwithstanding sharp division over which state statutes should apply, the circuits adhered to the approach of consulting state law.

The subsequent case of United Parcel Service, Inc. v. Mitchell, 451 U.S. 56, 101 S.Ct. 1559, 67 L.Ed.2d 732 (1981), did not mandate or otherwise prompt any change in prevailing practice among the circuits. ⁷ In choosing which of two state limitations periods should govern a section 301 action against an employer, the Mitchell Court specifically reserved the question whether the statute of limitations contained in section 10(b) of the NLRA ought to apply to hybrid claims. Id. at 60 n. 2, 101 S.Ct. at 1562 n. 2. The concurring opinions of Justices Stewart, id. at 65-71, 101 S.Ct. at 1565-68, and Blackmun, id. at 65, 101...