Jones v. Dupage Cnty. Sheriff's Office
| Citation | 529 F.Supp.3d 867 |
| Decision Date | 29 March 2021 |
| Docket Number | Case No.: 17-cv-1076 |
| Parties | Trinia JONES, Individually and as Independent Administrator of the Estate of Trevon Johnson, a Minor, Deceased, Plaintiff, v. DUPAGE COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois |
Larry R. Rogers, Jr., Powers, Rogers, LLP, Chicago, IL, for Plaintiff.
Gregory E. Vaci, Joseph A. Ruggiero, Lisa Ann Smith, William R. Roberts, Nicholas Vincent Alfonso, DuPage County State's Attorneys Office, Civil Division, Wheaton, IL, for Defendant DuPage County Sheriff's Office.
Gregory E. Vaci, Nicholas Vincent Alfonso, DuPage County State's Attorneys Office, Civil Division, Wheaton, IL, for Defendant Deputy Scott Kuschell.
On the night of New Year's Day 2017, DuPage County sheriff's deputy and defendant Scott Kuschell ("Kuschell") was dispatched to a residence in unincorporated Villa Park, Illinois, to respond to multiple 911 calls reporting a "domestic incident" that had escalated to a physical fight between 17-year-old Trevon Johnson ("Johnson") and his 23-year-old sister Ricquia Jones ("Ricquia"). See Pl.’s Resp. to Defs.’ [sic] R. 56.1 Stmt. Facts & Pl.’s Stmt. Add'l Facts ("RSOF") ¶¶ 6-7, 10-12, ECF No. 71; R. Jones Dep. 6:1-4, ECF No. 78, Pl.’s Ex. C (Ricquia Jones's date of birth). As discussed below, many of the material facts surrounding what happened that night are disputed. This much is not disputed: Kuschell entered the home, Ricquia yelled to Kuschell that Johnson was upstairs and stated that she wanted him to be arrested, and Kuschell called to Johnson, who was upstairs in his grandmother's bedroom, and told him to come downstairs.
See RSOF ¶¶ 15-16, 18, 22, 24-27, 32; Def. Kuschell's Resp. to Pl.’s R. 56.1 Stmt. Add'l Facts ("RSAF") ¶¶ 12, 16, 20, ECF No. 98. While the exact position of Kuschell's body at this point is disputed, all witnesses agree that he was standing just inside the front door at the foot of the stairs to the second floor. See RSOF ¶ 46, RSAF ¶ 25. As Johnson began to descend the stairs, Kuschell fired his service weapon at Johnson five times, killing him. RSOF ¶ 46.
Kuschell testified at his deposition in this case that he believed that Johnson was about to attack him with a knife. See RSOF ¶¶ 44-46. But it is undisputed that no knife matching the description of the weapon Kuschell later gave to the Illinois State Police was found. RSAF ¶ 33. And three witnesses testified at depositions in this case that Johnson made no threatening gestures and was instead walking down the stairs unarmed with his hands up, palms facing forward. See RSAF ¶ 20–26.
Johnson's mother, plaintiff Trinia Jones ("Trinia"), brought this suit individually and in her capacity as the independent administrator of Johnson's estate. See 1st Am. Compl. ("FAC") at 1, ECF No. 21. In count III of her amended complaint, plaintiff brings a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Fourth Amendment alleging that Kuschell used unreasonable and excessive force against Johnson. Counts I, II and IV, not presently at issue, assert Illinois law claims for survival, wrongful death, and infliction of emotional distress.
For the following reasons, the court denies Kuschell's motion for summary judgment because genuine disputes of fact exist material to Kuschell's qualified immunity defense.
Kuschell has filed a motion for summary judgment on plaintiff's Fourth Amendment claim, arguing that he is entitled to qualified immunity.1 See Mot. Summ. J. 2, ECF No. 62. Summary judgment is appropriate "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A genuine dispute as to any material fact exists if "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). At summary judgment, "the court has one task and one task only: to decide, based on the evidence of record, whether there is any material dispute of fact that requires a trial." Payne v. Pauley , 337 F.3d 767, 770 (7th Cir. 2003) (quoting Waldridge v. Am. Hoechst Corp. , 24 F.3d 918, 920 (7th Cir. 1994) ) (brackets omitted). The court therefore considers "all of the evidence in the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party," and draws "all reasonable inferences from that evidence in favor of the party opposing summary judgment." Donald v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 982 F.3d 451, 457 (7th Cir. 2020) (citing Dunn v. Menard, Inc. , 880 F.3d 899, 905 (7th Cir. 2018) ). The substantive law governing the claim or defense on which summary judgment is sought determines whether, and which, facts are material. Lord v. Beahm , 952 F.3d 902, 903 (7th Cir. 2020) (citing Anderson , 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505 ). Here, the substantive law of qualified immunity and Fourth Amendment law governing the use of force by police officers determines what facts are material.
Plaintiff's Fourth Amendment claim arises under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which "guarantees ‘a federal forum for claims of unconstitutional treatment at the hands of state officials.’ " Knick v. Twp. of Scott , ––– U.S. ––––, 139 S. Ct. 2162, 2167, 204 L.Ed.2d 558 (2019). At summary judgment for a § 1983 claim, the court "focuses on ‘(1) whether the conduct complained of was committed by a person acting under color of state law; and (2) whether this conduct deprived a person of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States.’ " Colbert v. City of Chicago , 851 F.3d 649, 656 (7th Cir. 2017) (quoting Armato v. Grounds , 766 F.3d 713, 719-20 (7th Cir. 2014) ). Here, there is no dispute that Kuschell acted under color of state law in his official capacity as a DuPage County sheriff's deputy. The question therefore becomes whether a reasonable jury could award money damages against Kuschell for violating the Fourth Amendment. See id.
Kuschell raises the affirmative defense of qualified immunity. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald , 457 U.S. 800, 815-18, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982) ; Rose ex rel. Estate of Williams v. Cline , 902 F.3d 643, 648 (7th Cir. 2018). Once a defendant properly raises the defense of qualified immunity, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to defeat the defense. Leiser v. Kloth , 933 F.3d 696, 701 (7th Cir. 2019) (citing Purvis v. Oest , 614 F.3d 713, 717 (7th Cir. 2010) ). To determine whether qualified immunity applies, the court asks two questions: (1) whether Kuschell violated a constitutional right; and (2) whether that "right was ‘clearly established’ at the time of the challenged conduct." Rose , 902 F.3d at 648 (quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd , 563 U.S. 731, 735, 131 S.Ct. 2074, 179 L.Ed.2d 1149 (2011) ). "A Government official's conduct violates clearly established law when, at the time of the challenged conduct, ‘[t]he contours of [a] right [are] sufficiently clear’ that every ‘reasonable official would [have understood] that what he is doing violates that right.’ " al-Kidd , 563 U.S. at 741, 131 S.Ct. 2074 (quoting Anderson v. Creighton , 483 U.S. 635, 640, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987) ) (brackets in original). Properly applied, the qualified immunity doctrine creates "breathing room for government officials to make reasonable but mistaken judgments about open legal questions." Id. at 743, 131 S.Ct. 2074. Hence qualified immunity shields "all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law." Id. (quoting Malley v. Briggs , 475 U.S. 335, 341, 106 S.Ct. 1092, 89 L.Ed.2d 271 (1986) ).
With the qualified immunity standard in mind, the court turns to the substantive constitutional right plaintiff claims was violated here. By its terms, the Fourth Amendment protects "persons" from "unreasonable" searches and seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV. A police officer's intentional use of deadly force constitutes a seizure for Fourth Amendment purposes. See Tennessee v. Garner , 471 U.S. 1, 7, 105 S.Ct. 1694, 85 L.Ed.2d 1 (1985) ; Estate of Williams v. Ind. State Police Dep't , 797 F.3d 468, 472 (7th Cir. 2015) (citing Graham v. Connor , 490 U.S. 386, 395, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989) ).
The Fourth Amendment reasonableness standard makes allowances for the realities police officers confront in their work: "[P]olice officers are often forced to make split-second judgments—in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving—about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation." Graham , 490 U.S. at 397, 109 S.Ct. 1865. The objective inquiry thus entails consideration of the "totality of the circumstances" surrounding the incident. Id. (citing Garner , 471 U.S. at 8–9, 105 S.Ct. 1694 ); Marion v. City of Corydon , 559 F.3d 700, 705 (7th Cir. 2009). "As applied to a Fourth Amendment excessive-force claim, the qualified-immunity doctrine gives ‘enhanced deference to officers’ on-scene judgments about the level of necessary force.’ " Dockery v. Blackburn , 911 F.3d 458, 466 (7th Cir. 2018) (citing Abbott v. Sangamon County , 705 F.3d 706, 725 (7th Cir. 2013) ). The Fourth Amendment reasonableness inquiry is objective in the sense that the officer's "underlying intent or motivation," good or bad, does not matter. Graham , 490 U.S. at 397, 109 S.Ct. 1865 (citation omitted). Instead, the defendant's use of force must be evaluated from the point of view of "a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight." Id. at 396, 109 S.Ct. 1865 (citing Terry v. Ohio , 392 U.S. 1, 20-22, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968) ).
Under Seventh Circuit and Supreme Court law, "it is reasonable for a law enforcement officer to use deadly force if an objectively reasonable officer in the same...
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