Jones v. Crothall Laundry

• Decision Date: 12 February 2019
• Docket Number: Record No. 1070-18-4
• Citation: 823 S.E.2d 37,69 Va.App. 767
• Court: Virginia Court of Appeals
• Parties: Andre JONES v. CROTHALL LAUNDRY and New Hampshire Insurance Company

69 Va.App. 767

823 S.E.2d 37

Andre JONES

v.CROTHALL LAUNDRY and New Hampshire Insurance Company

Record No. 1070-18-4

Court of Appeals of Virginia, Alexandria.

FEBRUARY 12, 2019

Casey Duchesne (ChasenBoscolo Injury Lawyers, on brief), for appellant.

Charles F. Midkiff (Brendan C. Horgan ; Midkiff, Muncie & Ross, P.C., on brief), Richmond, for appellees.

Present: Chief Judge Decker, Judges Humphreys and Huff

OPINION BY CHIEF JUDGE MARLA GRAFF DECKER

Andre Jones (the claimant) appeals the Workers' Compensation Commission's decision denying his claim for benefits. He argues that the Commission erred by finding that his injury was caused by his violation of a known safety rule and that the rule was enforced by Crothall Laundry (the employer). For the following reasons, we determine that credible evidence supports the Commission's finding that the claimant's act of entering the employer's machinery area without using the gate, which would have deactivated the equipment, proximately caused his injury. In addition, the Commission did not err in concluding that the employer enforced the safety rule. Consequently, we affirm the Commission's decision.

I. BACKGROUND¹

On October 14, 2017, the claimant worked as a "team leader" for the employer, a commercial laundry facility operator. That day, he entered a fenced area in which laundry was processed in order to move some mops. As the claimant did so, a piece of moving machinery pinned his leg against a conveyor belt. He suffered a serious leg injury as a result.

The claimant sought medical and disability benefits for his injury. The employer defended against the claim based on the claimant's alleged failure to follow a safety rule.

At the evidentiary hearing, the deputy commissioner considered the claimant's deposition and live testimony. The claimant explained that the area in which he received his injury was surrounded by a chain link fence. He acknowledged that employees were supposed to enter the area through the interlock gate in the fence. According to the claimant, the gate was designed to deactivate the machinery in the interior area when opened. The claimant affirmed that he knew that this particular safety rule existed and was enforced. Nevertheless, on the day of his injury, the claimant bypassed the gate and entered the area with the machinery through a separate opening in the fence without deactivating the equipment. The entire sequence of events was recorded on a video that was entered into evidence.

There was some evidence that employees did not always enter the fenced area through the gate. Nelson Gonzales, a "[t]unnel operator" for the employer and coworker of the claimant, testified that he had seen other unnamed employees entering the fenced area by circumventing the gate. Gonzales said that he had observed such actions in the presence of supervisors. However, he had never reported the safety rule violations to his supervisor.

The claimant explained that opening the gate at times failed to deactivate the machines but he believed the gate was working properly on the day of his injury.² He said that both a button and a kick plate inside the fenced area would also stop the machinery when pressed. According to the claimant, he attempted to press them but did not manage to deactivate the equipment before his injury. These alleged actions are not observable on the video of his entry into the fenced area and the resulting accident.

Two managers testified regarding the enforcement of the safety rule at issue in this case. Christopher Hallow,³ a general manager for the employer, stated that an employee who entered the fenced area without opening the gate to de-energize the equipment first would be terminated. Hallow explained that three months before the accident, he had given a verbal warning to other workers whom he overheard discussing the possibility of entering the fenced area without opening the gate. Further, he testified that he was not "aware that anybody was" entering the fenced area without using the gate. Carlos Gordon, a production manager for the employer, confirmed that the company enforced the safety rule that employees must enter the fenced area only through the interlock gate.

After hearing the case, the deputy commissioner found that the employer proved that the claimant violated a known safety rule and that such conduct was the proximate cause of his injury. Noting some inconsistencies in the claimant's testimony, the deputy commissioner also concluded that the employer enforced the known safety rule. He reasoned that consequently the claimant was not entitled to benefits.

The claimant requested review by the Commission. The Commission unanimously affirmed the decision of the deputy commissioner. It concluded that the claimant's violation of a known safety rule was the proximate cause of his injury. The Commission also credited the evidence that the rule was enforced.

II. ANALYSIS

The claimant appeals the Commission's denial of benefits. He argues that the Commission erred in denying his claim for benefits because the employer did not meet its burden to establish the defense that he violated a known safety rule.

As the appellant in this case, the claimant bears the "burden of showing" that the Commission committed "reversible error." See Burke v. Catawba Hosp., 59 Va. App. 828, 838, 722 S.E.2d 684 (2012). Further, this Court defers to the Commission in its role as fact finder. Vital Link, Inc. v. Hope, 69 Va. App. 43, 53, 814 S.E.2d 537 (2018). In our analysis, the Commission's factual findings are " ‘conclusive and binding’ " if "supported by credible evidence." Layne v. Crist Elec. Contractor, Inc., 64 Va. App. 342, 350, 768 S.E.2d 261 (2015) (quoting Mills v. Va. Elec. & Power Co., 197 Va. 547, 551, 90 S.E.2d 124 (1955) ). This principle applies "even [if] there is evidence in the record to support a contrary finding." City of Waynesboro v. Griffin, 51 Va. App. 308, 317, 657 S.E.2d 782 (2008) (quoting Morris v. Badger Powhatan/Figgie Int'l, Inc., 3 Va. App. 276, 279, 348 S.E.2d 876 (1986) ). The appellate court simply does not "retry the facts, reweigh ... the evidence, or make [its] own determination of the credibility of the witnesses." Layne, 64 Va. App. at 345, 768 S.E.2d 261 (quoting McKellar v. Northrop Grumman Shipbuilding Inc., 63 Va. App. 448, 451, 758 S.E.2d 104 (2014) ).

An employee seeking workers' compensation benefits must prove an injury (1) "caused by an accident," (2) arising out of and (3) "sustained in the course of the employment." Rush v. Univ. of Va. Health Sys., 64 Va. App. 550, 555-56, 769 S.E.2d 717 (2015) (quoting Southland Corp. v. Parson, 1 Va. App. 281, 284, 338 S.E.2d 162 (1985) ); see Code § 65.2-101 (defining "employee" and "injury"). The standard of proof is a preponderance of the evidence. Rush, 64 Va. App. at 556, 769 S.E.2d 717.

If the employee meets this burden, the employer can present certain defenses to defeat the claim. See Layne, 64 Va. App. at 349, 768 S.E.2d 261 (noting that the employer bears the burden of proving the elements of a defense under Code § 65.2-306(A) ). In pertinent part, Code § 65.2-306(A) provides that an employee is not entitled to workers' compensation benefits for an injury "caused by" the employee's "willful breach of any reasonable rule ... adopted by the employer and brought, prior to the accident, to the knowledge of the employee." Review of the Commission's decision on the willful breach defense presents a mixed question of law and fact. Mouhssine v. Crystal City Laundry, 62 Va. App. 65, 73, 741 S.E.2d 804 (2013).

To prevail on the defense of a willful breach of a safety rule, the employer must prove that the rule was "reasonable," that it was "known to the employee," and that it was for the employee's benefit. Layne, 64 Va. App. at 349-50, 768 S.E.2d 261 (quoting Owens Brockway v. Easter, 20 Va. App. 268, 271, 456 S.E.2d 159 (1995) ). Additionally, the employer must establish that "the employee intentionally undertook the forbidden act" and that the breach of the relevant rule proximately caused the injury. See id. at 350, 768 S.E.2d 261 (quoting Owens Brockway, 20 Va. App. at 271, 456 S.E.2d 159 ). Finally, the Commission must consider whether the employer enforced the safety rule. Mouhssine, 62 Va. App. at 72-73, 741 S.E.2d 804. An employer's "[h]abitual disregard of the rule" is a basis for rejecting the defense that an employee willfully breached that safety rule. Id. at 73, 741 S.E.2d 804 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Peanut City Iron & Metal Co. v. Jenkins, 207 Va. 399, 404, 150 S.E.2d 120 (1966) ).

Here, the claimant challenges only the Commission's conclusions that his breach of the safety rule was the proximate cause of his injury and that the employer enforced the rule at issue.⁴

A. Proximate Cause of the Injury

Whether the breach of a safety rule proximately caused the injury is a question of fact on which we defer to the Commission. See Owens Brockway, 20 Va. App. at 272, 456 S.E.2d 159 ; Layne, 64 Va. App. at 350, 768 S.E.2d 261. It may be established through direct or circumstantial evidence. Turf Care, Inc. v. Henson, 51 Va. App. 318, 325, 657 S.E.2d 787 (2008) (explaining that circumstantial evidence "is entitled to as much weight as direct evidence, provided it is sufficiently convincing" (quoting Basement Waterproofing & Drainage v. Beland, 43 Va. App. 352, 357, 597 S.E.2d 286 (2004) )).

"Proximate cause ‘is that act or omission which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by an ... intervening cause, produces the event, and without which that event would not have occurred.’ " Office of the Comptroller v. Barker, 275 Va. 529, 539, 659 S.E.2d 502 (2008) (quoting Doherty v. Aleck, 273 Va. 421, 428, 641 S.E.2d 93 (2007) ). The law recognizes that "[t]here may be more than one proximate cause of an event." Westlake Props., Inc. v. Westlake Pointe Prop. Owners Ass'n, Inc., 273 Va. 107, 125, 639 S.E.2d 257 (2007) (quoting Molchon v. Tyler, 262 Va. 175, 182, 546 S.E.2d...