Jones v. Detroit Med. Ctr.

• Decision Date: 20 May 2010
• Docket Number: Docket No. 288710.
• Citation: 794 N.W.2d 55,288 Mich.App. 466
• Parties: JONESv.DETROIT MEDICAL CENTER and Sinai–Grace Hospital.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

288 Mich.App. 466

794 N.W.2d 55

JONES

v.DETROIT MEDICAL CENTER and Sinai–Grace Hospital.

Docket No. 288710.

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Submitted March 2, 2010, at Detroit.Decided May 20, 2010, at 9:00 a.m.

Fieger, Fieger, Kenney, Johnson & Giroux, P.C., Southfield (by Victor S. Valenti and Thomas M. Lizza), for Trenda, Booker T., and Margaret A. Jones.Tanoury, Nauts, McKinney & Garbarino, P.L.L.C. (by Linda M. Garbarino and Anita Comorski, Detroit), for Detroit Medical Center and Sinai–Grace Hospital.Saurbier & Siegan, P.C., St. Clair Shores (by Debbie K. Taylor), for Danny F. Watson, M.D., and William M. Leuchter, P.C.Before: HOEKSTRA, P.J. and BECKERING and SHAPIRO, JJ.SHAPIRO, J.

This medical malpractice case returns to this Court a second time, this time for defendants' appeal by leave granted of the trial court's grant of partial summary disposition in favor of plaintiffs on the element of proximate cause. We affirm.

I. SUMMARY OF FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS

On September 23, 1999, the decedent, Jamar Jones,¹ was involved in a single-vehicle rollover accident in which he suffered contusions and lacerations. Jamar was transported to the emergency room at defendants Detroit Medical Center/Sinai–Grace Hospital (the hospital) for treatment. Jamar was referred to defendant Danny F. Watson, M.D., a neurologist, who saw Jamar in the emergency room on September 24, 1999. According to Watson's notes, Jamar could not recall how the accident had occurred, and Jamar stated that over the last few months “family members had told him that on approximately three occasions, he was seen staring blankly and that he was not easily aroused from these spells.” On the basis of this information, Watson concluded that Jamar had “[p]robable partial complex seizure disorder” and prescribed Tegretol, an anticonvulsant. Watson also ordered an electroencephalogram (EEG), which was performed the same day and was reported as normal.

Jamar had the prescription filled with carbamazepine, a generic form of Tegretol,² and began taking the medication as prescribed. A subsequent EEG was performed by Watson on October 8, 1999, which, like the first EEG, was reported as normal. However, Watson concluded that he “cannot exclude a seizure disorder” and continued Jamar on the anticonvulsant.

Jamar began to experience a sore throat and had trouble swallowing food around October 9, 1999. On October 11, 1999, Jamar awoke with bloodshot eyes. His father, Booker T. Jones, drove Jamar to work, but returned about an hour later to pick Jamar up because Jamar told his father that he was unable to see. Jamar began to develop a rash and blisters on his face and upper body. Booker took Jamar to the hospital emergency room on October 12, 1999, where Jamar reported the sore throat, inability to eat due to pain, and swollen lips and mouth. Jamar also had a fever.

The hospital kept Jamar overnight and, on October 13, 1999, transferred him to the burn unit at Detroit Receiving Hospital. Doctors there determined that Jamar was suffering a rare allergic reaction to the anticonvulsant and diagnosed him as having Stevens–Johnson syndrome resulting from that reaction. Stevens–Johnson syndrome is a life-threatening dermatological condition in which the top layer of skin dies and is shed. Jamar died of Stevens–Johnson syndrome, complicated by pneumonia, on October 21, 1999.

On August 19, 2003, plaintiffs filed their complaint alleging, among other things, that Watson was negligent for prescribing carbamazepine, given the lack of a sufficient basis to diagnose a seizure disorder, and that Watson failed to advise Jamar of the possibility of an allergic reaction to the medication, of the warning signs of such a reaction, and of the need to obtain immediate medical intervention should such occur. Plaintiffs also filed claims against the hospital and defendant William M. Leuchter, P.C., based on vicarious liability for Watson's alleged malpractice. Attached to their complaint, plaintiffs provided an affidavit of merit from Dr. Jon Glass, in which he opined that Watson breached the standard of care in the two respects just described.

Plaintiffs requested summary disposition on the issue of cause in fact, arguing that there was no dispute that the carbamazepine was the cause in fact of Jamar's developing Stevens–Johnson syndrome. The trial court granted the motion and that order is not at issue in this appeal. In the same motion, plaintiffs also requested summary disposition on the issue of proximate causation. The trial court took that motion under advisement, but before the trial court issued any ruling, defendants moved for summary disposition, arguing that the statute of limitations barred the suit and that the affidavit of plaintiffs' expert had been improperly notarized. The trial court denied the motion, and defendants appealed. This Court reversed the order denying the motion and remanded the case to the trial court. Jones v. Detroit Med. Ctr., unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued January 4, 2007 (Docket Nos. 262343, 262347, and 263259), 2007 WL 28376. Our Supreme Court, in lieu of granting leave to appeal, reversed this Court's opinion, reinstated the trial court's order denying the motion, and remanded the case to the trial court. Jones v. Detroit Med. Ctr., 480 Mich. 980, 741 N.W.2d 843 (2007).

On remand, plaintiffs renewed their motion for partial summary disposition as to proximate causation. Defendants filed a countermotion, arguing that they were entitled to summary disposition as to proximate causation. The trial court concluded:

All the experts here indicated that it's a very rare—Stevens-Johnson Syndrome is a very rare but known reaction to—to this drug in certain people. And, apparently, those people can't be identified prior to the taking of the medication.

The argument here by the—by the defense is that this is not foreseeable. Stevens–Johnson's [sic] is not a foreseeable result of—of taking this medication in that it is so rare, one in a million. I guess, there's been some testimony, you know, from one to one hundred thousand to one in a million people that take this medication would—would develop Stevens–Johnson Syndrome.

And that to agree with the plaintiff would be somehow to impose strict liability in—in prescribing this particular medication.

* * *

... The focus by the defense is Stevens–Johnson Syndrom[e] and the fact that it's rare and unpredictable.

But other not so rare and unpredictable results and—and injuries may result from the use of this medication.

And it's the argument here by the plaintiff that the misdiagnosis and the misprescription of this violated the standard of care and the person wouldn't—the plaintiff [sic] here wouldn't otherwise, have taken this medication. But for the—the negligence and the breach of the standard of care by the defendants.

And, therefore, it was foreseeable that an injury could result. The injury, perhaps, being bloodshot eyes, swelling of the lips, which happened. Other swelling. Some rash, which is much more common, indicated by all the doctors.

And because of his eggshell condition or pre-existing susceptibility to this type of Stevens–Johnson Syndrome that their—that the defendants ought to be responsible under the eggshell plaintiff theory.

And, frankly, it seems to fit in this case. The issue being, you know, whether the prescription was or this medication was appropriate. Whether there was, in fact, negligence.

* * *

[C]ertainly, the argument by the defense that the case ought to be dismissed ... would be denied on the basis that—that injury was foreseeable.

* * *

... I—I think the order is then the issue that will be tried in this case is one of whether or not there was a breach in the standard of care in—in—in prescribing this medication.

The trial court then stayed the case to permit defendants to pursue this issue on appeal. The hospital again sought leave to appeal, which this Court granted on December 30, 2008, in an unpublished order (Docket No. 288710). Watson and Leuchter timely filed their cross-appeal.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review de novo a court's determination of a motion for summary disposition. Ormsby v. Capital Welding, Inc., 471 Mich. 45, 52, 684 N.W.2d 320 (2004). Because the parties and the trial court relied on matters outside the pleadings when arguing and deciding, respectively, the motion for summary disposition, we review under the rules applicable to MCR 2.116(C)(10). Silberstein v. Pro–Golf of America, Inc., 278 Mich.App. 446, 457, 750 N.W.2d 615 (2008). When reviewing a motion brought under MCR 2.116(C)(10), the court considers the affidavits, depositions, pleadings, admissions, and other evidence submitted by the parties in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Rose v. Nat'l Auction Group, 466 Mich. 453, 461, 646 N.W.2d 455 (2002). Summary disposition is appropriate if there is no genuine issue regarding any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id.

III. ANALYSIS

The sole question before this Court is whether the trial court properly ruled on the issue of proximate cause. On the basis of our review de novo of the evidence, we conclude that it did.

Generally, proximate cause is a factual question for the jury. Nichols v. Dobler, 253 Mich.App. 530, 532, 655 N.W.2d 787 (2002). However, “[w]hen the facts bearing upon proximate cause are not in dispute and reasonable persons could not differ about the application of the legal concept of proximate cause to those facts, the court determines the issue.” Paddock v. Tuscola & S.B.R. Co., Inc., 225 Mich.App. 526, 537, 571 N.W.2d 564 (1997). Here, the trial court has already decided the cause in fact and defendants have not appealed that ruling, and the facts bearing on proximate cause are not in dispute. Thus, it was proper for the trial court to determine proximate causation as a matter of law if it found that reasonable minds...